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Abstract
The goal of this thesis is to develop and advance the interactionist approach
to moral character in philosophy. Interactionism recognizes the important
contribution that both personal and situational factors make to character, but
places its main focus on the dynamic interaction between person and
situation. Interactionism has emerged in recent years as a promising account
of character that could provide a way forward out of the debate between virtue
ethicists and situationists. This thesis seeks to contribute to this project by
pursuing three primary goals. The first is to develop the core theoretical
framework of interactionism in greater detail by synthesizing ideas from both
psychology and philosophy. The second goal is to defend interactionism
against a number of potential objections and challenges, in particular
methodological concerns about the psychological evidence supporting
interactionism, and worries that interactionism falls prey to the CausalConstitutive Fallacy objection familiar from the philosophy of mind. The
third and final goal is to explore some implications of interactionism for other
areas of philosophy, namely for well-being and environmental virtue ethics.
Ultimately, the thesis illustrates that interactionism stands as a rich,
empirically adequate moral psychology of character that does justice to the
importance of situational and personal variables, while emphasizing the
dynamic exchanges between agent and environment. Additionally, in
demonstrating implications for other areas of philosophy, the thesis also
demonstrates the broader appeal and usefulness of interactionism, and
highlights potentially fruitful future lines of research. In developing
interactionism further, defending it from objections, and extending it into new
areas, this thesis will have made a valuable contribution to the current
literature on moral psychology and normative theory.
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Statement of Choice of Thesis by Compilation
This thesis is presented in journal article compilation style, in accordance
University of Wollongong’s thesis by compilation guidelines. All papers
presented in this thesis have been submitted for review to journals, and the
full details of each submission are provided in the list below. I have chosen
to prepare my thesis as a compilation as I wanted to investigate a variety of
topics and issues relating to interactionism, and felt that the compilation
format would better suit the breadth of topics I wanted to research than a
traditional thesis would. I am the sole author of all the papers, and all material
presented in the thesis is written by me unless otherwise referenced or
acknowledged.
Given the thesis by compilation approach, some of the key background
arguments will be discussed in a number of the papers. I have chosen to leave
the papers intact though, in order to preserve the integrity of their structures
and arguments, and in order to give the reader a clear picture of the complete
papers as they were prepared and submitted. Thus, aside from inserting some
internal references to highlight connections between the papers, the papers
are presented in the same fashion as the submitted articles.
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General Introduction
I. Introduction
The focus of this thesis is the nature of moral character and virtue, a topic of
both longstanding historical interest, and intense recent debate. My central
purpose is to argue in favour of an interactionist approach to moral character
and virtue. Interactionism, as an account of character, focuses on the dynamic
interactions between agent and situation. It recognises an important role for
the personal features of the agents, the environment features of the situation,
and the ways in which they shape and influence each other. Interactionism
has a fairly long history in psychology, but has only recently received explicit
attention and development in philosophy. These recent efforts have helped to
highlight the potential and promise of interactionism, and illustrated that it
can stand as an appealing alternative to both traditional virtue ethics, and
situationism. As this thesis will argue, there is good reason to think debates
over the nature of character in philosophy should be resolved in favour of
interactionism, just as earlier debates in psychology were similarly concluded
in interactionist terms. This thesis will ultimately seek to support
interactionism as a compelling moral psychology of character, defend it
against potential objections, and explore some of its implications for other
areas of philosophical inquiry.
The purpose of this brief introductory chapter is to set the scene for the
topic and establish the aims for the papers to follow. I will begin by laying
out the central goals and aims of the research, and by highlighting the
contribution it will make to current research. I will then sketch out some of
the relevant background on philosophical and psychological work on
character, in order to establish the state-of-play in the field, and the
foundations that the work in the thesis is built on. In the final section I will
then present an outline of the thesis that both describes the content of the
subsequent chapters, and that also highlights the connections between the
papers, and the ways in which they contribute to the overall aims of the thesis.
In doing so, I hope to illustrate the cohesiveness of this compilation of papers,
10

and how they work in unison towards accomplishing the central research goal
of advancing the interactionist approach in philosophy.

II. Research Aims
The central research question addressed by this thesis is: does interactionism
present an appealing account of moral character? The central goal of the thesis
is to develop and advance the interactionist approach to character in
philosophy, and thereby support a positive response to this research question.
In order to consider this question, and to work towards this goal, the thesis
has three main aims. The first aim is to further the development of the
interactionist position in philosophy. This will involves drawing on both
philosophy and psychology to further flesh-out the interactionist account of
character. It will also involve highlighting the advantages of interactionism,
and illustrating the need for an interactionist approach to character as a useful
way of moving on from some of the recent debates about character and virtue
in philosophy.
The second aim of the thesis is to refine the interactionist account of
character, and to address potential issues and objections. These include both
theoretical worries, such as potential metaphysical issues with the
interactionist approach, and also methodological objections, such as concerns
about the evidential basis for interactionism. In addressing such issues, I
intend to show how interactionism can overcome some prominent objections,
and thereby shore up interactionism’s foundations, and further demonstrate
its attractiveness as an account of character.
The third and final aim of the thesis is to apply the interactionist framework
to topics and questions beyond pure moral psychology, and thereby explore
some of the interesting implications of the interactionist approach. In
particular, I investigate the connections between virtue and well-being
through an interactionist lens, and also consider the implications of
interactionism for environmental virtue ethics. These two studies will serve
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as illustrative examples of the fruitful contributions that interactionism can
make to a range of philosophical topics.
Work on moral character in particular, and moral psychology in general,
has received significant attention, research, and debate in philosophy in recent
years. It has emerged as a leading area of inquiry within the discipline.
Furthermore, contemporary work in moral psychology has implications for
an array of areas, including research on health and well-being, political
philosophy, education, environmental philosophy, and legal theory. Research
on moral psychology thus has broad relevance for a range of topics, and can
contribute much to a variety of philosophical endeavours. As this thesis will
argue, interactionism holds great promise and appeal as an approach to
character, and can make an important contribution to contemporary work in
philosophical moral psychology. In developing the interactionist position,
and exploring its connections with other topics, this thesis will seek to make
a valuable contribution to contemporary work on character and virtue; a
contribution that is also relevant to research in a range of other areas.

III. Methodology
As a field of study, moral psychology “investigates the psychological
properties of moral agents,” including cognitive, affective, and motivational
capacities (Doris 2002, p. 3). Moral psychology is investigated by both
philosophers and psychologists, and has become an important research area
in both disciplines. The methodological approach of this thesis will be to
conduct research in moral psychology using the tools of analytic philosophy.
I will investigate and analyse a range of key concepts, ideas, and arguments
in moral psychology, in particular those relating to moral character and virtue.
I will also evaluate a range of competing moral psychological theories, in
order to determine if interactionism is a viable and attractive approach to the
moral psychology of character.
With moral psychology being of interest to both philosophers and
psychologists, there is also much to be gained from engagement and
collaboration between the two disciplines. Until recently, such engagement
12

was not very widespread, with philosophers and psychologists largely
keeping to their own fields. Over the last two decades though, engagement
between philosophers and psychologists has increased dramatically,
producing many positive research outcomes. At present, many philosophers
working on moral psychology recognise the benefits of engaging with
empirical evidence from psychology and other fields to inform their work.
My thesis research will aim to continue in the tradition of this recent shift
towards empirical engagement. I will draw on a range of psychological
research to support my claims, while also investigating and critiquing the use
of empirical evidence by a number of other authors. I will thus aim to conduct
my research on moral psychology in the spirit of the kind of “methodological
naturalism” discussed by Alfano (2013, pp. 4-6), as I will propose an account
of character that aims to both give the best fit with the empirical evidence,
while also doing justice to our philosophical intuitions. In doing so, I hope to
demonstrate interactionism’s advantages as an account of character, by
showing that it is both empirically adequate and theoretically appealing.

IV. Background
I now want to sketch some of the background and recent developments that
are relevant to my research. I’ll preface this background section by noting that
it is not intended to be exhaustive. The relevant background material for each
topic I consider is discussed in more detail in the papers themselves, so I will
not attempt to cover everything at this stage. Instead, I will just aim to give a
brief outline of the present theoretical terrain, in order to set up the arguments
to come in the remainder of the thesis.
As I noted at the beginning, my primary interest in this thesis is with moral
character and virtue. Philosophical interest in virtue is ancient and
multifaceted, and has received important contributions from a range of
different approaches and traditions. Rather than attempt to survey all of this
though, I will take my starting point as the revival of interest in virtue in the
latter half of the Twentieth Century. While virtue had been a topic of
significant importance in classical antiquity, by the Twentieth Century, moral
13

philosophy was primarily driven by Kantianism and Utilitarianism, and thus
more concerned with duty, obligation, and consequences, than with virtue.
During the second half of the century though, a range of philosophers,
including Anscombe (1958), Foot (1978), MacIntyre (1981), and Williams
(1985, 1993), contributed to a resurgence of interest in virtue, and virtue
ethics is now a leading topic of research within contemporary philosophy.
As Doris (2002, p. 3) notes though, this resurgence of interest in virtue
within philosophy was taking place at the same time as research in
psychology was raising serious questions about the models of virtue normally
endorsed by philosophers. A range of experimental evidence, such as
Milgram’s (1963, 1974) work on obedience, Darley and Batson’s (1973)
study on helping behaviour, and work on the “bystander effect” (Darley &
Latane 1968; Latane & Darley 1970), cast doubts on traditional models of
personality and character traits, which conceptualised traits as robustly
influential, and consistent across a variety of different situations. Such
evidence contributed to the development of the situationist approach in
psychology, which posited that the features of the situation, and not the
features of the person, were the more important drivers of behaviour.
Psychological situationists challenged the conventional focus on personality
traits in psychology, and argued in favour of a shift towards focusing on
situations.
In the 1990s, philosophers started to draw on empirical evidence and the
situationist tradition in psychology to formulate situationist arguments of
their own. Flanagan (1991) was an early source of these kinds of ideas, before
they were developed in greater detail by Doris (1998, 2002) and Harman
(1999). Doris (2002, pp. 22-23) argued against “globalist” accounts of
character, and challenged the idea that character traits were cross-situationally
consistent, although he allowed that they could be stable over time. Harman
(1999) at points put things in even stronger terms, arguing that the empirical
evidence can be taken to suggest we do not have character traits at all (at least
as they are normally conceived). Situationists developed these arguments to
present a challenge to virtue ethics, and in particular the Aristotelian approach
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to virtue ethics: if empirical evidence reveals conventional accounts of virtue
to be inaccurate, and virtue ethicists endorse such accounts, then their models
of virtue are empirically inadequate. Put in stronger terms, the psychological
realism of virtue ethics has been undermined, and it may not be practical or
even possible to become the kinds of people that virtue ethics suggests we
should aspire to be.
Virtue ethicists adopted a variety of strategies for answering this response.
Some, such as Sreenivasan (2002) and Sabini and Silver (2005), took issue
with either the evidence used by situationists, or the interpretation of that
evidence and the conclusions drawn about virtue ethics. Many took a different
approach and argued that virtue was supposed to be rare, and so the empirical
evidence illustrating the rarity of virtue did not create an issue for virtue
ethics, and should not cause us to abandon our aspirations towards virtue (see,
e.g., Miller 2003; Kamtekar 2004; Kristjansson 2008). In turn, others
responded to these arguments, and developed new situationist arguments, to
show that virtue ethics could not so easily escape this challenge unscathed
(Merritt, Doris & Harman 2010; Alfano 2013). Rather than causing a decisive
shift towards situationism, the situationist challenge has instead resulted in a
substantial debate (the character-situation debate), that has seen significant
attention and discussion, and that remains ongoing.
In addition to the contributions from both Aristotelians and situationists,
the character-situation debate has also seen the development of a range of
alternative approaches to character. In my view, the most notable of these is
interactionism, as seen in the works of philosophers such as Alfano (2013,
2016) and Skorburg (2017, 2019). Given that interactionism is the focus of
the thesis, I will have much more to say about it in the coming chapters, and
I will present its core features in Chapter 1. In addition to interactionism
though, philosophers developed other alternative proposals about the nature
of character. For example, Merritt (2000) presented a Humean approach to
virtue, and argued that social relationships and contexts make a crucial
contribution to sustaining virtue, an account that thus has some points of
overlap with interactionism. Similarly, Slingerland (2011) argued in favour
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of a Confucian approach to virtue, which included a variety of strategies for
managing situational influences. The character-situation debate is thus not
just home to two rival camps, but to an array of different positions.
Alongside

these

developments

of

alternative

approaches

like

interactionism, the debate continues to see arguments made in favour of both
situationism and traditional virtue ethics. Recent publications, such as West’s
(2018) defense of virtue ethics, and Vargy’s (2018) argument in favour of an
“embodied situationism,” illustrate the ongoing nature of the debate, and the
fact that it has not received a clear resolution. As I will argue in more detail
in Chapter 1, it is my contention that interactionism possesses the best
framework for pursuing future work on character, and for moving on from
the character-situation debate.
While the character-situation debate has been primarily concerned with the
nature of virtue and the drivers of moral behaviour, it has also branched out
into other areas, and a number of theorists have drawn on debates over
character to inform research in other areas. For example, while a lot of the
debate has concerned itself with moral character (which will also be my focus
in this thesis), others have also investigated its implications for intellectual
character and virtue epistemology. Alfano (2012, 2013) has developed
situationist arguments in relation to virtue epistemology, and the topic has
also received attention from Iizuka (2020), King (2014), and Olin and Doris
(2014). Similarly, some of those working on character, including Skorburg
(2017), Howell (2016), and Alfano and Skorburg (2016), have explored the
connections between their accounts and the E cognition literature in the
philosophy of mind (I will explore these works in more detail in Chapter 2).
Further afield, the implications of the debate have also been considered in
various areas of applied ethics, including business ethics (Solomon 2003) and
military ethics (Cartagena 2017). Finally, there has also been research on the
implications of the character-situation debate for thinking about well-being,
and for environmental ethics, which I will investigate in Chapters 4 and 5,
respectively. Research such as this shows the ability of virtue theory and
moral psychology to contribute to a range of other areas of inquiry.
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In sum, moral psychology has become a key research area in both
psychology and philosophy, and the character-situation debate has become an
influential topic within contemporary philosophy. As I have discussed in this
section, debate over the nature of character is ongoing, and research in this
area has also branched out to inform a variety of other issues and debates. It
is thus my intention in this thesis to make a useful contribution to this rich
and developing field of research.

V. Précis
Chapter 1 will begin the thesis by presenting the core features and claims of
interactionism in order to establish a framework that supports the rest of the
chapters to follow. In this chapter, I provide some further background on the
character-situation debate, before presenting overviews of interactionism in
both psychology and philosophy. Drawing on ideas from both disciplines, I
then synthesise a core set of interactionist claims in order to clarify and fleshout my account, before highlighting some of its advantages as an account of
the moral psychology of character. The final section of the chapter then
emphasises the need for interactionism in philosophy by addressing some
examples of recent work that supports either a traditional virtue ethical
approach to character, or a situationist one. I then argue against such accounts,
and in favour of interactionism being a better way forward for research on
character and virtue.
In developing a clear account of the central ideas and claims of
interactionism, Chapter 1 is the thesis chapter most concerned with meeting
the first thesis aim outlined earlier in this introduction. It seeks to clarify the
interactionist position, and to develop a core framework that informs the rest
of the chapters in the thesis. Chapter 1 also considers and counters an
objection relating to the need for interactionism, and thereby also contributes
to the second thesis aim.
Chapter 2 builds on the framework established in Chapter 1 to explore
some of the metaphysical dimensions of interactionism. In particular, the
chapter considers whether interactionism is vulnerable to the Causal17

Constitutive Fallacy (C-C Fallacy) objection that has received significant
attention in the philosophy of mind. I consider some recent work on character
that makes extension claims about virtue; that is, that under the right
circumstances, virtue can extend beyond the agent, such that external factors
partially constitute the agent’s virtue. I then note how this exposes such
accounts to the C-C Fallacy objection, before going on to argue that
interactionism does not need to make extension claims, as they do not offer
any substantial benefits to a descriptive account of moral psychology. I thus
conclude that interactionism is better off avoiding extension claims, as they
are unnecessary, and they leave the interactionist open to the C-C Fallacy
objection.
In showing how interactionism can avoid this potentially concerning
objection, Chapter 2 works towards the second aim of thesis, by both refining
my interactionist account, and dealing with potential concerns. Chapter 2 will
also make a contribution to the first aim of the thesis by introducing new ideas
and elements of interactionist theory, and thereby help to further develop the
central account.
Chapter 3 continues this trend of defending interactionism from
objections, but this time from concerns relating to the empirical evidence that
has informed interactionism. As noted earlier, psychological evidence has
been one of the primary drivers of both the situationist challenge to virtue
ethics, and also of other recent developments in virtue theory, such as the
emergence of interactionism. The so-called “replication crisis” in psychology
though, has raised doubts about psychological methodology and a range of
psychological evidence, including some of the evidence that has informed
recent philosophical work on character. Chapter 3 explores some of the
implications of this crisis for philosophical accounts of character. In this
chapter, I review some of the key issues emerging from the crisis, and survey
the evidence relating to character and virtue. Drawing on this evidence, I
argue that interactionism remains the best fit with the empirical evidence, and
the best option for pursuing future research on character. The chapter
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concludes with some more general implications of the replication crisis for
future work on moral psychology.
Like Chapter 2, Chapter 3 also primarily works towards the second aim of
the thesis. If the evidence supporting interactionism has been undermined,
then this is a very serious issue, as it could thus necessitate a drastic overhaul
of my approach. Chapter 3’s defense of interactionism from this challenge is
thus crucial for supporting the entire thesis project. Additionally, Chapter 3
also again introduces some new elements of interactionist theory, and thus
contributes to the first aim of the thesis as well.
Having now established the core account of interactionism, and defended
it from potential objections, Chapter 4 shifts gears to consider
interactionism’s broader implications, namely for thinking about the
connections between virtue and well-being. In this chapter, I consider
perfectionist accounts of well-being, and the application of the situationist
challenge to perfectionism. I then introduce interactionism, and argue that it
can defend a suitably revised perfectionism (Interactionist Perfectionism)
from the situationist challenge. This chapter thus contributes to the third main
aim of the thesis, as it explores the broader implications of interactionism,
and shows how it can make a valuable contribution to research on well-being.
Chapter 5 also explores the implications of interactionism, but this time
for environmental virtue ethics (EVE). After surveying some of the
background on EVE, I then consider the threat that situationism poses to EVE,
drawing particularly on the work of Kasperbauer (2014). I then argue that
interactionism could potentially save EVE from this challenge, before
considering Kasperbauer’s argument against such an interactionist move.
Drawing on some of the relevant empirical work, I then present arguments
against Kasperbauer’s account, and show that an interactionist EVE is able to
overcome the situationist challenge. In the final section of the paper I then
explore some of the connections between interactionism and EVE in greater
detail, and highlight some of the potential benefits from engagement between
the two traditions. Chapter 5 also seeks to contribute to the third aim of the
thesis by showing interactionism’s relevance to environmental ethics, and by
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illustrating how it can save EVE from the serious threat posed by
situationism. This paper also helps to further highlight the significance of the
thesis research, especially given the widespread interest in environmental
ethics in response to pressing global environmental concerns.
Finally, the General Conclusion chapter at the end of the thesis will seek
to reinforce the main findings and arguments of the other chapters, and to tie
together the central themes and ideas. This chapter will also explore some
future directions and further implications based on the thesis research,
including the further development of interactionism’s moral psychology, the
exploration of additional normative implications of interactionism, and some
further implications for other topics such as the relationship between narrative
and virtue, and the connections between the E cognition literature and ethical
theory. In doing so, I hope to both further illustrate the appeal of
interactionism, and to highlight the relevance and significance of my thesis
research for a range of philosophical topics.
Now that I’ve presented my plan for the thesis, I hope to have highlighted
both the cohesiveness of the compilation of papers, and the sense of logical
progression between the papers. The thesis can be seen as proceeding in three
stages, corresponding to the three main aims I set out earlier. The first stage
(Chapter 1) lays out the core of the interactionist approach and highlights its
advantages. The second stage (Chapters 2 and 3) then refines the framework
and defend it from objections, and the third phase (Chapters 4 and 5) then
extends the framework to consider implications for other areas of inquiry, and
thereby demonstrates the broader relevance of the thesis research.
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Chapter 1
A Way Out of the Character Wars: Interactionism as
the Best Way Forward
Abstract
The recent debate between virtue ethicists and situationists over the nature
of character has received significant attention, but thus far there has been no
clear resolution. This paper aims to advance the cause of interactionism as an
approach to moral character, and as a way forward out of the charactersituation debate. It begins by briefly reviewing the character-situation debate
to set the scene. After this, I consider interactionism in both psychology and
philosophy, before synthesising a core set of interactionist claims based on
this analysis. I will then highlight some of the advantages of interactionism
as a descriptive moral psychology. Finally, I will consider an objection
relating to the present state of work on character, and the need for an
interactionist shift. In doing so, this paper will help to clarify and develop the
interactionist perspective, and further motivate a shift towards this way of
approaching research on character and moral psychology.

1.1 Introduction
Recent work in the philosophy of character and virtue has been centrally
concerned with the debate between virtue ethicists and situationists. This
debate, focusing on the nature of character and the importance of situational
factors, has seen numerous strategies, moves, and accounts deployed, but with
no clear outcome. In light of this stalemate, some have sought to develop
alternative approaches to character to move us past the conflict between
Aristotelians and situationists. The most promising of the alternatives is
interactionism, an approach to character that recognises the importance of
both personal and situational factors, but which focuses on the dynamic
interactions between them.
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The paper has two main aims: 1) To bring together and synthesise various
threads from both philosophy and psychology to present a clear picture of
philosophical interactionism in a more detailed way than has previously been
done in the literature; and 2) To illustrate the appeal and advantages of such
an approach, and defend it against objections and rival accounts. I will begin
by briefly reviewing the character-situation debate to set the scene. I will then
turn to consider interactionism in both psychology and philosophy, before
synthesising a core set of interactionist claims based on this analysis. I will
then highlight some of the advantages of interactionism as a descriptive moral
psychology. Finally, I will consider an objection relating to the present state
of work on character, and the need for an interactionist shift. In doing so this
paper will help to clarify and develop the interactionist perspective, and
further motivate a shift towards this way of approaching research on character
and moral psychology.

1.2 The Character-Situation Debate
I will begin by reviewing some of the debates and issues in recent work on
moral character, in particular the situationist challenge and the debates that
have arisen from it. This will lay out the current landscape to show the need
for an alternative, interactionist approach to character. Before considering this
recent philosophical work though, we should start with its primary
inspiration: the person-situation debate in psychology. This debate, which
began in the first half of the Twentieth Century, was centred on the issue of
whether personal or situational factors were more important for
understanding behaviour. This conflict was primarily driven by situationists
challenging prevailing ideas about personality and character. This situationist
assault was motivated by a variety of empirical evidence and studies that
raised concerns over conventional trait theories of personality. As Krahe
(1992, p. 20) notes, these conventional theories conceptualised traits as being
responsible for differences between individuals in their responses and
behaviour, and also speculated that the possession of trait dispositions would
result in a reasonable degree of cross-situational consistency. McAdams

25

(2006, p. 139) makes a similar point, when he notes that trait theories make
the “critical assumption” that “people do indeed show some general
consistency in their behaviour across situations and over time.” Such
personality trait approaches thus emphasise the central role that personal
factors play in driving and explaining behaviour, and also attribute a high
degree of temporal stability and cross-situational consistency to traits.1 Prior
to the development of situationism, such views had been highly influential in
personality psychology.
In contrast to such person-centred views of personality, situationist
psychologists presented a very different view of personality and the sources
of human behaviour.

An important early inspiration for situationist

approaches was Hartshorne and May’s (1928) extensive investigation into
honesty and dishonesty amongst a large group of school children (over
10,000), which challenged ideas about cross-situational consistency. Later
experiments contributed to the development of the situationist account by
presenting further challenges to cross-situational consistency and traditional
views of personality traits. Some examples of such experiments include:
Milgram’s (1963, 1974) infamous studies on obedience; Darley and Latane’s
(1968, 1970) research on the “diffusion of responsibility” and the “bystander
effect;” Isen and Levin’s (1972) studies on helping behaviour; Darley and
Batson’s (1973) Princeton Theological Seminary study on helping behaviour;
and the “Stanford Prison Experiment” conducted by Philip Zimbardo and
colleagues (Zimbardo et al 1973; Haney, Banks & Zimbardo 1973). In
addition to these experiments, Walter Mischel’s (1968) landmark book
Personality and Assessment also played a critical role in the development of
the situationist perspective, by arguing that there was little evidence to
support notions of cross-situational consistency, as behaviour instead seemed
to be a lot more situation specific.

1

As the terms suggest, stability refers to a trait producing the same or similar results in

similar situations over time. In contrast, consistency refers to a trait producing the same or
similar behavior across varying situations that activate that trait.
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Research such as this suggested that traditional accounts of personality
overemphasised the importance of personal factors, while neglecting the
important role that situational factors play in determining behaviour. The
most important situationist claim is thus that “behaviour is highly situation
specific, not cross-situationally consistent” (Krahe 1992, p. 29). Additionally,
situationists also tended to hold that individual differences within a situation
have more to do with “measurement error rather than broad internal
dispositions,” and that “there is little consistency in behaviour” because
“situational factors are seen as the most powerful determinants of behaviour”
(Krahe 1992, p. 29). The situationist approach thus directly challenged
traditional trait- and person-focused views of personality, and suggested the
need for an overhaul in how we view personality and behaviour.
Turning now to philosophy, situationists have drawn on this empirical
evidence from social psychology to challenge traditional ideas about
character, and in particular, the accounts of character supported by virtue
ethics. The situationist position was primarily initiated in philosophy by John
Doris and Gilbert Harman, beginning in the late 1990s. Harman advances a
particularly strong form of situationism, at points even suggesting that we
have no reason to suppose that people have character traits at all (1999). He
does clarify, however, that he means character traits as they are ordinarily
conceived, so he is taking issue specifically with traditional ideas about traits.
Despite this clarification though, Harman is more strongly opposed to notions
of character than other situationists.
In contrast to Harman, Doris specifically targets what he calls “globalist”
conceptions of character. Globalist accounts of character posit that traits are
both consistent and stable, and that these traits form together into an
integrated association of traits (Doris 2002, p. 23). Doris and other
situationists argue that globalist conceptions of character are empirically
inadequate. This is because, if the globalist account was true, we would
expect to see “pervasive behavioural consistency” (Merritt, Doris and
Harman 2010, p. 357). Systematic observation from empirical studies fails to
reveal such consistency, which suggests that the globalist picture is
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inaccurate. Doris contends that virtue ethics, in particular, Aristotelian virtue
ethics, entails a globalist account of character, and is thereby subject to this
challenge of empirical inadequacy. This raises concerns about the underlying
moral psychology of Aristotelian virtue ethics. Most worryingly, the evidence
presented by situationists could suggest that becoming virtuous is not a goal
that can be realised by human agents.
Unsurprisingly, this challenge to virtue ethics was met with a range of
spirited replies. One of the most popular strategies for responding to
situationism is the rarity response, or rarity reply. In simple terms, the rarity
response holds that situationists have misconstrued the descriptive claims of
virtue ethics. According to most virtue ethical approaches, virtue is not
supposed to be common, and is actually meant to be rare. Empirical evidence
illustrating the rarity of virtue is thus not damaging to virtue ethics, and
instead actually supports the descriptive aspect of virtue ethical theories. The
rarity response thus makes a fairly simple compatibility move: the empirical
evidence used by the situationists to threaten virtue ethics is actually fully
compatible with it – virtue ethicists can readily accept that very few people
are virtuous.
While this approach might at first seem effective at illustrating the
empirical adequacy of virtue ethics, there are a number of issues that arise
when deploying this strategy. For example, both Doris (1998, p. 512) and
Alfano (2013b, p. 244) have argued that the rarity response sacrifices some
of the explanatory and predictive power that the virtues are supposed to have
when it comes to human psychology and behaviour. Alfano (2013b, p. 244)
also notes that this strategy creates issues with moral schizophrenia and
theoretical mediation for virtue ethicists, an issue that they have often thought
their theory avoids. Finally, Doris (1998, p. 512) also argues that the rarity
response creates problems for the practical emphasis of virtue ethics on
character development and education, as it shifts the focus more to “reflection
on a rarefied ideal” rather than a model of character that agents could actually
achieve.
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None of these arguments are fatal to virtue ethics, and indeed seem to at
worst suggest that the rarity response strategy sacrifices some advantages that
virtue ethics has traditionally enjoyed (or thought itself to enjoy) over its rival
normative approaches. Despite this though, virtue ethicists may be
legitimately concerned that if virtue is so fleetingly rare that it is achieved by
almost no one, then approaches to ethics centred on virtue may lose some of
their motivational force and practical usefulness. This is particularly
problematic for a virtue ethicist, given the practical spirit of Aristotelianism.
Luckily for virtue ethicists, there is some good news on this front, as there is
empirical evidence that suggest that situationists push their case too far, as
personal factors are more important than situationists often allow.
For example, there has been evidence to support the consistency of
character from studies that focus on patterns of behaviour rather than
individual actions. This is sometimes referred to as the “aggregation solution”
(Alfano 2016, p. 129). Most of the classic situationist experiments are focused
on one-off actions. There is thus a chance that the behaviour of a subject in
such an experiment may be “out of character” or unrepresentative of the way
they generally act. Epstein (1983, p. 368) notes that when data are
“aggregated over occasions and situations,” we observe much greater
reliability and consistency in their behaviour. There is also evidence to
support the fact that while there is a ceiling on the correlation between
personal factors and particular behaviours, which Mischel (1968) placed at
.30, there is also a ceiling for the correlation between situational factors and
personal behaviour, of around .40 (Funder & Ozer 1983). This suggests that
personal factors and situational factors play a roughly similar role in
influencing behaviour. There is thus good empirical support that situations
are not the dominant, primary determinants of behaviour, as personal factors
also have an important role to play.
While such evidence does support the importance of character and counter
an extreme situationist position, it also doesn’t rule out the importance of
situational factors to character and behaviour. At this juncture two things are
worth noting. First, there has been no clear resolution to the character-
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situation debate, and the conflict is ongoing. Second, in light of this ongoing
debate, there is a need for an alternative approach that can offer a new way
forward for work on character and virtue. In the next section I will bring
together ideas from both psychology and philosophy to present interactionism
as an ideal new way forward for philosophical work on character.

1.3 Interactionism
1.3.1 Interactionism in Psychology2
As I noted in the previous section, the situationist assault presented a strong
challenge to traditional personality trait theorists in psychology. This created
a “crisis of confidence” among personality researchers (Krahe 1992, p. 38).
While a number of strategies for addressing this challenge were developed,
the most ambitious and promising of these was the development of
interactionism. Interactionism is an approach to personality that views the
behaviour of individuals as “resulting from the reciprocal interaction between
personal qualities and the features of the situation” (Krahe 1992, p. 37). This
was not an altogether new approach, as earlier theorists had endorsed
interactionist views about personality, which can be seen, for example, in
Lewin’s (1936) famous formula that B= f(P,S) (with B representing
behaviour, P representing the person, and S representing the situation). The
growing rivalry between trait theorists and situationists theorists though had
led to a shift in attention away from interactions, as the two rival approaches
were seen as presenting “competing, essentially incompatible, explanations
of behaviour” (Krahe 1992, p. 37).
In response to this, a number of theorists worked to revive the interactionist
approach to personality, as a way of moving past the person-situation debate.
Interactionists challenged the debate between personality theorists and

2

In Chapter 2 I will consider potential issues with the psychological evidence supporting

interactionism relating to the replication crisis, and illustrate how interactionism can
overcome these issues.
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situationists on the basis that the “person vs situation issue was a pseudo
issue” (Endler 1973, p. 301). This debate was particularly problematic,
because it placed greater importance on determining whether personality
factors or situational factors were more important, rather than being
concerned with “how personality variables and situational factors interact in
affecting behaviour” (Endler 1973, p. 301). Interactionism quickly developed
into a “widely accepted platform for empirical research in a variety of
personality domains” (Krahe 1992, p. 38), to the extent that by 1989, Pervin
(1989, p. 357) declared that despite differences over specific details, “most
psychologists now consider themselves interactionists.” The interactionist
approach in psychology has continued to develop and remains a prominent
and influential approach to personality (McAdams 2006, pp. 144-152).
Krahe (1992, pp. 70-71) lays out the core claims of what she calls the
“modern interactionist” perspective. She notes that there are differences
among interactionists about the specific details of interactionist theory, but
argues that the “consensual core” of interactionism involves the following
four claims:
1. Actual behaviour is a function of a continuous process of
multidirectional interaction or feedback between the individual and
the situations he or she encounters.
2. The individual is an intentional, active agent in this interaction
process.
3. On the person side of the interaction, cognitive and motivational
factors are essential determinants of behaviour.
4. On the situation side, the psychological meaning of situations for the
individual is the most important determining factor (Krahe 1992, pp.
70-71).3

3

While interactionist approaches in psychology share a commitment to these general

claims, a distinction is sometimes made between two different branches of interactionism:
mechanical interactionism and dynamic interactionism. Given my focus on developing the
interactionist position in philosophy, and that dynamic interactionism is more important for
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Most of the discussion of interactionism in psychology so far has been quite
general, in that it has concerned interactionism as a broad theory of
personality. One might wonder how relevant this makes psychological
interactionism to my project of further developing interactionism in
philosophy as an approach to character. Both psychologists and philosophers
see character and personality as closely related, with character being a subset
of personality that has normative dimensions. Character and personality are
also generally conceptualised as both crucially involving traits and
dispositions. Given this close relationship between personality and character,
there is good reason to see general psychological theory about personality as
being relevant to how we view and think about character.
Additionally, psychological theory does explicitly address character in
interactionist terms. For example, Hill and Lapsley (2009, p. 245) argue that
in the case of moral personality, a “stable behavioural signature emerges at
the intersection of person by context interactions.” There is also a range of
empirical evidence that explicitly gives support to an interactionist view of
character. The study conducted by Romer, Gruder and Lizzadro (1986), for
example, shows support for an interactionist view of prosocial behaviour, by
illustrating how personal features (prosocial goals) and situational factors
interact to produce helping behaviour. There is also a variety of empirical
support for the interactionist nature of bravery and heroism (see, e.g., Walker,
Frimer & Dunlop 2010; Jayawickreme & Di Stefano 2012).
In emphasising the centrality of continuous reciprocal exchanges between
agent and environment, interactionism challenges any kind of hard separation
or dichotomy between person and situation. As Magnusson (1999, p. 219)
writes: “the individual is an active, purposeful part of an integrated, complex,
dynamic, and adaptive person-environment system.” Reynolds et al. (2010,
p. 461) make a similar point when they note that “the person and the situation
are an irreducible ‘whole’ that must be studied as the one continuously
interdependent unit.” This interdependence of person and situation is even
the theoretical framework of interactionism in psychology (Krahe 1992, p. 79), I will focus
more on dynamic approaches to interactionism.
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discussed by Walter Mischel, who was one of the initial drivers of the
situationist position in psychology, but whose work (in particular his
“cognitive-affective personality system,” or CAPS, account developed with
various colleagues) has since moved in a more interactionist direction
(Mischel 2009; Reynolds et al. 2010; McAdams 2006). Mischel (2009, p.
289) has written that with recent developments in psychology and other
sciences, the best options for pursuing personality and social psychology are
those that “bridge the classic partitioning most unnatural and destructive to
the building of a cumulative science of the individual – the one that splits the
person apart from the situation, treating each as an independent cause of
behaviour.” Interactionism thus stresses that we don’t consider the person as
an isolated, atomic individual separate from the situation, and that we also
don’t view situations as discrete entities that overwhelm personal factors to
drive behaviour. Instead, person and situation are constantly exchanging and
transacting with one another, and these ongoing reciprocal interactions are a
vital part of character and moral behaviour.
In the previous section I introduced the concepts of consistency and
stability in relation to personality and character. For interactionism, a third
concept is also important: coherence. Coherence is a different way of
conceptualising consistency, which incorporates the psychological meaning
and interpretation of the individual (Krahe 1992, p. 15). Both the nominal or
objective features of the situation, and the psychological features of the
situation – that is, how the situation affects the person and how it is perceived
by them – are important to this account of consistency (Mehl et.al 2015, p.
632). Coherence allows for “both stability and change of behaviour so long
as they follow a systematic and hence individually predictable pattern”
(Krahe 1992, p. 16). Someone’s personality and character can thus be said to
be coherent if their patterns of behaviour “may be seen to be orderly and
intelligible, with respect to the sort of person they are hypothesised to be”
(Mehl et al. 2015, p. 632). Interactionism’s emphasis on coherence thus
differs from the situationist view of consistency, which is only concerned with
objective situations (Krahe 1992, p. 213). Further to this, when we use
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coherence as our model for consistency, we can observe greater individual
consistency in character and action than if we only incorporate the objective
features of situations (see, e.g., Krahe 1992; Snow 2010).

1.3.2 Interactionism in Philosophy
As was noted earlier, the move towards greater empirical engagement in
philosophical moral psychology in recent years has led to new debates, as
traditional approaches to character and virtue have been questioned and
challenged in light of empirical evidence. In response to this evidence and the
recent debates, a number of philosophers have attempted to develop new
approaches to character that draw on psychological evidence to address some
of the empirically-motivated concerns relating to established approaches and
traditions in philosophy. Inspired by the advantages and success of
interactionism in psychology, some philosophers have recently begun to
develop interactionist approaches to character, and this represents a promising
new research agenda.
I want to note at the outset that not all of the work discussed in this section
specifically labels itself as ‘interactionist.’ To date, there has been very little
work in philosophical moral psychology that has described itself as
interactionist, with the exception of a couple of the authors discussed below.
Nevertheless, the work of a number of recent authors writing about character
has been pushing in what is essentially an interactionist direction, in that they
assign important roles to both personal and situational factors, rather than
strongly emphasising one side over the other (as both traditional virtue ethics
and situationism do). Additionally, there is work in a number of areas and
traditions outside of modern research on moral character that is also largely
in sympathy with an interactionist approach, and I will sketch out some of
these connections in this section. My intent will thus be to identify a number
of different threads and trends in philosophical theory that can contribute to
the development of a general interactionist conception of character, which I
will pursue in the next section by combining ideas from psychology and
philosophy.
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The greatest driver of interactionism in philosophy has been Mark Alfano.
He argues that “character should be recast in interactionist terms, as partly
due to features of the agent, partly due to features of the situation, and partly
due to the interaction between them” (Alfano 2016, pp. 130-131). Alfano also
discusses particular kinds of interactive processes, such as the phenomenon
he refers to as “factitious virtue.” Factitious virtue involves the simulation of
a virtue through “self-fulfilling prophecies,” in which the public attributions
of a particular trait to an agent can actually contribute to the agent’s
possession of that trait (Alfano 2013a, pp. 82-83). Put simply, if I think of
myself as honest, and other people also describe me as honest and convey
expectations about my honesty, this can play a role in making me an honest
person. Factors beyond the individual, specifically the other people they are
interacting with, thus become crucially involved in the agent’s character
through these ongoing social transactions. As a result, if these social supports
were removed, I would no longer have that trait, or at least not possess it in
the same way, making such interactions a critical part of my character.
As a result of the importance of these kinds of interactive processes,
Alfano (2014, p. 73) has gone on to argue that we need to reconsider the
metaphysics of virtue, in particular the question of “what are the bearers of
virtues?”4 Alfano (2014, p. 73) argues for an “embodied, embedded, and
extended answer to this question,” which challenges the traditional view that
a “virtue is a monadic property of an individual agent.” Instead, and as a result
of the empirical evidence illustrating the importance of external factors to
character, we should recast virtue as involving a “triadic relation among a
person, a social milieu, and an asocial environment” (Alfano 2014, p. 82).
Under this relational model, the agent’s moral agency and character are
posited to extend beyond the individual to include external factors (Alfano
2014, p. 84). One of the most critical features of this account is that it makes
character and virtue multiply realisable: the division of labour between the
three sets of factors (personal, social, and asocial environmental) can vary
4

Chapter 2 will explore some of the metaphysical dimensions of interactionism in greater

detail.
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from person to person. For example, one individual’s courage could be
primarily due to traditional personal factors, such as “habituation and
reflection on reasons,” while another person’s courage may have more to do
with external factors, such as “noticing others’ signalling of expectations”
(Alfano 2014, p. 84). The result is that bodily, social and environmental
factors can offer additional support and reinforcement to character, but can
also, conversely, undermine and challenge character in new and surprising
ways (Alfano 2014, p. 84). This fundamentally relational and interactionist
view of virtue presents a very different model of character and virtue than the
individual-focused models of traditional virtue ethics.
Alfano has refined these ideas about the metaphysics of character and
virtue in a recent paper with Skorburg (2016). In this paper, the authors
provide a distinction between different ways in which character can crucially
involve interaction with external factors. In cases in which character is
strongly causally dependent on external factors such as social influences, then
it can be said to be embedded. Embedded character is further defined as being
largely asymmetrical and unidirectional, such as when the agent receives a
large amount of input from the environment, but is not able to change or
influence the environment themselves (Alfano & Skorburg 2016). Extended
character goes further than this: rather than being merely causally dependent
on external factors, extended character is partially constituted by these
external factors. Cases of extension involve tightly coupled, reciprocal
feedback loops between the agent and their environment, and these
interactions are more symmetrical and multidirectional than in embedded
character. When these conditions are met, Alfano and Skorburg (2016) argue
that we are justified in describing character as being partially constituted by
external factors, and thus as being extended.5
Skorburg (2017) also endorses an interactionist view of character. He
discusses the conflict between personality trait theorists and situationists as
creating a problematic dichotomy, and endorses the resolution of this debate
5

See Chapter 2 for an argument about why such extension claims may be unnecessary for

interactionism.
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through a move to interactionism (Skorburg 2017, p. 463). Echoing his work
with Alfano, Skorburg (2017, p. 463) emphasises the importance of “ongoing
feedback loops” and how they make person and situation interdependent. He
also discusses how psychological evidence reveals the ways in which people
actively choose and shape the situations they encounter, and argues that such
engagements play a central role in personality and character dispositions
(Skorburg 2017, p. 462). These kinds of multidirectional interactions
challenge “strict distinctions between agents and environments,” and
highlight the importance of taking an interactionist approach to character
(Skorburg 2017, p. 462).
Howell’s (2016) account of extended virtue is also part of this growing
move towards interactionism in philosophy. Howell (2016, p. 147) argues
against what he calls “skindividualism,” which is the view that “the person
does not extend beyond her or his skin,” and that an agent’s virtue or character
trait “must involve a disposition that is wholly grounded by features inside
the person’s skin.” Howell (2016, p. 148) recommends that we reject this
view of virtue, and instead adopt an extended account of virtue, in which “our
virtues are undergirded by systems beyond our skin.” He further argues that
such a view presents a powerful way of countering situationism, as
situationist evidence highlights the importance of environmental factors,
which can be readily accepted by an extended account of virtue (Howell 2016,
pp. 154-157). While Howell describes his account as extended virtue, its
emphasis on the interdependence of personal and situational factors means
that it is largely in sympathy with an interactionist approach.6
Another important source of inspiration for the shift towards
interactionism in work on character are extended, embodied, embedded and
enactivist approaches in the philosophy of mind (often referred to as “4E

6

For further examples of accounts of character that are not explicitly interactionist, but

which share some points of sympathy, see Merritt’s (2000) Humean account of virtue, and
Slingerland’s (2011) Confucian model of character.
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Cognition”).7 These approaches have received enormous attention in the
literature over the last several decades, and they continue to develop and
grow. While the label of “4E” groups together a large range of different
accounts, not all of which are compatible with each other, they nevertheless
share a commitment to opposing accounts of mind that are strongly
cognitivist (Menary 2010, p. 459). Furthermore, as the various “e” labels
suggest, these approaches emphasise the importance to cognition of an
agent’s body, and the interaction between an agent and their natural and social
environment. Such accounts thus share a degree of overlap with interactionist
approaches to character, as is noted by Skorburg (2017).
The philosophical work discussed in this section highlights a growing
trend in philosophy towards approaches to character that eschew the
dichotomy between individualist virtue ethics and situationism. These
accounts recognise the important role that situational factors play in
influencing moral agents, but they also do not take an eliminativist or strongly
reductionist view about the role of character traits and personal factors in
moral behaviour. Both personal and situational factors are important by the
lights of these accounts, but what is also crucial is that we draw attention to
the ways in which person and situation interact and influence each other in
ongoing reciprocal exchanges. This kind of interactionist approach, while
new in philosophy, represents a promising new research agenda for
philosophical work on moral character.

1.3.3 Core Principles of Interactionism
The previous two sub-sections have considered some central ideas about
interactionism from both psychological and philosophical theory. In this subsection I will attempt to combine these two strands and distil the central

7

For some examples of these approaches in the philosophy of mind, see, e.g., Varela,

Thompson & Rosch (1991); Clark & Chalmers (1998); Lakoff & Johnson (1999);
Gallagher (2006); Thompson (2007); Chemero (2009); Clark (2008); Wheeler (2005);
Rowlands (2010); Hutto & Myin (2013; 2017); Menary (2007); Noe (2009); and Stewart,
Gapenne and Di Paolo (2010).
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themes and ideas that emerge. Given that interactionism in philosophy has
taken inspiration from psychological interactionism, it is unsurprising that
there is a large degree of overlap between the two. From this, we can draw
five critical claims that form the core of a framework for interactionist moral
character. The five central claims are:
1. Interactionism recognises the importance of situational inputs, but
doesn’t endorse situationism or eliminativism about character.
2. Personal factors are also important, but need to be considered
alongside situational factors and the interactions between the two.
3. Moral character crucially depends on interactions between person
and situation.
4. Interactionism challenges any kind of hard separation or split
between person and situation – person and situation are
interdependent.
5. Character and virtue are multiply realisable.
Interactionism recognises the importance of situational inputs, but doesn’t
endorse situationism or eliminativism about character
As I noted earlier, there is compelling empirical evidence attesting to the
power of situations. There are powerful social influences, such as bystander
effects that diffuse our sense of responsibility (Darley & Latane 1968; Latane
& Darley 1970), and also social pressures to conform to expectations, as can
be seen in Milgram’s work on obedience and in the Stanford Prison
experiment (Zimbardo et al. 1973; Haney, Banks & Zimbardo 1973). As
Alfano (2014, p. 78-79) notes, there is also strong evidence for the influence
that asocial environmental influences can have on behaviour, such as the
impact of lighting levels on honesty (Zhong, Bohns & Gino 2010), or the
influence of ambient sound levels on helping behaviour and aggressiveness
(Donnerstein & Wilson 1976).
While this evidence shows the importance of situational factors, it doesn’t
show that they are the only determinants of behaviour, or that personal
attributes play no role. There are limits to the power of situations, and the
precise impact of a situation is also dependent upon the specific individual
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interacting with that situation. We thus shouldn’t take evidence of the power
of situations as requiring us to take a strongly situationist view that reduces
or even eliminates the role of personal factors and character. Instead, we
should acknowledge that while it is important to recognise the importance of
situational forces, it must always be with an eye to their involvement in
interactions with personal factors in the production of behaviour.

Personal factors are also important but need to be considered alongside
situational factors and the interactions between the two.
While situational factors are undeniably important, interactionism also
recognises the importance of the features of the individual agent. To begin
with, there is good evidence to support the role of personal factors in
behaviour. For example, studies focused on patterns of behaviour over time
find greater consistency in character compared to one-shot studies focused on
a particular action or scenario (Epstein 1983). Psychologists have also noted
the parity of traits and situations: while personal features do not entirely
explain behaviour, situational factors don’t either. The correlation between
personal factors and a particular behavioural outcome seems to be roughly on
par with the correlation between situational factors and behavioural outcomes
(Funder & Ozer 1983).
The importance of individual factors can also be seen in the focus in the
psychological literature on the meaning of a situation to the individual and
how they have interpreted it. This makes understanding the unique features
of the individual important to understanding their behaviour and how they
engage with the situation, as we can’t just look at the objective features of the
situation itself. The ways in which individuals select, manage, and shape the
situations they encounter also illustrates their active role in driving behaviour.
As was the case with the claim about situational factors, it is also important
to note that support for personal factors doesn’t warrant an extreme view
focused on individuals separated from situations and environments.
Interactionism recognises the role of personal factors, but emphasises that
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they are bound up with and in constant exchange with situational forces in
ongoing interactions.

Moral character crucially depends on interactions between person and
situation
The third core claim is that person-situation interactions play a crucial role in
determining behaviour. While it is important to consider both personal
attributes and situational features, the interaction between the two represents
a third, vital part of the equation for understanding moral character. Crucially,
a robustly interactionist account of character like the one I am putting forward
posits that agent-environment interactions play the central role in character.
As Endler (1983, p. 160) notes: “behaviour is a function of a continuous
multidirectional process of person-by-situation interactions.” Interactionism
thus doesn’t just involve recognising the importance of personal and
situational factors, but also makes the interaction between the two its focus.
This last point is important, as we want to avoid a hollow variety of
interactionism that incorporates personal and situational factors without
giving proper recognition to the ways in which they reciprocally influence
and shape each other in ongoing processes. As Endler and Parker (1992, p.
178) note, many psychological researchers pay “lip-service” to interactionism
by endorsing it as an approach to personality. In practice though, many
researchers are only taking a “pseudo-interactional” approach that doesn’t
give proper attention to the dynamic interplay of personal and situational
factors, and instead either remain one-sided in their approach, or treat person
and situation as largely separate (Endler & Parker 1992, pp. 185-186).
Similarly, philosophers on both sides of the debate between virtue ethicists
and situationism have made concessions to the importance of the opposing
side. Despite this, there is little work being done that is robustly interactionist,
as most work still treats person and situation as static and separate, rather than
as dynamically and interdependently connected. Advancing the cause of
robust interactionism as a unique and promising approach to character is the
central aim of this paper.
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Interactionism challenges any kind of hard separation or split between person
and situation – person and situation are interdependent
Both psychologists and philosophers argue that the interactionist approach
challenges any kind of hard separation or split between the person and the
situation. Rather than conceptualising person and situation as separate,
discrete units, interactionism posits that they are fundamentally enmeshed.
Throughout this paper I have noted the emphasis interactionism places on
multidirectional, reciprocal connections between person and situation. People
enter into or choose situations, these situations have an impact on them,
people are then able to influence the situation, and so on (Endler 1983, p.
160). This kind of close interdependence makes it difficult to pull agent and
environment apart, and highlights the importance of not only considering both
personal and situational variables, but also how they are constantly
influencing and affecting each other.

Character and virtue are multiply realisable
The enormous variety of possible agent-environment interactions means that
the levels of input from various factors (personal, social, environmental) can
vary between cases. As such, character traits can be realised in different ways.
For example, Krahe (1992, pp. 120-122) discusses how empirical work on
prosocial behaviour shows varied patterns of personal and environmental
input underlying helping behaviour. Varying types of moral personality can
have a disposition or tendency to help, with some being more dependent on
situational support (such as social incentives or compensation), and other
people requiring less situational support (Krahe 1992, p. 122). Similarly,
Walker, Frimer and Dunlop (2010, p. 907) note that exemplary moral
behaviour such as bravery and long-term caring relationships can arise from
different kinds of character, “reflecting divergent person x situation
interactions,” again with some people showing strong individual features,
while other agents are more dependent on external factors. This illustrates
some ways in which character traits like kindness and bravery can be realised
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in different ways, with varying amounts of environmental input. This is claim
is also advanced in philosophy by Alfano (2014, p. 84), who argues that if we
reconceive virtue as involving dispositions that extend beyond the individual
to include external components (both social and asocial environmental
influences), then virtue can be instantiated in a multitude of different ways
(Alfano 2014, p. 84).

1.4 Advantages of Interactionism
The situationist challenge has resulted in greater expectations regarding
accounts of character and virtue. We no longer simply want such accounts to
be normatively attractive, we also want them to be descriptively compelling
and compatible with the best available empirical evidence. Historically, most
major ethical traditions have aimed for some degree of descriptive adequacy,
but rarely with significant empirical engagement. This was, of course, largely
due to the dearth of relevant evidence prior to the second half of the Twentieth
Century. In more recent times though, there has been an explosion of
psychological, neuroscientific, and other empirical evidence relevant to ethics
and moral psychology. This evidence has raised new challenges and concerns,
highlighted gaps in existing philosophical accounts of moral psychology, and
created possibilities for new developments and avenues of research. The
situationist challenge represents an excellent example of this.
In light of these developments, philosophers became more concerned with
empirical engagement; with ensuring that the descriptive claims that figure in
their ethical theories are compatible with the best available empirical
evidence about human psychology. An early and influential formulation of
this commitment was Flanagan’s (1991, p. 32) Principle of Minimal
Psychological Realism, which states that: “make sure when constructing a
moral theory or projecting a moral ideal that the character, decision
processing, and behaviour described are possible, or are perceived to be
possible, for creatures like us.” Now, in the wake of the character-situation
debate, philosophers on both sides accept the importance of empirical
adequacy and psychological realism. Snow (2010, p. 2) for example, argues
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that the fact that virtue ethics was “largely divorced from empirical
psychology” in the past is what left it open to the situationist challenge, and
that virtue ethicists need to address this by becoming more empirically
engaged.
What we thus now want from an account of character is for it to be both
normatively appealing and descriptively accurate. Alfano (2013a, pp. 4-6)
describes this methodological outlook nicely when he endorses an approach
to ethics that attempts to “systematically explain[s] as much as possible of
two bodies of evidence: the relevant scientific data and theories, and
philosophical intuitions and theories about moral conduct.” It is my
contention that interactionism can satisfy these requirements.
My focus in this paper is on supporting interactionism as a compelling and
empirically adequate descriptive moral psychology of character. Before
moving on to present evidence in support of this goal, I first want to quickly
touch on interactionism’s normative dimensions. Given its differences from
conventional accounts of character, a shift towards interactionism will
undoubtedly raise normative questions, about, for example, whether traits
supported by external factors should properly count as moral virtues; or about
the implications of interactionism for moral responsibility.8 More pointedly,
one might object that interactionism’s account of character has shifted too far
from our predominant moral frameworks, such that we might not want to
count it as a theory of character at all. As I have already noted though,
interactionism preserves a crucial role for personal factors and traits, and in
doing so does justice to the strong and widespread moral intuitions that we
have about the importance of character and virtue. Moreover, if I am right in
suggesting that interactionism provides the best (or at least a very
competitive) descriptive account of character, then the many normative
questions and implications it raises can be seen, not as objections or worries,
but as avenues for pursuing the development of a normative accompaniment
to interactionism’s descriptive moral psychology. I thus see no reason why
8

In Chapters 4 and 5 I will consider further implications of interactionism, namely for well-

being and environmental ethics respectively.
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interactionism couldn’t meet Alfano’s requirement that an account of
character fits with our philosophical theories about morality.
Let’s now turn to the reasons supporting interactionism’s appeal as a
descriptive moral psychology of character. To begin with, we can note that a
move towards interactionism in philosophy would be a logical next step that
mirrors the progression of research on personality and character in
psychology. As I discussed earlier, the development of theories of personality
and moral behaviour in psychology has seen a progression that began with a
strongly person- and traits-focused view, which was then challenged by the
situationist perspective, before an irenic conclusion in favour of
interactionism was reached, which is now the dominant framework for
understanding personality and character in psychology. Given that the
situationist challenge and the character-situation debate have been inspired
by psychological theory and empirical work, it seems logical to follow
psychology’s lead and also resolve the debate via a shift towards
interactionism. In shifting towards interactionism, we will be getting
philosophical theories about character and virtue synced up with the dominant
view in psychology, which will enhance their descriptive accuracy and
empirical adequacy.
In addition, there is good reason to think that interactionism has greater
explanatory power than its rivals, which would give it a compelling edge as a
descriptive moral psychology of character. The primary reason for this is that
interactionism does justice to the full range of psychological evidence in a
way that its rivals don’t. It acknowledges the importance of personal factors,
which is supported by the evidence for the greater consistency we see in
character when aggregating across situations (Epstein 1983) and when we
base consistency on the psychological features of the situation rather than the
objective features (Krahe 1992; Mehl et al. 2015). While virtue ethicists
happily acknowledge such evidence as supporting their frameworks, this
evidence for the importance of personal factors is absent from or downplayed
by situationist accounts, and thus represents a flaw in their framework; a flaw
not present in interactionism.
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We can make a similar move in the opposite direction. Interactionism also
recognises the influence of situational variables. This includes both the kinds
of social situational factors seen in ‘classic’ situationist experiments and the
more recent DIAMONDS model (Rauthmann et al. 2014), and also the kinds
of asocial environmental influences mentioned previously in Section 1.3. The
importance of these variables is something interactionists and situationists
can agree on, but is not properly recognised by conventional virtue ethical
accounts of character. While situationists may have overstated their case at
points, there is still significant evidence for a range of efficacious situational
phenomena, so for virtue ethicists to downplay or ignore this evidence creates
issues for their descriptive account. In this instance then, interactionism fares
better than traditional virtue ethics.
Lastly, interactionism performs far better than both of its two main rivals
when it comes to highlighting the importance of interactions. In treating the
issue as a debate between two sets of factors (the personal and the situational)
and in focusing on one at the expense of the other, both virtue ethics and
situationism fail to recognise the interdependence of person and situation, and
the dynamic interplay between them. Alfano (2013a, p. 77) argues that
because, taken on their own, neither personal or situational factors provide a
full explanation of behaviour, then “what neither explains independently must
be attributed to their interaction, to a third factor, or to randomness.”
Considering interactions is thus doubly useful: it can help to fill in the gaps
in our explanatory picture that aren’t covered by either personal or situational
factors; and it can help to explain the surprising ways in which personal and
situational factors can reciprocally shape and influence each other. In not
giving proper consideration to interactions, virtue ethical and situationist
theories are thus missing a crucial part of the story of how character and moral
behaviour work.
Additionally, interactionism also gains further explanatory power from its
claim that character traits are multiply realisable. This is because
interactionism is able to account for an enormous range of cases, including
cases that virtue ethical accounts struggle with, and cases that situationist
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have trouble explaining. For example, it can account for the people in social
psychology experiments who seemingly succumb to situational pressures, as
these agents may rely heavily on external input for their character. When such
support is removed, the agent’s character trait is crippled, which explains poor
behaviour and a lack of consistency. Virtue ethical accounts have a much
harder time explaining these cases, especially if the external influences are
asocial in nature. In positing that character traits can crucially involve both
social and environmental supports, interactionism provides a much more
compelling explanatory story. Similarly, interactionism can also explain the
character of moral exemplars who remain virtuous despite a lack of external
support and enormous situational pressures. Situationists allow for the
existence of such characters, but also fail to give an adequate explanation for
such examples. Due to its multiple realisability claim, interactionism does not
have this issue, as such exemplars fit within its framework. This provides
further support for interactionism’s greater explanatory power than its virtue
ethical and situationist rivals.
In sum then, we can see that interactionism has much promise for
providing the kind of psychologically realistic framework that philosophers
now desire in a theory of character. It presents a logical resolution to the
character-situation debate in philosophy that mirrors the interactionist
resolution of the person-situation debate in psychology. Adopting
interactionism would thereby get philosophy synced up with the dominant
approach to character and personality in psychology. Interactionism does
justice to the widest range of empirical evidence and possesses great
explanatory power. Interactionism thus seems to be the best option for
pursuing philosophical work on the moral psychology of character and virtue.

1.5 Isn’t Everyone an Interactionist?
I now want to consider an objection to my approach in this paper. The worry
goes something like this: interactionism is indeed an appealing approach to
character, so appealing that it has now been recognised as the best available
option. As Mehl et al. (2015, p. 632) put it: “everyone’s an interactionist.”
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And if everyone is already an interactionist, then there is no real need for
papers like this that aim to clarify and further develop the interactionist
position and show its advantages over its rivals, because everyone has already
accepted it as the canonical solution to the debate. In short: why I am urging
a bigger shift towards interactionism if everyone is already an interactionist?
I think this picture of the current state of affairs does not apply to
philosophy for two reasons. The first of these is the lack of interactionist
research in philosophy. As I noted earlier in the paper, there has been limited
work on interactionism in philosophy, apart from the notable exceptions
discussed in Section 1.3. While interest in interactionism is growing, it is still
far from developing into a widespread research paradigm, despite its
empirical backing and appeal as an account of character. If everyone was an
interactionist, and it was an obvious and widely accepted solution to the
character-situation debate, then we would surely see intense and voluminous
research on the subject. This is not the case.
The second reason is that not only has there not been a widespread shift to
a new interactionist paradigm, but philosophers also continue to work on
character within the character vs. situation paradigm. Philosophers continue
to support both traditional virtue ethics, and strong forms of situationism,
without considering interactionism as a viable alternative to these approaches.
Some of this work does have sympathies with interactionism, but doesn’t
consider the possibilities for developing a fully fleshed-out interactionism.
Some examples will help to illustrate this. In a recent paper, Vargy (2018)
argues in support of what he calls “embodied situationism (ES).” Like other
situationists, Vargy opposes the view that most people have global character
traits, and instead places an emphasis on situational influences. In particular,
Vargy (2018. Pp. 272-275) is concerned with the ways in which seemingly
irrelevant situational influences, such as room temperature, ambient light
level, and tactile experiences; can induce “bodily experiential states that
influence morally relevant reasoning and behaviour.” Vargy takes it as key
point of difference between his ES account and conventional situationism that
his account draws on embodied cognition and neuroscience, in addition to
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social psychology. It is worth noting though that while Vargy introduces some
new ideas relating to embodiment into situationism, his incorporation of nonrelevant asocial situational influences into his framework is also present in
prior work in the area, particularly that of Alfano (2013a). Nevertheless,
Vargy (2018, pp. 278-279) thinks that his ES account provides a compelling
brand of situationism that presents a strong challenge to conventional models
of character, especially since they struggle to explain the ability of irrelevant
environmental influences to bypass our moral reasoning.
While I am in agreement with Vargy that irrelevant asocial influences can
play an important role in behaviour, there are some issues with his approach.
The first is the lack of consideration of the evidence supporting the role of
personal determinants in behaviour. As previously discussed, situationists
have had a tendency to overstate their case, and to downplay the role of
personal factors, and Vargy’s account is no exception. He does note that there
are possibilities for improving our characters by resisting and exploiting
situational influences, and to develop local character traits. Yet he doesn’t
consider the greater consistency observed in personal dispositions through
aggregation and focusing on the psychological features of the situation. Given
that Vargy (2018, p. 283) also acknowledges that our actions are not entirely
explained by situational influences, it seems problematic to downplay and
ignore the role of personal influences, given the evidence that they also have
an important part to play.
This brings us to the second, and even more problematic issue, which is
the absence of interactions from Vargy’s framework. If situational factors
don’t explain all behaviour, and personal influences also have limitations (as
Vargy also argues), then the interactions between the two represent an
important part of the explanatory picture that is missing from Vargy’s
account. Despite some new elements and innovations then, Vargy’s account
is still getting us bogged down in the old quagmire of persons vs. situations,
instead of focusing on dynamic person x situation exchanges. This is thus a
clear example of recent philosophical work on character that is not
interactionist in nature, and illustrates the need for further work on
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interactionism and its relationship to rival approaches like Vargy’s ES
account.
On the other side of the debate, there has also been recent support for virtue
ethics. In a recent paper, West (2018) attempts to use the CAPS theory of
personality to defend the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics. On the CAPS
model, traits are treated as clusters of cognitive-affective units, which include
things like feelings, expectations, values, goals, beliefs and desires. These can
then be activated in response to internal or external stimuli (West 2018, p.
86). Crucially, the CAPS view of traits also focuses on the psychological
meaning of situations rather than the purely objective features. As a result,
West argues that CAPS can help to defend virtue ethics, as it shows that
character is more consistent (understood in terms of coherence) than
situationists allow. Furthermore, West (2018, p. 88) also points to the work
of other advocates of the CAPS approach, such as Snow, as illustrating ways
in which the CAPS framework can help to guide us to turn local traits into
more global ones. In short, West (2018, p. 89) argues that CAPS can help to
defend virtue ethics because there is good evidence for CAPS traits, and that
these traits can be seen as the “raw materials of virtue.” As such, even if virtue
is relatively rare, if CAPS traits are widespread, and can be developed into
virtues, then there is still much hope for a traditional virtue ethical approach
to character and moral development.
Just as was the case with Vargy, I have points of sympathy and overlap
with West’s account, in particular its emphasis on the psychological features
of situations and considering consistency in terms of coherence. Further to
this, West (2018, p. 94) acknowledges the interactionist nature of the CAPS
model, and explicitly endorses an “interactionist picture of human agency.”
What then are the significant differences between West and the interactionist
account I am developing? A key part of the issue is that West doesn’t go far
enough in an interactionist direction. His account features very little
discussion of the importance of interactions; in fact, he only brings
interactionism into his discussion to defend against the objection that CAPS
traits don’t explain enough behaviour. His point is that critics sometimes seem
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to suggest that virtue ethicists need traits to explain most or all behaviour.
Against this, he argues that all virtue ethics needs is for traits to “figure
significantly in the explanation of action,” and that, past this, virtue ethicists
can accept that situational factors and the interaction between the two can also
play a role (West 2018, p. 94, emphasis in original). The issue with this
though, is that the view of traits that West is espousing is a more traditional
one that is troubled by the empirical evidence.
The key issue in regard to the model of traits here is the issue of ‘reasonsresponsiveness’ or ‘sensitivity to reasons.’ Alfano (2013a, pp. 78-79) has
argued that the CAPS view of traits is unsuitable to defend virtue ethics
because of this issue. As a result of the focus of the CAPS model on the
psychological features of a situation, CAPS traits are “individuated
internally,” such that someone could be counted as having a particular trait,
such as compassion, on the CAPS model if they reliably act in compassionate
ways in situations in which they have interpreted the situation as calling for a
compassionate response (Alfano 2013a, pp. 78-79). In contrast to this, to have
the virtue of compassion would require one to be reliably disposed to act
compassionately in any situation that calls for a compassionate response,
rather than just situations the agent has construed as requiring compassion.
The virtue thus requires the agent to respond or be sensitive to the right reason
in a situation; in short, that they respond to the nominal or objective features
of the situation, rather than the merely psychological ones (Alfano 2013a, pp.
78-79). This is the key point of separation between an interactionist approach
to traits, like the CAPS model, and the more traditional globalist account
featured in virtue ethics.
This is significant, because much of the sting of the situationist attack
relates to this issue. Given the evidence for the influence of irrelevant asocial
situational influences, the virtue ethicist’s reason-responsive trait model is
troubled, because these influences are “non-reasons” that don’t give the agent
any actual reason for action, but are nevertheless surprisingly influential
(Alfano 2013a, pp. 43-44). West is aware of this issue, and attempts to counter
it by arguing that even if non-reasons don’t supply a specific reason for action,
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they don’t “bypass practical reasoning altogether.” This is because nonreasons can affect what we focus or don’t focus on. West (2018, p. 101)
argues that our “patterns of attention and construal” relate to our values and
beliefs, and reflect our character.
To suggest that something like the impact of the ambient lighting level on
my actions reflects my values and character seems a bit of a stretch, and it
doesn’t receive enough support from West. We can highlight this by looking
at the example of priming effects. In many cases of priming, the priming
stimuli (such as a particular temperature or tactile effect) are present in an
initial situation, but their impact on the agent’s actions (during the
experimental measurement) takes places in a second, later situation, in which
the stimuli are no longer present. As such, there isn’t even a possibility of
responding to the stimuli as relevant reasons, as they are not even present at
the point of reasoning and action (Vargy 2018, p. 277). It thus seems highly
doubtful that such influences could be considered situational features that
provide reasons for action, and West’s attempt to defend a globalist, reasonsresponsive view of traits is still troubled by situational non-reasons. West’s
attempt to combine the CAPS framework with a traditional virtue ethical view
of traits is thus not able to overcome this crucial gap between the two when it
comes to the issue of reasons-responsiveness. 9
Ultimately then, despite some positive steps towards interactionism, West
doesn’t go far enough. He continues to rely on a globalist model of traits and
virtues that isn’t fully compatible with the CAPS framework he wants to
adopt, and he unsuccessfully attempts to force the combination in regard to
sensitivity to reasons and the influence of non-reasons. Additionally, West
also doesn’t discuss interactions specifically in any detail, or assign them a
robust role to play in his model of traits and character. Given both the
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West (2018, p. 101) does note that we can potentially become aware of non-reasons and

the specific impacts they have on us, and thereby perhaps work to counteract or avoid those
impacts. While I agree with him on this point, he doesn’t say enough about why these
factors, even if they can be detected, present morally significant and compelling reasons for
action, rather than “merely causal influences on moral conduct” (Alfano 2013a, p. 44).
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importance of interactions to character and behaviour, and the interactionist
nature of the CAPS framework West draws on, it thus seems that he would
be better off embracing a fully-fledged interactionist approach like the one
outlined in this paper, rather than still trying to defend a more conventional
virtue ethical model of traits and character.
These examples show that while some have claimed that philosophers
have already followed psychology’s lead and that now ‘everyone is an
interactionist,’ this is not the case. While there has been developing support
for interactionism in philosophy, as I discussed in Section 1.3, this is not yet
widespread. Vargy’s paper illustrates that there is still recent, and strong
support for a more conventional situationist view; one that doesn’t properly
recognise the importance of interactions. In addition, even when there is
philosophical acknowledgement of interactionism, it often doesn’t go far
enough, and still hangs on to problematic features of virtue ethical approaches
to character, as was seen in West’s account. What is thus needed is a more
decisive and thoroughgoing shift towards interactionism about character and
virtue in philosophy.

1.6 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to further the cause of interactionism in philosophy
by expanding upon its key details and features, and by illustrating some of its
advantages over rival approaches. I began by reviewing key features of both
psychological and philosophical interactionist theories, and the evidence
supporting them, before synthesising these strands into a series of core claims.
I then argued that interactionism presents a moral psychology that is highly
competitive with, and perhaps even superior to its situationist and virtue
ethical rivals, due to its greater explanatory power and better fit with
contemporary psychology and cognitive science. As a result of this appeal,
interactionism warrants further investigation into both its moral psychology,
and also its implications for normative ethics, and how it could fit into broader
normative schemes. Thus far, despite some notable exceptions, there has not
been significant and sustained work on developing this project. It is thus my
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hope that this paper will have both shown the need for, and great potential
benefits of, further exploration of interactionist approaches to character and
virtue in philosophy.
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Chapter 2
Interactionist Moral Character and the CausalConstitutive Fallacy

Abstract
Interactionism has emerged as a promising approach to moral character in the
wake of the situationist challenge and the character-situation debate. This
paper will consider whether interactionism is troubled by a familiar problem
from the philosophy of mind: the coupling-constitution or causal-constitution
fallacy (C-C fallacy). In relation to character, this issue pertains to whether
the external factors featured in interactionist models are partly constitutive of
the agent’s character, or whether they merely play a causal role. In contrast
to some other interactionist theorists, I argue that interactionism doesn’t need
to make distinctions regarding causation and constitution, and would be better
off without attempting to do so. Making such claims would only add
metaphysical baggage to interactionism that won’t aid in its goal of providing
an empirically adequate moral psychology of character. Interactionists are
thus better off evading the C-C fallacy challenge, rather than attempting to
meet it head-on.

2.1 Introduction
Interactionism has emerged as a promising approach to moral character in the
wake of the situationist challenge and the character-situation debate. This
paper will consider whether interactionism is troubled by a familiar problem
from the philosophy of mind: the coupling-constitution or causal-constitution
fallacy (C-C fallacy). 1 In relation to character, this issue pertains to whether

1

This paper will discuss and draw on the 4E cognition literature, but only insofar as it

relates to the moral psychology of character. My intention is not to make a contribution to
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the external factors featured in interactionist models are partly constitutive of
the agent’s character, or whether they merely play a causal role. In contrast
to some other interactionist theorists, I argue that interactionism doesn’t need
to make distinctions regarding causation and constitution, and would be better
off without attempting to do so. Making such claims would only add
metaphysical baggage to interactionism that won’t aid in its goal of providing
an empirically adequate moral psychology of character. Interactionists are
thus better off evading the C-C fallacy challenge, rather than attempting to
meet it head-on.2

2.2 The Character-Situation Debate and the Emergence of
Interactionism
As discussed in the previous chapter, there has been significant recent debate
in both philosophy and psychology over the nature of character and virtue.
This debate has been discussed at length in the literature, so I will only
provide a quick review here.3 Within philosophy, this debate was sparked by
philosophical situationists such as John Doris (1998; 2002) and Gilbert
Harman (1999; 2000), who were echoing concerns and arguments raised
much earlier in the piece by psychological situationists. Their central
contention was that empirical evidence from psychology suggested that
situational factors, not personal ones, were more important determiners of
moral behavior, and that the accounts of character traditionally put forward
by virtue ethicists were thus empirically inadequate. This challenge was met
with a range of replies, such as the popular rarity response strategy, which
posits that virtue is supposed to be a rare phenomenon for most virtue ethical

the debates surrounding 4E cognition, but instead to simply draw on the resources from the
debates to address related issues in the moral psychology of character.
2

Thank you to an anonymous referee from The Journal of Philosophical Research for

drawing my attention to Sneddon’s (2011) book Like-Minded: Externalism and Moral
Psychology, which considers the same themes as this paper.
3

See Alfano (2013b) for a more detailed summary of the debate.
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accounts, and they are thus not undermined by the empirical evidence
marshalled by situationists that illustrates the rarity of virtue (Kamtekar
2004).4 Responses such as these have then been addressed by situationists,
for example, Alfano’s (2013b, p.244) argument that the rarity response
sacrifices some of the appeal of virtue ethical moral psychology, most notably
by giving up much of the explanatory and predictive power that the virtues
are supposed to have.
The upshot of all this is that the debate over the nature of character and
virtue has received no clear resolution, and remains a live area of research
inquiry within philosophy. As the debate has progressed, alternatives to
situationism and Aristotelian virtue ethics have emerged. A number of
philosophers have sought to develop accounts that reconceptualise virtue in
ways that are both more empirically adequate than virtue ethics, and which
present a more robust account of virtue than situationism. Of these, the most
promising is interactionism. Like situationism, interactionism has taken
inspiration from an earlier trend in psychology. In psychology, interactionism
emerged as a resolution to the debates between personality psychologists and
situationist social psychologists, with interactionists arguing that “the
personality vs situation issue was a pseudo issue” (Endler 1973, p. 301).
Interactionist psychologists posit that “actual behaviour is a function of a
continuous process of multidirectional interaction or feedback between the
individual and the situations he or she encounters” (Krahe 1992, p. 70). As
an account of behaviour then, interactionism stresses the dynamic interplay
of personal and situational variables, rather than focusing predominantly on
one or the other. Crucially, such interactions are not static or one-way, but are
reciprocal and mutually influencing. As a result, the “individual is an
intentional, active agent in this interaction process” (Krahe 1992, p. 70).
Interactionism thus differs from its situationist and virtue ethical rivals in
assigning an important place to both personal and situational factors, and in
making its focus the interaction between them.
4

A range of other strategies for responding to situationism have also been proposed. See,

e.g., Snow (2010), Russell (2009), and Sreenivasan (2002).
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As an account of character traits, interactionism holds that traits are more
consistent than situationists allege. This is because interactionists view
consistency in terms of coherence, which involves considering not just the
objective features of a situation, but also the psychological features of the
situation: how the meaning of the situation is actively interpreted by the
individual (Krahe 1992, p. 15). When consistency is understood as coherence,
greater trait consistency is observed (see, e.g., Krahe 1992; Snow 2010; Mehl
et al. 2015). While interactionism does hold that traits are more consistent
than situationist models, it is not a return to the robustly individual traits of
traditional virtue ethics models either. For the interactionist, traits are
enmeshed in ongoing and dynamic exchanges between agent and
environment, and are dependent on such interactions and environmental
inputs, not only for the development and cultivation of traits, but also for
sustaining and supporting those traits.
In recent years, a number of philosophers have argued in favour of an
interactionist approach to character. A prominent example of this trend has
been the work of Alfano (2013a, 2014, 2016; Alfano & Skorburg 2016), who
has argued in favour of an interactionist view that conceives character as
“partly due to features of the agent, partly due to features of the situation, and
partly due to the interaction between the two” (Alfano 2016, pp. 130-131).
This shift towards interactionism can also be seen in Skorburg (2017; 2019).
In contrast, Howell (2016) also aims at reconceptualising virtue in more
empirically adequate terms, but focuses exclusively on developing an
extended approach to virtue, without incorporating interactionism. Both
Alfano and Skorburg have also incorporated extension claims into their
development of interactionist accounts of character. What is critical for my
subsequent discussion and argument is that in introducing extension claims
into their projects for reconceptualising virtue, these theorists are adding in
extra metaphysical steps that are unnecessary and potentially harmful. As I’ve
noted, interactionism is a promising approach to developing a more
empirically adequate moral psychology of character, but its account of
environmentally-dependent traits can be handled purely in causal terms,
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without the need for further claims about constitutive extension. The
remainder of this paper will be concerned with the issues that arise from this
shift towards extension, and with arguing in favour of avoiding such claims
in pursuit of an interactionist approach to character.

2.3 Interactionism, 4E Cognition, and the C-C Fallacy
A number of the prominent supporters for interactionist and extended
approaches to character have drawn connections between their accounts and
what they see as sympathetic approaches in the philosophy of mind literature.
Howell (2016, pp. 148-150) for example, discusses the extended mind
literature in relation to his own account of extended persons and extended
virtues. While noting that the “individuation criteria for persons are apt to be
quite different from those for minds,” he does think that the argument for
extended minds suggests an analogous argument for extended virtues, and
notes that if certain mental states, like memories, can be extended, then “it
would seem that in principle states like virtues can be extended as well”
(Howell 2016, pp. 148-149). Similarly, Alfano and Skorburg (2016) also aim
to bring together work on the extended mind hypothesis and work on virtue
and situationism. They write that if virtues and vices involve “dispositions to
token a suite of occurrent mental states,” then if “those mental states are
sometimes extended, perhaps the dispositions to have them are too” (Alfano
& Skorburg 2016, p. 465). Proponents of interactionist character thus see
clear connections between their accounts of character and accounts of mind
like the extended mind hypothesis.
Approaches like the extended mind account fall under the broader heading
of “4E cognition.” The category is so named due to the numerous “e” terms
for the accounts grouped under it: embedded, embodied, extended, and
enactive. As these varied terms suggest, a diversity of approaches are grouped
under the 4E cognition label, not all of which see eye-to-eye. While these
approaches differ in the precise nature and magnitude of their claims, they
nevertheless share a commitment to opposing accounts of mind that are
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strongly cognitivist or internalist (Menary 2010, p. 459). Furthermore, as the
various “e” labels suggest, these approaches emphasise the importance to
cognition of an agent’s body, and the interaction between an agent and their
natural and social environment. Since the 1990s, 4E cognition has grown and
diversified, and become one of the most active and influential developments
in the philosophy of mind in recent years.
Given that many 4E cognition accounts challenge strongly individualist
approaches to cognition, and instead emphasise the importance of external
factors and interactions between organism and environment, it is not hard to
see the similarities between 4E cognition and interactionist approaches to
character. As Skorburg (2017, pp. 464-465) notes, both the person-situation
debate and the development of 4E cognition have similar narratives, in that
both start “with a dichotomy which is eventually eschewed in favour of an
interactionist conclusion with a gradient of positions in between.” The
connections between interactionist character and 4E cognition suggest the
potential for a mutually beneficial exchange of insights and ideas between the
largely disparate fields of research (Skorburg 2017). These parallels also
suggest potential problems though, in that certain challenges and criticisms
of 4E cognition accounts could also be directed at interactionism. In
particular, metaphysical concerns about causation and constitution raised in
relation to 4E cognition accounts could also be deployed in the field of
character. For example, Howell (2016, p. 157), after establishing his account
of extended virtue, notes that “By now a common objection is screaming to
be heard,” by which he means that the proponent of extended virtue might be
thought to be “committing a particularly egregious version” of the couplingconstitution fallacy. While other criticisms of 4E cognition may also apply to
interactionism, the coupling-constitution fallacy has received the most
attention from character theorists, and seems to be the most serious issue, and
will thus be my focus in this paper.
The

coupling-constitution

fallacy

or

causal-constitution

fallacy

(henceforth C-C fallacy) is a well-known criticism directed at 4E cognition
accounts in the philosophy of mind. The essence of the fallacy is that a
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mistaken inference is made from a case of causal coupling to a case of partial
constitution. More specifically, the criticism is that proponents of extended
cognition (and certain other kinds of 4E cognition accounts) make a
problematic move from claiming that certain external objects or processes are
causally coupled to a cognitive agent, to then claiming that this object or
process is actually partially constitutive of the agent’s cognition (Adams &
Aizawa 2010, pp. 67-68). Adams and Aizawa (2010, p. 68), the primary
architects of the C-C fallacy challenge to extended cognition, describe the
issue in the following way:
“The fallacious pattern is to draw attention to cases, real or imagined,
in which some object or process is coupled in some fashion to some
cognitive agent. From this, one slides to the conclusion that the object
or process constitutes part of the agent’s cognitive apparatus or
cognitive processing. …Yet coupling relations are distinct from
constitutive relations, and the fact that object or process X is coupled
to object or process Y does not entail that X is part of Y.”
The challenge is thus to provide a convincing argument for moving from
causal coupling to constitutive extension, which Adams and Aizawa (2008,
p. 91) contend that proponents of extended cognition and related approaches
fail to do. This is not to rule out the importance of external factors entirely:
cognitive processes and systems may involve environmental interactions, but
this doesn’t entail the process extends to include these external factors
(Adams & Aizawa 2008, p. 91). The C-C fallacy is thus a specific
metaphysical challenge about the nature of the role played by external factors
in cognition.
A variety of responses have been made to the C-C fallacy in the philosophy
of mind. One strategy is to specify appropriate criteria for distinguishing
between causation and constitution, and to illustrate how external factors can
meet the criteria for constitution, thereby justifying the claim of extension.
Heersmink (2015) for example, develops eight criteria for adjudicating
between cases of coupling and cases of constitution, and similarly, Palermos
(2014, p. 34) advocates for necessary and sufficient conditions for
67

constitutive extension based on “ongoing feedback loops.” Conversely,
critics of the extended mind thesis have argued for alternative criteria for
determining constitution, and posited that external factors cannot meet these
criteria, ruling out the possibility of extension. Adams and Aizawa (2010, pp.
68-69) argue that “a mark of the cognitive” is needed for determining what
makes a “process a cognitive process rather than a noncognitive process,” and
propose “intrinsic, non-derived content” as such a criterion. Furthermore,
Adams and Aizawa (2008, 2010) contend that extended cognition theorists
cannot demonstrate that extracranial resources can meet such a criterion, or
provide their own compelling alternative criteria.
Numerous other arguments and moves have been made in relation to the
C-C fallacy. 5 I will not delve into the details of these various arguments and
counter-arguments relating to the C-C fallacy at this point. As will become
clear later, this is not necessary for my strategy for addressing the C-C fallacy
in relation to interactionism. Instead, what I want to convey at this point is
that the C-C fallacy presents a challenge to 4E cognition that has been taken
seriously by proponents of such accounts, and that debate over this challenge
is ongoing, with no clear and canonical solution.
In relation to character, the parallel C-C fallacy claim is that proponents of
interactionist and extended accounts of character are mistakenly claiming that
certain external factors can partially constitute an agent’s character, when in
fact they are merely causally coupled to the agent’s character or traits. This
has been anticipated as an objection by Howell (2016) and by Alfano and
Skorburg (2016). As I have just noted though, answering this objection is no
small task: the C-C fallacy has been the subject of much debate without a
clear resolution. The interactionist thus has their work cut out for them in
showing how to resolve the C-C fallacy in relation to character.

5

For further responses to the C-C Fallacy, see Menary (2007) and Ross and Ladyman

(2010).
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2.4 Attempts to Address the C-C Fallacy in Work on
Character
In this section I will consider the way in which Howell (2016) and Alfano and
Skorburg (2016) have attempted to address the C-C fallacy in relation to
character and highlight some flaws in their strategies. My purpose will be to
both emphasise that interactionists see the C-C fallacy as a challenge that
needs to be answered, and that their attempts to answer it are troubled by a
number of problems. In the remainder of the paper I will then argue in favour
of an alternative strategy focused on evading and dissolving the C-C fallacy
objection to interactionism, rather than attempting to meet it on its own terms.

2.4.1 Howell
Let’s begin by looking at Howell’s (2016) account of extended virtue and
how he addresses the C-C fallacy in relation to it. Howell (2016, p. 147)
opposes what he calls “skindividualism,” which is the view that the
boundaries of the person do not extend beyond their skin, and neither do the
grounds for their character dispositions. As an alternative to this view, Howell
(2016) proposes an extended account of persons and virtues, in which factors
outside the skin of the agent can serve as part of the grounds for their character
and personhood. Howell (2016, pp. 148-150) discusses this account as being
a parallel to the hypothesis of extended cognition. Howell accepts that the
empirical evidence of the power of situational factors creates problems for
traditional virtue ethics, but disagrees with the situationist conclusion that we
need to focus on situations rather than traits. Further, he disagrees with the
move by situationists like Doris and Harman to eliminate or reduce the role
for traits in their moral psychological frameworks (Howell 2016, p. 154).
Instead, he proposes that we reconceptualise virtue in extended terms. By
incorporating external factors into its model of character, the extended virtue
framework is able to both account for the empirical evidence, and preserve a
reasonably robust sense of character. While Howell is not explicitly
interactionist, he is still trying to achieve a similar goal of reconceptualising
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virtue in order to better account for the dynamic interplay of factors in
character and behaviour, and his account is thus closer to interactionism than
it is to situationism.
Given the radical nature of this view, metaphysical issues are bound to
arise, which Howell attempts to address. Early in his discussion, Howell
(2016, pp. 151-152) highlights that while the extended virtue account is
related to the extended mind approach, they are not the same, and the claim
of extended virtues doesn’t depend on the hypothesis of extended minds. As
a result, criticisms of the extended mind approach to cognition may not apply
to the extended virtue approach to character. Howell (2016, p. 151) writes
that “The general reason is that minds are not persons, and persons, not minds,
are the bearers of virtue. Arguments against extended minds, then, aren’t
necessarily arguments against extended persons and extended virtues.”
Howell thus thinks that his account may avoid certain criticisms directed at
the extended mind, like Adams & Aizawa’s (2010) intrinsic content
requirement, and Rupert’s concerns about drawing the bounds of cognition,
because it is focused on persons, not minds, and thus such attacks may not
apply.
Could the same be said of the C-C fallacy? May the extended virtues
account simply avoid the issue? Howell thinks not. As noted earlier, Howell
acknowledges that questions of causation and constitution still arise, but
argues that his account is able to deal with them. He argues that unlike cases
of extended cognition, our ways of differentiating and individuating persons
do not depend on “cognitive scientific individuation criteria,” but instead on
“the norms governing persons and the ascriptions of personality” (Howell
2016, p. 158). As a result, things are part of a person when they play a role in
someone’s “disposition to behave and feel in certain ways,” and there is no
good reason to suggest that something has to be within the skin of an agent to
play such a role (Howell 2016, p. 158). Additionally, Howell also notes how
his extended persons accounts fares better with the empirical evidence and
the situationist critique than skindividualism does, suggesting that it provides
a better account of personality and character (Howell 2016, p. 158). Howell
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(2016, p. 158) thinks that as a result of these points, his account presents a
compelling case for “constitution instead of mere coupling.”
Despite thinking that the C-C fallacy doesn’t stand as an objection to his
account of extended persons and virtues, Howell (2016, p. 159) nevertheless
thinks that it does raise the important question of determining the criteria for
constitutive extension. He notes the great difficulty of such a task, but thinks
a step in the right direction is to focus on the functional roles that dispositions
play, as this can give us insight into whether the grounds for the disposition
can be counted as part of the agent. By functional role Howell (2016, p. 159)
is referring to things like the explanatory role that dispositions can have in
explaining people and their behaviour. Additionally, he is also concerned with
the predictive role that dispositions can play, and the evaluative role they play
in making normative judgements about a person. If a disposition plays such
roles then it might qualify for being a character trait or virtue, and there
doesn’t seem to be a good reason why the disposition being partially grounded
in features external to the agent should disqualify it from counting as one of
their character traits (Howell 2016, p. 159). As such, if external factors are
contributing to functional roles like this, Howell thinks they could be
considered as partially constituting an agent’s character.
It is unclear why this is the case. Howell emphasises that the external
factors need to be playing important roles in the agent’s traits and
dispositions, but doesn’t do enough to clarify why this makes them partially
constitutive rather than just causally coupled. The external factors could still
form part of the grounds for an agent’s disposition if they were figured into
the disposition as stimulus conditions, and could thereby still be involved in
the explanatory, predictive and evaluative roles of the disposition.
Additionally, one might wonder why the constitution claim is needed at all if
it isn’t contributing to the empirical adequacy or explanatory and predictive
power of the account. Howell’s account thus needs more development if it is
to justify the necessity of a causal-constitutive distinction, and to better
illustrate how the constitution claim is justified.
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This marks an important point of separation between an interactionist
account of character and Howell’s extended one. Both approaches emphasise
the importance of external factors and agent-environment interactions.
Howell’s version though, crucially involves a claim of constitutive extension.
Interactionism need not make such a claim. As I stated at the beginning of
this paper, and as I will argue in the next section, this constitution claim is
unnecessary, and actively unhelpful, as it exposes the account of character to
additional issues and criticisms from the philosophy of mind.

2.4.2 Alfano and Skorburg
Alfano and Skorburg (2016) endorse an interactionist approach to character,
and are precise about the scope and nature of their metaphysical claims:
sometimes character is embedded, sometimes it is extended, and sometimes
it might be neither. They intend for these embedding and extension claims to
roughly mirror their namesakes from the philosophy of mind; that is,
embedded character involves strong causal coupling, while extended
character involves the claim that external factors partially constitute the
agent’s character (Alfano & Skorburg 2016, pp. 467-468). There is thus a
clear distinction made between causal coupling and constitution, which is
why the C-C fallacy again arises as a potential challenge for their account to
overcome.
Alfano and Skorburg (2016) make reference to the importance of
functional integration for determining both cases of embedding and
extension. They note that a critical part of the functional integration of the
agent into their environment is the role of “ongoing feedback loops” between
the agent and environmental factors (Alfano and Skorburg 2016, p. 468). How
are we to determine between cases of embedding and extension then? Alfano
and Skorburg (2016, pp. 467-468) write that:
“When the bonds holding them [the moral agent] in that context are
tight and modally robust, perhaps it makes sense to think of their
character as extending out into the social environment. When the
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bonds holding them in that context are relatively looser and less
modally robust, perhaps it makes sense to think of them as merely
embedded in the social context, with some properties that are
metaphysically independent of it.”
What acts as the distinguishing criterion for separating cases of causation
from constitution for Alfano and Skorburg is thus the importance of the
ongoing interactions involved. If the feedback loops between agent and
environment are highly reciprocal, consistent and reliable, then character can
be thought to be constitutively extended, rather than just causally coupled in
an embedded fashion (Alfano & Skorburg 2016, p. 471).
The authors point to the case of friendship as a paradigmatic example of
constitutively extended character. They argue that the tightly coupled, reliable
and modally robust nature of the feedback loops between close friends
support the view that in such cases, the friends partially constitute each
other’s character (Alfano & Skorburg 2016, pp. 475). In contrast, they also
identify a case that they think qualifies for embedding, but not extension:
stereotype threat in relation to intellectual character.6 Put very briefly, the
concept of stereotype threat refers to the situational pressures that stereotypes
can have on individuals, pressuring them to conform to the stereotypes
relating to their social or racial group. In regard to intellectual character,
stereotype threat can result in decreased intellectual and academic
performance when there are negative stereotypes relating to a particular
group. For example, stereotypes of black students underperforming can
decrease the performance of black students, as it can act as an additional
source of pressure and stress, which has been illustrated in a number of studies
(Alfano & Skorburg 2016, pp. 469-470). Alfano and Skorburg (2016, p. 471)
argue that stereotype threat presents a case of embedded intellectual
character, as the agent’s character may “depend on the stereotypes,
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While I am focusing on moral character, I agree with Alfano and Skorburg that this

discussion of the metaphysics of character applies equally well to intellectual character as it
does to moral character.
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expectations, noises, worries, distractions, and anxieties in the social
environment.” Such a case thus qualifies for embedding because of the fairly
tight and reliable feedback loops between the agent and the environment, but
falls short of the requirements for extension. This is because the relationship
is largely asymmetrical: there is strong and reliable input from the
environment to the agent, but the feedback from the agent to the environment
is significantly less strong (Alfano & Skorburg 2016, p. 471). Another aspect
of Alfano and Skorburg’s criteria for distinguishing between causation and
constitution is thus that constitution requires multidirectional, symmetrical
and highly reciprocal interactions between agent and environment, while
more unidirectional and asymmetrical interactions would only qualify as
causal coupling.
If ongoing feedback loops are involved in both constitutive and nonconstitutive cases, then there are still issues in justifying the move to
constitution. Just because the feedback loops are more reciprocal, reliable,
and consistent, doesn’t seem to in itself justify the constitution claim. Why
wouldn’t the less reciprocal, reliable, and consistent ongoing feedback loops
also qualify for constitution? Conversely, why don’t both cases simply
represent causal coupling, even if it is of a particularly strong variety? While
Alfano and Skorburg go further than Howell in attempting to detail the criteria
for constitutively extended character, it is still not definitive that their criteria
support constitution claims, and they would thus require further elaboration
and defence.
As with my consideration of Howell, my aim has not been to demonstrate
conclusive or knock-down objections to Alfano and Skorburg’s handling of
the C-C fallacy. Instead, I have illustrated that the criteria Alfano and
Skorburg present for determining constitution, while more detailed than other
accounts, are nevertheless still open to criticism, and thus still vulnerable to
the C-C fallacy objection. Additionally, in insisting on a distinction between
causation and constitution, their account could also be criticised from those
favouring a more radical view in which the causal-constitutive distinction is
abandoned. Their strategy for handling the C-C issue can thus be objected to
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from a number of different directions, and would need to be refined and
further developed to defend it against such objections.

2.5 The Evasive Manoeuvre
Having seen some issues with these other strategies for addressing the C-C
fallacy, I now want to turn to my own strategy: the evasive manoeuvre. In this
section, I will argue that while interactionism does require some revisions to
our metaphysical account of character and traits, it does not require the
causal-constitutive distinction in relation to external factors. This is because
the distinction does not add any descriptive or explanatory power to the
account, and is thus not doing any work fleshing out interactionism’s moral
psychology. The C-C distinction also raises additional and challenges, as
illustrated in the previous section, thereby creating unnecessary pain for the
interactionist. As a result of these two points, it is best for interactionism to
avoid making the distinction altogether.
This strategy does not mean that I am suggesting that we don’t need to
make any revisions to traditional models of character and virtue. On the
contrary: I am supporting interactionism as an alternative to such traditional
accounts. As discussed in Chapter 1, some of the central claims of
interactionism include: that moral character crucially depends on personsituation interactions; the thesis that character and virtue are multiply
realisable; and the claim that interactionism challenges the person-situation
dichotomy in favour of the view that person and situation, are, to an extent,
interdependent. Such claims not only represent the core of interactionism, but
also highlight features that separate it from other approaches to character, in
that the focus is on neither the agent, nor the environment, but on their
dynamic interplay. As was noted earlier, interactionism recognises the
importance of both situational and personal factors, but it is the interaction
between them that is primary. This is what separates interactionism from rival
models like situationism and virtue ethics.
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Interactionism thus stands apart from other models of character, and
involves changes and revisions to more conventional accounts of character.
If it involves a number of changes to traditional models, should one such
change be making a constitutive claim about the role of external factors in
character? As I have been discussing in this paper, other proponents of
interactionism (and related approaches) seem to think so. It isn’t entirely clear
why this is the case though. These other authors make some interesting
arguments about distinguishing between causation and constitution, but, in
my view, they haven’t done enough to justify the need for constitutive claims
in the first place. Instead, they seem to assume the need for such an approach,
and then work to unpack its details and address potential criticisms.
In my view though, such an approach is unnecessary. This is because
making constitutive claims doesn’t have any impact on a descriptive moral
psychology of character, which is the focus of this paper. What should matter
for a descriptive moral psychology of character? As most modern
philosophers working on the subject have come to argue, it’s vital that such
an account be empirically adequate: it should fit with, and not be obviously
contradicted by, our best available empirical evidence about the nature of
human character. In Section 2.2 I noted that interactionism has emerged as an
approach to character that provides a compelling alternative to situationism
and traditional virtue ethics. Interactionism presents an account of character
that is empirically adequate, and which possesses great explanatory power: it
provides an excellent framework for explaining and understanding a broad
range of moral behaviour and moral agents. As a result of such factors,
interactionism can be seen as an appealing descriptive moral psychology of
character.
This brings us back to the question of whether constitutive claims would
add any explanatory power to interactionism. What is critical for explanation
is causation. As Lewis (1986, p. 214) notes, if we want to explain something,
then we need to consider its causal history. Lewis (1986, p. 218) explicitly
connects causal information with explanatory information: information about
the causal history of an event is the explanatory information about that event.
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Alfano (2013b, p. 239) follows Lewis in this account of explanation, but in
relation to character and virtue specifically. He notes the tradition of viewing
character traits and virtues as explanatory, and agrees with Lewis that
explanatory power depends on causation (Alfano 2013b, p. 240). As such, for
virtues and character traits to figure into an explanation of behaviour, they
should play a causal role in that behaviour, or at the very least be correlated
with the behaviour (Alfano 2013b, p. 240). In short, what is essential for the
explanatory power of a moral psychological theory of character is causation.
If causation is the vital ingredient for explanatory power, then constitutive
claims amount to an additional layer of metaphysical detail that isn’t adding
anything to the descriptive moral psychology. Sprevak (2010, p. 361) notes
how the choice between a causal claim and a constitutive claim has no impact
on explanatory power:
“Psychological theories can, at negligible cost, be given either a causal
gloss, or a constitutive gloss. If, in a particular case, psychology
chooses to favour one gloss, the other is still available via a trivial
transform, and the reasons for a preference for one over the other
appear to be more likely to be idiosyncratic and accidental rather than
tied to tracking the truth.”
This highlights not only that the further step of a constitutive claim is
unnecessary, but also that the choice between calling a case causal coupling
and calling it constitutive extension is ultimately rather arbitrary as far as
explanatory power is concerned.
Given that the constitution claim isn’t adding any explanatory power, it
seems as though it is adding unnecessary complexity to our account of
character. Rupert (2009, p. 18) makes a similar point when endorsing his
embedded cognition approach over extended cognition:
“If two theories embrace structurally equivalent explanations (with or
without the same labels), but one of those theories simply tacks on
commitment to an additional kind of entity, of no causal significance,
then the relative simplicity comparison is straightforward.”
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This is does not mean that I am taking a particular side in the debates over E
cognition (i.e. that I am in favour of embedding). My point is a more general
one: an interactionist framework that doesn’t make constitutive claims is
simpler and more elegant than similar accounts that do make such claims,
because those claims are add-ons that aren’t contributing anything substantial
to the account, like explanatory power. If the kind of interactionist framework
I am proposing and an alternative model like Alfano and Skorburg’s both
accept the same kinds of explanations about character and moral behaviour,
but their account makes an additional metaphysical claim that mine does not
(that has no impact on the explanation), then we should prefer my option by
virtue of greater theoretical elegance and simplicity.
Let’s focus things down to the core of the issue. If what matters for a
compelling descriptive moral psychology of character is empirical adequacy
and explanatory power, then the causation vs. constitution question is
irrelevant. Instead, what the issue comes down to is the choice of explanatory
framework, which we can view as a debate between two rival frameworks
that Sprevak (2010, p. 361) calls: “internal self-sufficiency (INT)” and
“external dependence (EXT).” Sprevak is presenting these as explanatory
frameworks for cognitive science and understanding the mind, but they serve
my purposes as well, so I have adapted them to apply to character.
(INT) Character and character traits “are largely self-sufficient, and
can be studied largely in isolation from environmental props”
(Sprevak 2010, p. 361).
(EXT) Character and character traits “depend intimately on
environmental resources, and should be studied within the context of
those resources” (Sprevak 2010, p. 362).
Clearly interactionism is a variety of EXT rather than INT. I have noted that
interactionism has potential as an explanatory framework for moral character.
Claims about constitution and the debate between causal coupling and
constitutive extension have no bearing on such explanatory frameworks
though. They do not provide new information or greater explanatory power,
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and do not drive our choice between these rival frameworks. As a result,
interactionism does not need to make constitutive claims about the role of
external factors in character, and can thus leave them aside.
In sum then, my evasive manoeuvre strategy is, firstly, concerned with the
descriptive moral psychology of character. Other things being equal, a
simpler, more elegant theory is preferable – the more moving parts, the harder
they are to justify. Adding claims about constitutive extension into the mix
increases complexity and requires further justificatory steps. This could be an
acceptable price to pay if the result was greater explanatory power and a better
descriptive account of character. As I have noted though (and as will be
discussed in greater detail in Section 2.6), these constitutive claims do not
provide such explanatory advantages. What matters is the psychological
significance of the external factors and the interactions between agents and
environment, not metaphysical hair-splitting over which cases are
constitutive and which are merely causal. Given that the constitutive claims
require so much extra justification, the burden of proof is on proponents of
extended character to show why such claims are necessary for an empirically
adequate moral psychology of character. Barring such compelling support for
constitutive claims, we seem far better off with a more general account like
the EXT position outlined above, rather than wading into the waters of the CC fallacy debate.

2.5.1 Illustrative Examples
To further flesh-out this argument, it will be useful to consider some
illustrative examples. We can start by examining Howell’s (2016) example of
a long-time user of antidepressants. Howell (2016, p. 54) describes a case of
someone who has been effectively using antidepressants for years, and in
which this usage makes the person much more compassionate. While using
antidepressants, the person is “more likely to help others, less likely to be
brusque or insulting, and likely to be far less aloof.” Howell then notes that if
this person went on vacation and forgot their antidepressants, they would be
less compassionate during that trip, but that wouldn’t lead us to suggest that
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they weren’t compassionate at all. Instead, we can say in this case that the
individual’s virtue is extended to include the antidepressants (Howell 2016,
p. 154). For Howell then, the virtue of compassion that the agent in this case
has is partially constituted by their use of antidepressants.
Clearly, in this case the agent’s use of antidepressants is playing a role in
their character, specifically in their trait of compassion. Howell and I could
agree on this point. The antidepressants figure into the explanatory story, in
that they help to explain why the agent is compassionate most of the time, and
their absence helps to explain the agent’s lack of compassion while on
vacation. Considering the antidepressants would also aid us in prediction, as
their presence affects the likelihood of compassionate behaviour. The
antidepressants thus seem to play an important part in the agent’s character.
All of this though can be captured by an interactionist account: the agent’s
ongoing interactions with external factors (the antidepressants) are critical to
their character. Whether such interaction involves mere causal dependence or
constitution though is irrelevant: it is a further claim that isn’t adding anything
to the moral psychological picture of character. Whether the agent’s
engagement with the antidepressants is causal or partially constitutive makes
no difference to how we explain, understand and predict their behaviour.
Howell’s claim of constitutive extension is thus unnecessary, because it is
getting into abstract metaphysical territory that doesn’t have direct bearing on
questions of moral psychology. As established in the previous section, this
extra claim also makes him open to additional objections. As his case of the
agent on antidepressants can be adequately explained without the constitution
claim, it thus seems as though it should be abandoned.
We next turn to a real-world case: the Milgram experiments.
Interactionism can offer an effective explanation for the results of the
Milgram experiments: the specific and unusual circumstances of the
experiment separated the participants from their normal social and
environmental connections and engagements. This can explain the behaviour
of the participants in the study: their character was dependent upon
interactions with social and environmental factors. With these factors
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removed, their character traits were crippled, resulting in their surprising and
harmful behaviour. Interactionism thus offers a compelling alternative
explanation of the results of the Milgram experiments to the situationist view
that the situational factors are running the show and that character traits are
minimal or non-existent.
If interactionism provides a good explanation of the Milgram results, does
its explanatory power require or depend on a constitutive claim? It is hard to
see how it could. Howell (2016, p. 155) makes a similar argument about the
Milgram experiments, but his is in service of his argument for constitutively
extended virtue. This constitution claim though, doesn’t add anything to the
explanatory account of the Milgram experiments over my interactionist
account. Whether we conceptualise the external factors as playing a causal or
a constitutive role in the agent’s character makes no difference to the
explanatory picture, because the fact that a particular external factor is
partially constitutive isn’t adding any new information to our explanation of
the agent’s character compared to a version where the external factor is
merely causally coupled to the agent. As long as the external factors are
playing some kind of causal role in the agent’s character, then this is enough
as far as explanation goes. Again then, we can see that the constitutive claim
is unnecessary for a compelling and empirically adequate descriptive moral
psychology of character.

2.6 Objections to the Evasive Manoeuvre
2.6.1 Constitution Claims are Necessary for Descriptive Moral
Psychology
A potentially strong objection to the evasion strategy I have been
recommending is that the constitutive claim isn’t just potentially beneficial,
but actually in some way critical or necessary for an interactionist account of
character. We can build such an objection by drawing on and adapting
Palermos’ (2014) work on extended cognition. Drawing on dynamical
systems theory, Palermos gives both an account of the criteria for determining
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constitution, and also provides arguments in support of the explanatory value
of constitution claims. It is this latter point that is of particular concern to me,
as it creates potential problems for my evasion strategy. Palermos (2014, p.
32-33) posits that when two systems are engaged in ongoing interactions with
each other, this can sometimes give rise to properties that can’t be attributed
to any of the individual systems. As a result, we would need to think that there
is a single coupled system made up of the individual interacting systems. Such
a coupled system would involve dense feedback loops between its component
systems, making it difficult to “decompose systems in terms of distinct inputs
and outputs from the one to the other” (Palermos 2014, p. 33).
Palermos’ (2014, pp. 32-33) point is then that such coupled systems
represent an additional entity, which is constituted by its “interdependent
components.” Additionally, this postulation of coupled systems would be
doing explanatory work, because it would account for the properties that arise
from the interactions between the systems “which we would otherwise be at
a loss how to account for” (Palermos 2014, p. 32). Applied to character and
virtue, the argument would be that ongoing interactions between an agent and
the environment would produce a coupled system, which would be their
character trait or virtue. On Palermos’ reasoning about coupled systems, such
a trait would then be partially constituted by the external factors involved in
the system. Furthermore, this constitution claim would also be doing
explanatory work, because it would be accounting for the properties of the
coupled system that couldn’t be attributed to the sum of the agential and
environmental contributions alone. This would thus represent a strong
objection to my evasion strategy, as it claims that constitutive claims could
be explanatorily necessary when it comes to the descriptive moral psychology
of character.
Palermos (2014, p. 31) develops this argument through the example of a
blind agent engaging with a tactile visual substitution system (TVSS). The
continuous mutual interactions between the agent (A) and the TVSS produce
tight feedback loops, and give “rise to new systemic properties (such as the
new quasi-visual experiences produced, or new possibilities for interaction
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with the environment),” and these properties cannot be attributed to either A
or TVSS alone. Instead, they require the postulation of the coupled system,
ATVSS, rather than continuing to treat each sub-system as distinct entities.
Cases such as this may thus show the explanatory necessity of postulating
coupled systems, and of making constitutive claims.
My central point in response to this objection is that it is unclear why close
interactions between multiple systems would demand the postulation of a
further entity, and why this would add explanatory value. Such cases could
seemingly also be explained by tight, continuous reciprocal causation, and
thus cashed out in terms of causal dependence rather than constitution.
Additionally, even if the individual systems (agent, social setting,
environmental factors) are interdependent and difficult to pull apart, this
doesn’t make the postulation of a further coupled system constituted by these
components necessary for explanation. It’s true that the complexity of the
interactions might require highly detailed analysis and fine-grained modelling
to produce a good explanatory account, but this doesn’t mean that a further
claim about constitution would give greater explanatory power. A framework
of causal dependence could do an equally effective job of explanation,
without the need for constitutive claims. Connecting back to my argument
from the previous section, it seems as though both options would be able to
give the same explanation, with the former then beating out the latter because
of its simplicity.
This argument is further supported by Sprevak’s (2010) discussion of
extended cognition and explanatory power. Sprevak (2010, p. 358) notes the
potential advantage of sometimes considering “sensory input, internal state,
behaviour output cycles as single explanatory units.” Treating such cycles or
loops as single explanatory units echoes Palermos’ discussion of coupled
systems. Sprevak (2010, p. 358), however, argues that “treating entire
sensorimotor loops as single explanatory units is compatible with holding that
the input and output sections of the loops are non-mental, albeit
psychologically significant.” It is thus possible to “obtain whatever
explanatory benefits are to be gained by appealing to whole loops as single
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explanatory units, without being committed to sensorimotor loops being
100% mental in all their parts” (Sprevak 2010, pp. 358-359). Again, applied
to character, even if we treat agent-environment interactions as involving a
coupled system or single explanatory unit, this does not require us to treat all
the parts of the system as being virtuous, or as part of the character or trait in
question.
Returning to Palermos’ TVSS example then, we may object to his claim
that the coupled system is necessary, but let’s assume that is the case for now.
Even if this is so, and we get explanatory benefits from postulating ATVSS
rather than treating A and TVSS separately, this doesn’t mean that the
external factor (the TVSS) is itself mental. Based on Palermos’ analysis, the
TVSS certainly is playing a psychologically significant role, but that isn’t
enough to show that it should qualify as mental. As Sprevak (2010, p. 358)
writes, “being psychologically significant is not sufficient to make a state
mental…the causes and effects of mental states are often not mental
themselves, and yet are still significant in psychological explanations.” The
postulation of the coupled system of ATVSS is what is doing the explanatory
work in Palermos’ example, not the constitutive claims about the TVSS.
Given that we can get the same explanatory result without the need for the
constitutive claims, the burden is on Palermos to illustrate why such claims,
and not just the proposal of the coupled system, are explanatorily necessary.
As a result of all this, Sprevak (2010, p. 359) argues that there is no
explanatory difference between the Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition
(HEMC), and the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC): “A cognition
scientist could swap between HEC and HEMC with negligible net change in
explanatory value.” Furthermore, this also misses the point of what’s critical
for explanatory power. In regard to extended cognition, what gives it an
explanatory edge is the claim that psychology needs to include features
outside the agent’s brain, because of their significance in cognition and
action. But this point can also be accepted by an embedded cognition theorist.
What separates them is the further claim that such external factors aren’t just
psychologically significant, but are themselves mental (Sprevak 2010, p.

84

359). This claim though, is adding no additional explanatory power. HEC and
HEMC thus disagree about the bounds of cognition and the extent of mental
states, but when it comes to explanatory power, there are no substantial
differences.
I want to turn now to look at another example of this kind of objection. In
a recent paper, Skorburg (2019) has argued for the specific importance of
constitutive extension claims when it comes to virtue. Skorburg (2019, p.
2334) first highlights the widespread agreement that “virtues are comprised
of cognitive and affective processes,” before noting that there are “welldeveloped arguments in the extended mind literature” that both cognitive and
affective process can extend beyond the individual. As a result of these
premises, it thus seems that we should question the “default internalism”
about virtues, and take seriously the idea of extended virtue (Skorburg 2019,
p. 2346). In contrast to Palermos, Skorburg is making the case that extension
claims are important for not just cognition, but for understanding and
explaining virtue and character as well.
I’ll begin my reply by noting that Skorburg’s argument hinges on the
“well-developed” arguments in favour of extended cognitive and affective
process. He acknowledges that extended mind theorists were initially met
with a range of objections, such as the C-C fallacy, before highlighting the
many replies that have been made in the literature. He highlights Palermos’
account of feedback loops as being a prime example of an approach to
extended cognition that can overcome such objections (Skorburg 2019, p.
2335). As I have just argued though, drawing on Sprevak, there are
compelling reasons to doubt whether the constitutive extension claims in
Palermos’ account are adding any explanatory power. Thus, while there have
been many responses by proponents of extended cognition to objections like
the C-C fallacy, it is hardly a settled matter that they have effectively and
completely overcome them.
Skorburg (2019, p. 2340) also draws on a number of examples which, he
argues, demonstrate the “epistemic gains to be made by adopting an extended
systems perspective” on things like emotion regulation, but also for cognition
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and emotion more generally. This feeds into his argument about the similar
kinds of epistemic gains to be made by going extended when it comes to
virtue as well. For example, Skorburg (2019, p. 2339) considers how research
on Transactive Goal Dynamics reveals the advantages that taking an extended
position gives us for explaining and predicting the behaviour and motivations
of romantic partners. He quotes Fitzsimons et al. (2015, p. 648), who write
that: “Ultimately, we suggest that relationship partners are best
conceptualised not as mostly independent goal pursuers who occasionally
influence each other, but instead, as interdependent parts of one selfregulating system.”
Similarly, Skorburg draws on Varga’s (2016) work on emotion regulation
in infants and caregivers. He notes that, as the interactions between the infant
and caregiver are so tight and coordinated, “the process of emotion regulation
in the infant extends to include the caretaker” (Skorburg 2019, p. 2339).
Furthermore, this “process of emotion regulation…is not de-composable into
simple child inputs and caretaker outputs,” and we thus have reason to see it
as a genuine case of constitutive extension (Skorburg 2019, p. 2339).
Skorburg takes examples such as these to be extended systems, and posits that
we get epistemic advantages by treating them as such. That is,
conceptualising such cases as involving extension is taken to offer benefits
for explaining and understanding the phenomena involved. Once again then,
the worry is that there are explanatory benefits to be gained from an extended
approach, which would be missed by my evasion strategy.
In response to these examples, I’ll begin by noting that this argument still
does not provide enough support for the necessity of constitutive claims, or
the epistemic payoffs of those claims. As was the case with the TVSS
example though, let’s assume for now that we do need to propose coupled
systems in cases such as these to get the full explanatory picture. Again, what
is crucial then is that it would be the coupled system doing the explanatory
work, not the constitutive claims about the external factors. Take the example
of Transactive Goal Dynamics with romantic partners. There is no doubt that
the external factor (the partner) is playing a psychologically significant role.
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Furthermore, the evidence presented by Skorburg suggests it may even be
necessary, at least in some cases, to consider the partners as a coupled system
rather than purely as independent agents. What still needs justification
though, is why claims that the external factors are themselves mental (or
virtuous) are necessary for explaining and understanding the phenomena. As
was the case with the TVSS example, these cases show that it may be
necessary to postulate coupled systems, but this can be accommodated by the
broad EXT framework I mentioned in Section 2.5. The constitutive claims
are where the problems arise, yet they are doing no extra work to justify their
high price. Given that these claims add complexity and require significantly
more support, while also offering no clear benefit, the burden of proof is still
on proponents of extended character to illustrate why they are necessary, over
and above the postulation of coupled systems.
In all of this I am not trying to suggest that extended cognition is a failed
project. My claim is more modest: when it comes to virtue and the moral
psychology of character, extension claims are not adding any explanatory
power over strong causal dependence, and are thus unnecessary. While there
are “well-developed arguments” in favour of extended cognition, as Skorburg
points out, the debates over the nature of cognition and the mind are ongoing
ones, without a clear and canonical resolution. What I have been trying to
show is that there are plausible reasons for doubting the added explanatory
power of extension claims when it comes to virtue. Couple this reasonable
scepticism of the value being added by extension with the very real
difficulties and objections that arise with extension claims, and it seems
unnecessary to make this further metaphysical step. I am thus unpersuaded
by Skorburg’s argument that extension claims are necessary for virtue.
To sum up and conclude my response to this objection, we can break things
down in the following way: one issue is whether external factors need to be
considered in a framework for explaining character and virtue, while a
separate, second issue is whether such external factors should themselves
count as virtuous or as constituting the virtue. These are not the same issue.
My concern is with the first issue, as I am focused on descriptive moral
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psychology, which the second issue has no bearing on. This is because, as I
have been arguing throughout this paper, this question of constitution makes
no difference to the explanatory power and descriptive accuracy of our moral
psychology of character. The objection that constitutive claims would make
a difference because they would add explanatory value doesn’t hold up, as we
could get the same explanatory picture with just causal coupling. As a result,
the evasion strategy is not defeated by this objection.

2.6.2 Normative Implications of Evasion vs. Extension
The final objection I will consider relates to the possible normative
consequences of my evasion strategy. As I have noted, my focus is on
descriptive moral psychology, but, despite this, there may still be a worry that
by stopping short of constitutive extension claims, there will be problematic
consequences for the normative dimensions of interactionism. In particular,
the issue that arises is whether constitution claims could play an important
evaluative (rather than just explanatory) role. For example, questions arise
concerning the implications of interactionism for thinking about
responsibility. If interactionism posits a crucial role for external influences
and agent-environment interactions, then we might wonder whether this
leaves any place for individual responsibility for character. The worry then
would be that making the move to extension could help clear up this issue,
and by avoiding extension claims my account produces a more muddled
evaluative picture.7
In proposing an interactionist approach, my suggestion is not that the
individual is no longer important to understanding character and behaviour,
or that the individual simply dissolves into the web of interactions. As I noted
earlier, interactionism maintains a strong role for individuals, who are an
active and purposeful part of the equation. Additionally, interactionism also
posits that people often possess coherent traits, and that traits can be more

7

Thank you to an anonymous referee from The Journal of Philosophical Research for

highlighting this concern.
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consistent and robust than situationists allow. There is thus still an important
role for personal factors and the individual in the interactionist picture of
character, and it still makes sense to talk about (at least partial) individual
responsibility for character.
In focusing on agent-environment interactions, interactionism does, of
course, raise a range of interesting normative questions. For example, as
Alfano (2014, pp. 84-86) notes, if we allow that virtues can be realised in
different ways with varying levels of input from personal, social, and asocial
environmental factors (as interactionism does), then we might wonder
whether some means of realising virtue are preferable to others. If a particular
person’s honesty is heavily reliant on environmental supports, while another
person’s is less reliant on such factors, then we might think the latter’s
honesty is more praiseworthy. Fully exploring such normative implications
lies beyond the scope of this paper. The central point though is that
interactionism preserves a role for responsibility for one’s character, and it is
unclear why additional constitutive extension claims would better clarify this.
Let’s now consider a more pressing variety of this objection. Carter and
Palermos (2016) consider some of the normative implications of extended
cognition, and argue in favour of the view that, in cases in which a person’s
cognition extends to incorporate an external artefact, such as a smartphone,
damage to that artefact should be viewed as a kind of assault, rather than
merely as property damage. Thus, if the proponents of extended cognition are
on the right track, our ethical and legal thinking will need to be revised to
account for these cases of “extended personal assault” (Carter & Palermos
2016, p. 542). Furthermore, this could help to do justice to the common
intuition that there is a special kind of importance to the devices we are deeply
involved with, and that makes them more than mere property (Carter &
Palermos 2016, p. 543). Directed towards my account, the worry is then that
by leaving constitutive extension claims out of the picture, interactionism
won’t properly recognise the normative importance of such external artefacts,
and thus wouldn’t properly account for certain kinds of harms that intuitively
seem important.
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In response to this, I’ll begin by noting that, as Carter and Palermos (2016,
p. 549) themselves acknowledge, a central premise of their argument is that
extended cognition is true. In particular, they point to feedback loops as
crucial for supporting cases of extension. As I argued in the previous subsection though, there is reason to doubt that such feedback loop-based
extension claims are adding any explanatory power. Additionally, for this to
be a compelling objection to my argument, it isn’t enough that extended
cognition is true – it also requires that extended virtue be true. As I have been
arguing throughout the paper though, there are compelling reasons to be
sceptical of moving virtue in the direction of an extended approach.
Crucially, it also again seems that extension claims are an unnecessary
addition for the argument Carter and Palermos are trying to make. They write
that:
“…whenever an individual’s mental power and faculties rely for their
operation on continuous mutual interactions between some of the
individual’s organismic faculties and some artifact of the individual’s,
we have sufficient indication that the relevant person—and the
individual’s legal and ethical rights against personal assault—should
be extended to include the artifacts involved.” (Carter & Palermos
2016, pp. 554-555).
I agree with them on this claim but disagree that an extended account is
needed to support it. As I have been arguing, we can give recognition to the
importance of ongoing interactions with our environments and other agents
without the need for constitutive extension. In these kinds of cases, if an agent
is sufficiently dependent on some external artefact, then that seems enough to
justify rethinking of it in ethical and legal terms as more than mere property.
Once again then, extension claims are an unnecessary further step.
Interactionism is thus able to account for these kinds of normative cases and
intuitions without the need for a shift to constitutive extension.
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper has argued that interactionism is not threatened by the C-C fallacy
objection. It began by noting how a number of contemporary philosophers
working on character have drawn connections between their accounts and
work on 4E cognition in the philosophy of mind. This raises concerns that
their accounts may be open to the C-C fallacy objection. In response to this,
I then proposed my own strategy for addressing the C-C fallacy: the evasion
strategy. I argued that interactionism does not require a constitutive claim
about the role of external factors in character, and thus does not need to draw
a distinction between causal coupling and constitutive extension. This allows
my brand of interactionism to escape the C-C fallacy, as it is not making
potentially false constitutive claims to begin with. As a result, interactionism
is better off not making constitution claims, and thereby avoiding this
particular metaphysical minefield altogether. This evasion strategy thus
allows interactionism to escape the C-C fallacy objection.
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Chapter 3
The Replication Crisis and Moral Character
Abstract
This paper investigates the implications of the replication crisis in psychology
for philosophical work on moral character and virtue. The replication crisis
has cast doubt on a range of psychological evidence and raised broader
questions about psychological methodology and theory. While there has thus
far been some consideration by philosophers of the general nature of the crisis
and its broad implications for the philosophy of science, there is another
crucial area that has received very little attention: the implications of the crisis
for work on the nature of character and virtue. Philosophical work on virtue
has become increasingly empirically engaged in recent years, as considerable
debate has arisen concerning the implications of psychological evidence for
philosophical theories of character and virtue. If there are potential problems
with that evidence, as the crisis seems to suggest, then it seems crucial to
consider and evaluate the replication crisis in greater detail to properly
determine its implications for philosophical work on virtue. It is the aim of
this paper to do just that. After considering the core issues of the crisis and
evaluating the evidence, I will ultimately argue that the interactionist
approach to moral character emerges as the most promising approach to
character in light of the replication crisis. The final section of the paper then
considers some broader methodological implications of the replication crisis
for future work in philosophical moral psychology.

3.1 Introduction
There has recently been significant discussion about the so-called ‘replication
crisis’ (or replicability crisis) in psychology and the social sciences. The crisis
involves a range of methodological issues with empirical work in psychology.
In particular, the results of a number of important and influential studies have
been called into question, raising broader questions about the implications
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that these issues have for both psychological theory, and, more generally,
psychology’s scientific status. While this crisis has been the subject of
significant and ongoing debate in psychology, it also has critical implications
for philosophical work that makes use of psychological evidence. While there
has thus far been some consideration by philosophers of the general nature of
the crisis and its broad implications for the philosophy of science, there is
another crucial area that has received very little attention: the implications of
the crisis for work on the nature of character and virtue. Philosophical work
on virtue has become increasingly empirically engaged in recent years, as
considerable debate has arisen concerning the implications of psychological
evidence for philosophical theories of character and virtue. If there are
potential problems with that evidence, as the crisis seems to suggest, then it
seems crucial to consider and evaluate the replication crisis in greater detail
to properly determine its implications for philosophical work on virtue. It is
the aim of this paper to do just that.
I begin by presenting some background details on the replication crisis in
general, and by reviewing the core issues at play. I then provide an overview
of the recent situationist challenge in philosophical work on virtue, and the
subsequent character-situation debate. Of particular importance here is the
recent emergence of interactionist approaches to character as competitive
alternatives to their virtue ethical and situationist rivals. With the scene set,
and the players established, I move on to consider the evidence emerging
from the replication crisis concerning psychological work on character, and
the implications of this evidence for philosophy. Section 3.4 specifically
considers the implications for philosophical theorizing about character, and
argues that interactionism emerges as the most promising approach to
character in light of the replication crisis. Section 3.5 then considers some
more general methodological implications for future research in
philosophical moral psychology. Ultimately, I hope to show both the
importance of embracing further empirical engagement and cooperation
between psychologists and philosophers, and that interactionism provides the
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ideal framework for pursuing such future work on the moral psychology of
character and virtue.

3.2 The Replication Crisis in Psychology
Issues with replication and reproducibility are not new to psychology. Even
in the early stages of psychology’s development into a formal discipline in
the late 19th and early 20th Centuries there were already studies being done on
the reproducibility or various experiments and findings. As psychological
methods, tools, and instruments became more developed and refined during
the 20th century, this interest in replication increased, both for “advancing and
refining theory,” and also for demonstrating the reliability of an effect
(Wiggins & Chrisopherson 2019, p. 203). As such efforts increased, and as
the organization and meta-analysis of psychological research increased,
confidence in psychology’s scientific legitimacy and reliability also increased
(Wiggins & Chrisopherson 2019, p. 203).
While concerns with replication have a long history, the present
“replication crisis” has primarily developed in the last decade, with many
psychologists pointing to 2011 as “the watershed year for the replication
crisis” (Wiggins & Chrisopherson 2019, p. 204). There were a number of
reasons for this, including the publication during that year of questionable
research in prestigious journals; the revelation of Diedrik Stabel’s research
fraud, which included fabricating data in many of his published studies; and
the publication of Simmons, Nelson & Simonsohn’s (2011) ‘False Positive
Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows
Presenting Anything as Significant in Psychological Science,’ which
highlighted a range of questionable research practices (QRP) in psychology
(Wiggins & Chrisopherson 2019, pp. 204-205).
The combination of these and related events and issues created a
“collective challenge to the credibility of psychological science,” and
growing concerns about the reliability and reproducibility of psychological
results (Wiggins & Chrisopherson 2019, p. 205). Subsequent broader
investigations into replication only exacerbated these concerns. For example,
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the investigation by the Open Science Collaboration (2015) that attempted to
replicate 100 studies, but reported a replication success rate of only between
36% and 47%, understandably raised some alarm bells. This has resulted in
greater concern with replication and research practices than ever before, and
with numerous other studies aiming to reproduce various results and effects.
Further studies and evidence added to these concerns about psychological
methodology. For example, the Many Labs project (Klein et al. 2014, Klein
et al. 2018), which conducted large-scale, multi-lab replication studies of a
variety of well-known psychological effects and experiments, found that a
number of them failed to replicate successfully. Similarly, a number of other
psychological theories and constructs have been cast into doubt by failed
replication efforts, including ego depletion (Hagger et al. 2016), the facial
feedback hypothesis (Wagenmakers et al. 2016), social priming (O’Donnell
et al. 2018), and the “infirm words” priming effect (Doyen et al. 2012). These
failed replications, when coupled with other issues such as QRPs, and
publishing practices that reward novel findings (which may pressure
researchers to engage in QRPs) and discourage negative findings and
replications, has resulted in the current widespread concern about whether
psychology has been undermined by this crisis of failed replications and bad
practices (Wiggins & Chrisopherson 2019).
While many have expressed concern about psychology’s replication crisis,
there is no consensus on the scale of the crisis, or even if we should be talking
about a crisis at all. For example, Smith, Smith and Smith (2017, p. 285) argue
that replication “currently exists to a sufficient degree for those findings that
are of interest to the field.” They note that while there are some issues in
psychology, such as with false positives, psychology cannot be said to be in
a crisis, and any issues can be addressed “through positive steps rather than
punitive ones,” and through “an ethic of honest reporting” (Smith, Smith &
Smith 2017, p. 285). On a different but still positive note, Rodgers and Shrout
(2018, p. 134) posit that the replication crisis has resulted in “positive selfexamination” within psychology that is helping to grow the discipline, and
assisting in the “development of new and innovative methodologies.” In

99

contrast to these positive views, others, such as Pashler and Harris (2012, p.
531), argue against claims that the replication crisis is overblown, and insist
on the need for “systematic reforms in scientific practice” within psychology.
I will not attempt to resolve such debates in this paper. Instead, what I am
concerned with is that there have been replication failures and other
methodological issues with at least some of the psychological evidence. The
existence of such problems is enough to raise concerns philosophers should
care about, so determining whether these issues are worthy of being called a
crisis will not be the focus of this paper, although I will use the term
“replication crisis” throughout as shorthand for the methodological concerns
discussed in this section. What I instead want to investigate is the nature and
implications of these methodological issues in relation to philosophical
research. Philosophers have become increasingly interested in empirical
engagement in recent years, and psychological evidence has helped to inform
philosophical work on a range of different topics. If some of the psychological
evidence used by philosophers has now been undermined, then this calls into
question the philosophical work that has drawn on this evidence. An area of
particular concern in this regard is the recent empirically inspired work on
moral character and virtue, which will be the focus of the remainder of this
paper.

3.3 Recent Developments in Virtue Theory
Before considering the evidence and implications from the replication crisis
in more detail, I first want to review some of the recent developments in
philosophical work on character, in order to establish the relevance of the
crisis to such work. The recent debates between virtue ethicists and
situationists have received significant attention in the literature, and I will not
attempt to describe them in detail here. Instead, I want to provide a snapshot
of the current state-of-play and leading approaches, and to detail a distinction
between different kinds of situational influences, as this distinction is crucial
to my analysis of the implications of the crisis in Section 3.4.
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Recent debates over the nature of character were initially sparked by
philosophical situationists, such as John Doris (1998, 2002) and Gilbert
Harman (1999). Taking inspiration from empirical evidence and the
situationist tradition in psychology, philosophical situationists challenge the
idea that people had robust, global character traits that were consistent across
situations. They argued that the evidence suggested actual human traits were
far more frail than this, and that situational factors played the primary role in
determining behavior. For this reason, the traditional virtue ethical view of
character is not empirically adequate, and should be abandoned in favour for
a moral psychology that focuses on the power of situations.
It’s important to note that while situationists have drawn on a broad range
of evidence that highlights numerous kinds of situational variables that
influence behavior, we can draw distinctions between different kinds of
situational influences. Alfano (2013, p. 40) proposes a helpful taxonomy of
situational factors that distinguishes between “bad reasons” and “situational
non-reasons.”1 Bad reasons include things like temptations to act in ways that
we know are, all-things-considered, problematic. As Alfano (2013, p. 41)
notes, temptations are easily accounted for by virtue ethicists, as they “slot
nicely into their scheme of virtue, continence, incontinence, and vice,” and
thus have not figured much in the situationist critique.
A more interesting variety of bad reason is what Alfano (2013, p. 41) calls
“situational demand characteristics.” Demand characteristics are a more
subtle kind of temptation to act on bad reasons, that “either give people bad
reasons without their realizing it or induce them to attend too much to bad
reasons and too little to good reasons” (Alfano 2013, p. 41). A well-known
example of a demand characteristic is the bystander effect, in which people
become less likely to help someone in need if there are other people present
(see, e.g., Darley & Latane 1968; Latane & Darley 1970). In bystander effect

1

Alfano (2013, pp. 50-53) also discusses a third category: “non-moral individual

differences.” As he himself notes though, the influence of such factors is harder to pinpoint,
and the evidence in favour of them much more limited. Due to this, I will leave this category
out of my discussion.
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cases, the sense of responsibility to help is diffused as the number of people
present who could help increases, because each individual now knows that
there are others who may help instead. Additionally, the presence of multiple
potential helpers also affects the ways in which individuals construe the
situation, as the inaction of others can lead them to thinking that this may not
be a situation that calls for help (Alfano 2013, p. 42). The influences involved
in bystander effect cases thus cause people to focus too much on bad reasons,
without their knowledge of this happening, which is why they are more
difficult to avoid than conventional temptations.
The evidence illustrating the power of demand characteristics raises
potential difficulties for virtue ethics, as it shows situational forces to be both
more influential than is often though, and much harder to detect. As Alfano
(2013, p. 43) notes though, improving our understanding of demand
characteristics can help us to recognize their influence. In doing so, we can
turn them into regular temptations. They may still be difficult to overcome
(as many temptations are), but this could still be potentially accounted for by
virtue ethical frameworks, although more recognition of the power of
situations would still be required.
This brings us to situational non-reasons, which create the real threat to
virtue ethical approaches. Non-reasons, as the name suggests, do not even
give agents a particular reason for action. Instead, they are “merely causal
influences on moral conduct, and yet they are hugely and secretly influential”
(Alfano 2013, p. 44). Some categories of non-reasons include priming effects,
framing effects, mood elevators and depressors, and ambient sensory stimuli,
such as light and temperature levels. Examples include the effects of ambient
sound levels on aggression and helping behavior (Donnerstein & Wilson
1976; Matthews and Cannon 1975), the impact of ambient light levels on
honesty (Zhong, Bohns & Gino 2010), and the effect of physical warmth
(from a warm beverage or heat pack) on prosocial behaviour (Williams &
Bargh 2008).
As I argued in Chapter 1, non-reasons present a particular and difficult
challenge to virtue ethical accounts, because they lay outside of the traditional

102

virtue ethical framework. Unlike bad reasons, which can cause agents to act
poorly by acting on the wrong reasons, non-reasons are seemingly morally
irrelevant, and are not actively deliberated upon by the agent, yet can still
influence behaviour. The evidence for non-reasons suggests “not that people
easily succumb to temptation, but that non-temptations play a surprisingly
large role in moral conduct” (Alfano 2013, p. 44). Evidence for these kinds
of influences thus shows that the virtue ethical model – involving as it does
responsiveness to reasons – cannot account for some important aspects of
human moral psychology.
The evidence for the importance of both bad reasons and non-reasons type
influences challenges virtue ethicists by calling into question the empirical
adequacy of their accounts of moral psychology. A range of responses have
been made to this challenge. One of the most popular is the rarity response,
which claims that virtue was always supposed to be something rarely
achieved in practice. As a result, evidence that virtue is rare doesn’t
undermine the virtue ethical framework after all. While this response does
address some of the situationist evidence, it still fails to properly account for
the surprising influence of non-reasons, which don’t fit in with the virtue
ethical focus on reasons-responsiveness. In contrast, other virtue ethicists
have taken issue with the evidence itself and questioned whether it actually
does undermine their accounts (see, e.g., Sabini & Silver 2005; Sreenivasan
2008). It is important to note though that there is now widespread recognition
of the importance of situational factors in psychology, even by personality
psychologists who have traditionally emphasized the individual as the
primary determinant of behaviour (Tracy, Robins & Sherman 2009, pp. 12131215). Thus, even if these virtue ethicists are right and there are issues with
some of the evidence, or perhaps with how that evidence has been utilized by
situationist philosophers, there is still a mass of evidence illustrating the
importance of situational influences. Further to this, I will show in the next
section why this evidence still creates problems for the virtue ethical position.
Despite the compelling evidence in favour of situationism, there is also
good reason to think that situationism itself goes too far. For example, while
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the influence of personal factors on behavior is limited, Funder and Ozer
(1983) famously claimed that the influence of situational factors was also
limited, and perhaps only a little more influential than personal factors. As a
result, there is reason to think that the power of situations and the power of
personal factors may be “roughly on par” (Alfano 2013, p. 77). Additionally,
there is also support for the importance of personal factors from the so-called
“aggregation solution” (Alfano 2016, p. 129). For example, Epstein (1983)
notes that when we consider data about the behavior of an individual over
time, and aggregate it across different situations, a greater degree of reliability
and consistency is observed. In a more recent article, Jayawickreme et al.
(2014, p. 298) surveyed a range of recent evidence supporting the importance
of personality traits, but ultimately conclude in favour of an integrated
approach: “in light of the totality of the evidence presented, psychologists
across the field have accepted the evidence and concluded that both situations
and persons are powerful.” Due to evidence such as this, situationists may
have been overstating their case by suggesting that situational influences are
the main drivers of behavior.
It is thus widely recognized in contemporary psychology that both
personal and situational factors play an important role in behavior. What thus
seems clear is that we need an approach to character that recognizes the
importance of personal, social, and environmental influences on behavior,
and the dynamic and reciprocal ways in which they influence and shape one
another. This is where interactionism enters the picture, as it provides us with
just such an account. Interactionism emphasizes the dynamic interplay
between personal and situational variables, and makes such interactions its
focus. These interactions are ongoing and multidirectional, as “situations
affect persons, who subsequently affect these situations”, and so on (Endler
1982, p. 217). Interactionism posits an important role for both personal and
situational factors, but is most interested in the ways in which they interact,
as this is crucial for understanding personality and behavior. It is also
important to note that in recognizing that the interactions between agent and
environment can be dynamic and variable, interactionism posits that character
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traits can be realized in different ways. One person’s trait of courage might
be primarily driven by their personal factors, while another person’s courage
may involve more environmental and social supports. Such traits can thus be
said to be multiply realizable (Alfano 2014, p. 84-85). 2
Interactionism has a long history in psychology and has become the
dominant approach to personality among psychologists, and is usually seen
as the logical resolution to the debates between personality theorists and
situationist social psychologists. More recently, a number of philosophers
(e.g. Alfano 2013, 2016; Skorburg 2017; 2019) have come to endorse
interactionism as being the logical next step for philosophers as well, arguing
that it represents the best fit with the empirical evidence, and that it can help
us to move past the debates between virtue ethicists and situationists.
While interactionism stands as a promising way of thinking about
character and virtue, it has not yet become a dominant approach in
philosophy, despite some claims that “everyone’s an interactionist” (Mehl et
al. 2015, p. 62). This is firstly because there has thus far been limited work
done on interactionism by philosophers, and there is thus a need for the further
development of the interactionist position in philosophy. The other reason it
can’t be said to be the dominant framework is because there continues to be
advocacy for both situationist (Vargy 2018) and more traditional virtue
ethical (West 2018) accounts of character. The debate over the nature of
character is thus still a live one.
This continued debate has had an important methodological upshot, in that
it has created a trend towards empirical engagement in philosophical moral
psychology. While some have resisted this trend, most have embraced it, and
drawing on empirical evidence from psychology is now common among

2

As Alfano (2014, p. 85-86) notes, and as I mentioned in Chapter 1, interesting normative

questions arise in relation to this multiple realisability claim. For example, we may specify
that for someone’s trait to count as virtuous, it may need to meet a minimum threshold of
contribution from their personal attributes, and thus not be overly reliant on social and
environmental supports. While interesting, fully exploring these implications is work for a
different paper.
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philosophers working on virtue. Such a methodological approach has many
potential benefits, in that it allows philosophers to develop richer and more
psychological realistic moral psychologies, which can, in turn, also help guide
work in normative ethics, such as questions about the demandingness of
moral theories. There is thus potentially much to be gained, by both
philosophers and psychologists, from greater engagement and collaboration
between the disciplines, which I will explore in more detail in Section 3.6.
In light of this empirical shift, it becomes clear why the issues with
replication in psychology should be of great concern to philosophers.
Philosophers working on character have not only been engaging with
psychology more, but have also been relying on psychological evidence for
the development of approaches like situationism and interactionism. The
replication crisis thus presents a clear threat to such work, for if the evidence
supporting these approaches is called into question, these frameworks may
similarly be undermined. While philosophers have given some attention to
the replication crisis in general, there has been very little consideration of the
implications for work on character and virtue specifically, which this paper
will hope to remedy somewhat.

3.4 Implications of the Crisis for Moral Character
Having set up the replication crisis and its relation to recent debates in
philosophy over the nature of character, I now want to investigate the
implications of the crisis for work on character in detail. What is of particular
interest is whether the more empirically engaged approaches to character that
have been developed in response to the situationist challenge, such as
interactionism, are troubled or undermined by the replication crisis. I will
seek to show that while there are issues with some of the psychological
evidence, it has not all been undermined, and there is still good support for
the importance of situational factors. Further to this, I will also sketch out a
variety of reasons why interactionism remains the best way of approaching
character, even in light of the replication crisis.
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We’ll start with the bad news. There have been replication issues with a
number of studies relevant to work on moral character. This includes some of
the evidence supporting the power of situational factors, such as some of the
evidence for situational non-reasons. As I mentioned in Section 3.2, some
priming effects have failed to replicate in subsequent studies. For example,
the Many Labs project (Klein et al. 2014), found that a number of priming
effects either replicated poorly, or not at all. Similarly, O’Donnell et al. (2018)
and Doyen et al. (2012) conducted replication studies for priming effects, and
also found a failure to replicate.
There have also been replication problems with another well-known nonreasons type effect. I previously mentioned the findings by Williams and
Bargh (2008) that physical warmth can influence prosocial behavior. As they
write: “experiences of physical temperature per se affect one’s impressions
of and prosocial behavior toward other people, without one’s awareness of
such influences” (Williams & Bargh 2008, p. 607). This study represents a
clear example of a morally irrelevant, ambient feature impacting behaviour
without the agent’s conscious awareness, and thus seems like a good example
of a situational non-reason. Yet subsequent replication studies by Lynott et
al. (2014) and Chabris et al. (2019) were unable to replicate the results of the
original study.
In addition to these issues with non-reasons type situational influences,
there have also been problems with some of the evidence for the better known,
bad reasons situational factors. The Stanford Prison Experiment (Haney,
Banks & Zimbardo 1973; Zimbardo et al. 1973), one of the most famous
psychological experiments in history, is frequently pointed to as an extreme
example of the power of situations, and was a favourite example of
situationists in philosophy. Aside from ethical concerns over the nature of the
experiment, subsequent investigation has also revealed a range of other
methodological concerns, including issues with data collection, and with the
‘guards’ in the experiment being specifically instructed on how to treat the
‘prisoners’ (Le Texier 2019). These issues have cast significant doubt on the
striking and provocative findings of the experiment.
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Based on these examples, we can see that there may be reason to question
the power of situational influences, especially when it comes to non-reasons.
The replication crisis thus may have taken the sting out of the situationist
challenge. Depending on one’s perspective though, all of this might not be
such bad news after all. For the virtue ethicist, these examples could be taken
as proof that the situationists did overstate their claims, and that virtue ethics
isn’t threatened by the evidence after all. As noted earlier, some virtue
ethicists responded to the initial situationist challenge by making arguments
criticizing the empirical evidence. The new evidence arising from the
replication crisis could support similar arguments to counter the situationist
threat. Alternatively, the virtue ethicist may take these developments as a sign
that they can justifiably ignore psychology, at least for now. As Alfano (2018,
p. 117-118) notes, earlier responses to situationism sometimes took such an
approach, arguing either that “the empirical evidence is in principle
irrelevant” to virtue theory, or that the specific kinds of evidence cited by
situationists are irrelevant to virtue theory. Again then, the replication crisis
may be taken as justification for such approaches, given that some evidence
has been cast into doubt.
As Alfano (2018) argues though, virtue ethicists would be better off taking
the former, empirically-engaged response in light of the replication crisis,
rather than the latter approach of withdrawing from or ignoring psychology.
Part of the reason for this is the general importance of psychological realism.
Flanagan (1991, p. 32) argues that the majority of ethical traditions are
committed to psychological realism to some extent, and seek to meet at least
a minimal standard, which he formulates as the Principle of Minimal
Psychological Realism (PMPR):
“Make sure when constructing a moral theory of projecting a moral ideal
that the character, decision processing, and behavior prescribed are
possible, or are perceived to be possible, for creatures like us.”
Further to this, virtue ethics has traditionally been particularly concerned with
psychological realism, both in the sense that virtue ethicists frequently make
descriptive claims about moral psychology, and also that the Aristotelian
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tradition has always emphasized the importance of practice, and the actual
cultivation of virtuous traits, rather than a purely theoretical understanding of
virtue. To remain separated from or uninterested in the empirical evidence
thus seems problematic in light of such aspirations.
More than this though, the virtue ethicist should take the empirically
engaged response because things seem to be shaping up in their favour.
Evidence supporting personal factors, such as personality traits, has thus far
not been as troubled by replication issues as the evidence for situational
influences. In terms of the evidence for situational factors, Alfano (2018, p.
119) notes that the best supported situational influences tend to be those that
“provide reasons for thought, feeling, and action.” As a result, while virtue
ethics may be in need of some revisions, the core account of human agency
offered by virtue ethics hasn’t been undermined, because it is able to account
for these kinds of reason-giving situational influences (Alfano 2018, p. 119).
If the replication crisis does show non-reasons to be out of the moral
psychological picture, then virtue ethics may turn out to be empirically
adequate after all, and be the best framework for future philosophical work
on the moral psychology of character.
I want to argue to against this line of thinking, and to instead show that
interactionism remains the better fit with the empirical evidence. 3 To do this,
I’ll begin by noting that that there is still support for the existence of nonreasons. There has been good support for priming, for one thing. For example,
in contrast to the previously mentioned failed replication of the “infirm
words” priming effect by Doyen et al. (2012), there have been two successful
replications of this effect by Cesario, Plaks and Higgins (2006) and Hull et al.
(2002). Additionally, a meta-analysis of 167 studies conducted by Cameron,
Brown-Iannuzzi and Payne (2012, p. 330) found that “sequential priming

3

It is worth noting that interactionism and virtue ethics need not be incompatible. Some

traditional approaches to virtue ethics, such as Aristotelianism, already contain some
interactionist elements, and with a suitable amount of revision we could derive a fully
interactionist virtue ethics. My point here is that virtue ethics is not interactionist enough, and
it is still troubled by the empirical evidence, especially the influence of non-reasons.
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tasks were significantly associated with behavioral measures,” and that “these
results generalized across a variety of study domains and methodological
behaviors.” There is thus still a broad range of support for priming effects,
and we shouldn’t be too quick to dismiss them on the basis of a few failed
replications.
Similarly, the issues with Williams and Bargh’s (2008) work on
temperature and prosocial behavior that I mentioned before is not a settled
matter either. To begin with, there has been a successful conceptual
replication of the study by IJzerman and Semin (2009), which has itself been
replicated by Schilder, IJzerman and Denissen (2014). Further to this, Bargh
and Melnikoff (2019) also highlight related studies showing the ability of
physical warmth to prime social warmth, as well as neuroscientific evidence
supporting this phenomenon. Bargh and Melnikoff (2019) also note some
methodological reasons that the previously mentioned replication by Chabris
et al. (2019) may have failed, such as differences in the temperature of the
beverage between the original study and the replication. While further
investigation may be necessary, there is thus still good suggestive support for
the influence of these kinds of situational non-reasons as well.
As well as this evidence for non-reasons, there has also been replication
support for situational demand characteristics. For example, Milgram (1963,
1974) repeated his famous experiments on obedience, one of the most
frequently cited situationist examples, and replicated its results reliably
(Pettigrew 2018, p. 968). With some adjustments made in response to ethical
concerns, Doliński et al. (2017) were also able to produce results similar to
Milgram’s original studies. Alfano (2013, p. 42) highlights support for
another well-known situational factor, the previously mentioned bystander
effect, which has been well-supported by a range of related studies (Latané &
Nida 1981; Schwartz & Gottlieb 1980).
As a final point of response to the replication crisis, we can note that
replication failures in and of themselves do not prove the phenomena or effect
in question do not exist, and there may be other factors at play. Vargy (2018,
p. 280) notes: “Given the complex nature of social and motivational
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behaviours, it is natural to expect priming effects to exhibit significant
variations due to individual differences and minor variables in the
experimental context,” and that we thus shouldn’t jump too quickly to
conclusions in response to replication failures. In a different vein, Doris
(2015, pp. 46-47) posits that responses to evidence of priming effects may
have been coloured by the incredulity bias, which “presumes that if a study
reports a surprising finding, there must be something fishy.” Finally, the
authors of the second Many Labs report (Klein et al. 2018), which found a
number of replication failures, note that “the failures to replicate do not
necessarily mean that the tested hypotheses are incorrect,” and that further
investigation and study is needed to better explore particular effects and
phenomena. We thus shouldn’t take a failed replication as immediate proof
against a particular experiment or hypothesis.
In making the points in this section, I have not been trying to show that the
replication crisis is a non-issue, and that there are no issues with the relevant
evidence. Clearly there are methodological problems in psychology,
including issues with some of the evidence related to character and moral
behavior. What I have tried to show though is that when it comes to evidence
for the power of situations, not all the relevant studies have failed to replicate,
and some of it has actually replicated quite well. There is thus still quite a
large mass of evidence supporting the existence and surprising influence of
both situational bad-reasons and situational non-reasons.
As a result of all this, we can see that despite some replication problems,
there is still compelling evidence for both situational demand characteristics,
and situational non-reasons. When taken together with the evidence
supporting the role of personal factors, we can see that it is still important to
give proper consideration to both personal and situational factors. Crucially,
we can see that there is still support for at least some non-reason type
situational factors, which means that there are still significant problems for
virtue ethics, as its framework cannot properly incorporate such morally
irrelevant influences on moral behavior. In contrast to virtue ethics and
situationism, interactionism is able to properly account for and explain this
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full range of personal and situational factors. It thus remains a highly
compelling framework for character, as it possesses greater explanatory
power than its rivals.
In addition, empirical evidence continues to support interactionism’s
appeal as a framework for understanding and predicting behavior (Fleeson
2007), and there is also a range of evidence supporting interactionist
interpretations of various kinds of moral behavior (see, e.g., Walker, Frimer
& Dunlop 2010; Romer, Gruder & Lizzardo 1986; Jayawickreme & Di
Stefano 2012). Interactionism is also widely acknowledged as the dominant
framework for personality and character in psychology (Hill & Lapsley 2009;
McAdams 2006). There is thus still significant empirical support for the
interactionist position.
Ultimately, it is my contention that despite some replication issues,
interactionism still represents the best fit with the empirical evidence, and is
not undermined by the ongoing replication crisis. Virtue ethicists may take
the crisis as good news, and perhaps even as a sign that they can return to the
earlier, less empirically engaged approaches to virtue theory that were
dominant before the situationist challenge. As I have argued though, there is
still good support for the power of situations, so if the virtue ethicists were to
carry on with business as usual and ignore this evidence, their account would
be empirically inadequate. In showing how interactionism can cope with the
replication crisis, I hope to have further highlighted interactionism’s appeal
as an account of character, and its advantages over its rivals.

3.4.1 Is Interactionism Held Hostage by the Evidence?
I want to turn now to a potential worry about interactionism that is amplified
by the present state of flux in the evidence, which we can call the ‘hostage to
the evidence objection.’ The worry is that if we pitch interactionism’s chief
selling point as being its empirical adequacy, and that it provides a better fit
with the evidence than its rivals, then it might become hostage to the evidence.
That is to say, if interactionism’s fit with the empirical evidence is its only (or
at least its main) selling point, then if there were to be a significant change in
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the evidence and the prevailing empirical view, the rug could be pulled out
from under the interactionist and leave them with very little to go on. Given
the ongoing crisis and instability in psychology and questions over the
empirical evidence, this seems to be a particularly pressing issue. As a result
of such ongoing questions over the evidence, we might not want our approach
to character to be entirely dependent on such evidence.
To press this objection, a critic might contend that because, in the previous
section, I argued that interactionism seems best positioned given how it fits
with the evidence, that I am placing my argument on shaky foundations. If
problems were to arise with that evidence, or new evidence were to emerge
that overturned the prevailing view, then interactionism would need to fall
back on some other desirable attributes. If the evidence forms the entire basis
of its appeal as a theory of character though, then the interactionist would
have nothing else to fall back to. While this could be a general concern or
worry for theories of character, it seems particularly concerning in light of the
ongoing crisis in psychology. The concerns over various existing kinds of
evidence, coupled with the potential for new kinds of evidence to arise (given
psychology’s relative immaturity as a scientific discipline) mean that there is
a genuine concern over whether the interactionist might be going awry by
making themselves so dependent on the evidence.
To address this concern, I first want to begin by acknowledging that, at
least to a certain extent, it is necessary for interactionism to be dependent on
the evidence. This is because, in so far as interactionism aims at being an
account of the descriptive moral psychology of character that is
psychologically realistic, it will always be beholden, at least to an extent, to
the evidence that informs our best understanding of the psychological
properties of human agents. Even if we are only interested in a minimal sense
of psychological realism, such as Flanagan’s (1991) PMPR, we would still
need to meet basic requirements about proposing models of character and
moral agency that are actually attainable by human agents. The systematic
observations of human behavior presented in psychological evidence would
then be one of the primary ways we can determine if we are meeting such
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requirements. Thus, unless we were content with abandoning psychological
realism all together, our theorizing about the moral psychology of character
will always need to be tied to the best available empirical evidence, at least
to some extent.
In addition to this though, I will also make a few points about
interactionism’s advantages beyond just giving the best fit with the empirical
evidence, to show how it has some insurance against new developments in
relation to the empirical evidence, and thereby dispel the worry over it being
held hostage to the evidence. Firstly, we can note that interactionism, as a
theoretical framework for character, possesses great explanatory scope and
power. It doesn’t focus narrowly on either persons or situations, but instead
seeks to give proper attention to both, always with an eye to the ways they
interact with and influence each other. In casting such a wide net, it seeks to
capture the full richness of character and moral psychology, and to properly
consider them in their environmentally situated contexts. While the true
measure of its explanatory power will be dependent on the empirical
evidence, its broad scope sets it apart from rivals that tend to focus on one
side of the person-situation equation at the expense of the other.
Related to this first point, interactionism also has great flexibility and
adaptability. Interactionism has broad scope, in that it properly recognizes
both personal and situational influences on behavior, and the varied ways in
which they can interact with each other. This makes it better positioned to
adapt to future shifts and developments in the empirical evidence. For
example, if, contra my arguments in Section 3.4, it turned out that a lot of the
evidence supporting the power of situations had been undermined, this
wouldn’t necessarily also undermine interactionism. The interactionist may
need to revise their account of the role of situations, but unless new
developments in the evidence somehow showed situations had almost no
influence on agents, or that the interactions between the agent and the
situation were unimportant, the interactionist ship would not be sunk. In
contrast, this kind of undermining of the evidence would cast significant
doubt on situationist accounts of character. The same can be said if we
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reversed the case and new evidence emerged that showed personal factors to
be less important in moral behavior than previously thought. This would
create significant problems for the virtue ethicist, but could be accounted for
by interactionism.
As I noted earlier, moreover, interactionism allows for character traits to
be realized in different ways, with varying levels of input from environmental
and personal factors. If it turned out that personal factors only played a
significant role in the character or a very small number of people, or,
conversely, that personal factors were the drivers for character for most
people, then interactionism could account for either development. As I argued
above though, interactionism, like any account interested in psychological
realism, will always be somewhat dependent on the evidence, and this
flexibility thus wouldn’t be limitless. What I have tried to show though is that
interactionism possesses a great deal of flexibility, and is thus well-equipped
to handled future changes or shifts in the evidence.
The final point I will make in response to the hostage to the evidence
objection is that it also applies to situationists and virtue ethicists. Provided
they are interested in some degree of psychological realism for their accounts
of character, virtue ethicists and situationists will also be held hostage by the
evidence. Given that empirical evidence was the main driver of the
development of situationism in philosophy, it would be a very strange move
for the situationist to abandon psychological realism. As I discussed earlier
though, some virtue ethicists have taken the approach of suggesting their
accounts are unfalsifiable, or that they don’t need to be empirically adequate,
so they might insist that they are not held hostage by the evidence after all.
As I also argued earlier though, this seems to be a problematic move, given
that virtue ethics often takes its descriptive richness to be a key selling point,
and that virtue ethicists traditionally have placed a great deal of importance
on the practical elements of moral development. Furthermore, many virtue
ethicists have now noted the need for empirical adequacy, thereby making
themselves hostage to the evidence as well.
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Due to these factors, the hostage to the evidence objection also applies to
virtue ethics and situationism. Further to this though, because interactionism
has great scope and flexibility as a theory of character, it is actually better
able to handle this objection than its rivals, and for that reason, we can see
that the hostage to the evidence objection is actually a more serious threat to
situationism and virtue ethics than it is to interactionism. Thus, while this
objection may persist, interactionism has theoretical resources and
advantages beyond its fit with the empirical evidence, and this results in it
being able to handle the hostage to the evidence objection better than its
rivals.

3.5 Methodological Implications for Work in Philosophical
Moral Psychology
In this final section I want to consider some broader, methodological
implications of the replication crisis for philosophy work on character, and
moral psychology more generally. The main line of thinking I will seek to
address goes something like this: the replication crisis raises serious questions
about psychology’s scientific status, and the legitimacy and usefulness of its
evidence. While I agree that the ongoing replication problems in psychology
show the need for greater care and caution in the use of psychological
evidence in philosophical theorizing, I will seek to demonstrate in this section
why the best response is further engagement and collaboration with
psychology, rather than withdrawing from empirical engagement in favour of
more traditional philosophical methods.
I’ll start by considering this worry in relation to work on character in
particular. In the previous section, I noted that issues with the evidence for
non-reasons might make the virtue ethicist think that their account was
empirically adequate after all, before going on to show why this attitude
would be problematic. Now I want to consider the possibility that the
replication crisis might make the virtue ethicist (and other philosophers
working on character) skeptical of empirical engagement in general. The
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character-situation debate arose directly in response to empirical evidence.
Now that such evidence has been called into question, philosophers working
on character may wonder if it was just a lot of fuss over nothing. As a result,
empirical engagement may not be that important after all, and we could return
to pre-debate ways of doing philosophical work on character, which were
“largely divorced from empirical psychology” (Snow 2010, p. 2). This could
be taken two ways. The first would be a response of delaying action: we
should hold off from further use of psychological evidence until psychology
has got its house in order. The second is a more extreme version: empirical
engagement for philosophical theorizing about character is a misguided
endeavor, and we should focus instead on other methodological approaches.
Related to this second option, the virtue ethicist might insist that the
empirical evidence is irrelevant to virtue theory, or that their theory of virtue
is in some sense unfalsifiable, as was seen in some earlier contributions to the
character-situation debate (Alfano 2018, pp. 117-118). In any of these
responses just discussed, the ultimate result is a withdrawing from
engagement with psychology, either temporarily, or permanently.
The same worry could be expanded to apply more generally to the use of
psychological evidence in other philosophical work on moral psychology, and
also to other areas of philosophical research that draws on psychology, such
as the philosophy of mind. Engagement with psychology and empirical
evidence has become commonplace in many areas of philosophical inquiry.
The replication crisis may show that this trend is misguided though, and that
again we should either hold off on our engagement with psychology for now,
or perhaps turn to other, less empirically engaged philosophical methods
instead.
In response to this worry, we can start by noting that there is some merit
to this line of thinking. Some philosophers have been too easily impressed by,
and too quick to draw implications from, evidence that is limited in scope, or
that was methodologically suspect. There is thus a legitimate need for a more
cautious and critical approach to empirical engagement, one that doesn’t leap
to drawing drastic conclusions too readily.
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This doesn’t show that we should be withdrawing from empirical
engagement with psychology though. This is firstly because there is good
support for and replication of some of the evidence, as I argued in the previous
section. In addition, a range of other studies have successfully replicated,
while others still require further investigation and replication. Given the
positive signs of successful replication though, coupled with the wealth of
psychological studies that are conducted with exacting and precise
methodologies to begin with, we can take a positive outlook on the chances
of successful future replication studies. Thus, while the crisis raises legitimate
concerns and shows that more analysis and replication is needed, there is also
reason to think that the scale and breadth of the problems is at least somewhat
overblown (Smith, Smith & Smith 2017).
Additionally, while replication problems and suspect methodologies do
raise justified worries, the crisis is not an entirely negative thing. As I noted
in Section 3.2, some psychologists argue that the crisis is helping to generate
greater interest in psychological methodology, and fostering greater selfanalysis and rigour, the development of new methodologies, and greater
interest in replication studies to better support claims and theories (Rodgers
& Shrout 2018). This last point is important, given that psychology journals
have traditionally shown limited interest in publishing replication studies, so
the replication crisis is helping to shift these publication practices in favour
of more replication (Wiggins & Chrisopherson 2019, p. 207). These positive
developments thus illustrate that the replication crisis may be a healthy sign
of psychology’s scientific maturation, as it refines its methodological tools,
and better supports its claims and theories.
Taken together, the fact that there is a wealth of good psychological
evidence, and that psychology as a discipline is rapidly responding to existing
issues, moving away from engagement with psychology in philosophy would
be an unnecessary step and an overreaction. Indeed, philosophers could play
a role in assisting psychologists to move past this crisis. As Morawski (2019)
notes, the crisis doesn’t just raise methodological concerns, but also questions
about psychology’s underlying philosophical and theoretical approaches,

118

such as conceptual questions about what constitutes a ‘crisis’ and
‘replication,’ and also about psychology’s epistemological and metaphysical
commitments. Philosophers could play a role in helping psychologists
address such questions.
Benefits run both ways though: as I have noted at various points,
psychological evidence usefully informs philosophical work on moral
character, and a range of other topics. Greater engagement and collaboration
between philosophy and psychology could thus also lead to the gathering of
valuable new empirical evidence. For example, the work conducted by
Bollich et al. (2016) featured an interdisciplinary team of philosophers and
psychologists (including John Doris) and developed an innovative method of
investigating everyday moral behaviour. Similarly, Mark Alfano, one of the
primary proponents of interactionism in philosophy, has recently done
worked (Alfano et al. 2017) with a team of psychologists and philosophers to
investigate intellectual humility. Such work highlights the benefits of greater
collaboration between philosophy and psychology.
Ultimately, I have tried to show in this section that philosophers should
not jump to drastic conclusions in response to the replication crisis. While the
crisis has drawn attention to the need for cautious and critical engagement,
there is still a broad range of useful and well-supported psychological
evidence, and a range of benefits to be gained from further engagement with
psychology. Withdrawing from empirical engagement would thus be a
mistake. Further to this, as I argued in the previous section, interactionism as
a philosophical approach to character has the best fit with the empirical
evidence, even in light of the replication crisis. Interactionism also remains
the dominant approach to personality in psychology. It is thus ideally
positioned to guide future collaborative work between philosophers and
psychologists that investigates the nature of character and moral behaviour.

3.6 Conclusion
This paper has argued in favour of a response to the replication crisis that
recognizes the issues and challenges involved, while also arguing that this
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should not cause us to abandon engagement with empirical psychology in
the philosophy of character. I have attempted to show that interactionism is
capable of weathering this replication storm better than its rivals, and is an
excellent framework for guiding future work on moral character. The paper
began by reviewing the replication crisis in psychology, and some reasons
why, despite the limited attention it has received in the philosophical
literature, it should be of great interest to both philosophers in general, and
to those working on virtue theory in particular. I then considered the recent
debates over the nature of character in the philosophical literature, and how
the replication crisis poses a potential challenge to empirically-driven
approaches to character, such as situationism and interactionism. In
response to this, I set about reviewing the evidence concerning replication
and other methodological issues with the psychological evidence relating to
character. While some of the evidence is troubled by replication problems,
there is also support for the influence of both bad-reasons and non-reasons
type situational effects.
For these reasons, I have argued that it is problematic to simply write off
the situational evidence as completely undermined, as not all the evidence
has methodological problems, and some of it has been well supported and
replicated. As such, it would be problematic for philosophers to revert back
to less empirically engaged approaches to moral psychology, as there is still
good evidence that challenges traditional virtue ethical accounts. As a result,
interactionism still seems like the best fit with the empirical evidence, and
the best framework for guiding future work and adapting to future
developments in the empirical evidence, owing to its greater explanatory
power and theoretical flexibility. In the final section of the paper I tried to
illustrate the need for further engagement by philosophers with the
empirical literature, and for greater collaboration between philosophers and
psychologists, which could have great mutual benefit. While the replication
crisis may show the need for greater caution and precision when it comes to
drawing implications for philosophical theorizing from empirical
psychology, this doesn’t mean that such efforts are not worthwhile, or that
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the recent interactionist trend in philosophy was misguided. Interactionism
still stands as the framework of character that has the best fit with both
psychological theory and the empirical evidence, and is thus best positioned
to drive future work in philosophical moral psychology.
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Chapter 4
Virtue, Well-Being, and Interactionism
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate some of the implications of situationism
for philosophical thinking about well-being, and in particular for perfectionist
approaches to well-being. Given the deep connection between virtue and
well-being for perfectionism, the situationist threat to conventional models of
virtue also raises doubts over perfectionist accounts of well-being. In this
paper I will present two situationist challenges that undermine Aristotelian
perfectionism. I will then introduce and motivate a shift towards a different
version of perfectionism: interactionist perfectionism (IP). In showing that
this interactionist version of perfectionism can counter the two main
challenges from situationism, I will demonstrate that perfectionism can
survive this empirically motivated critique, and remains an appealing and
viable way of approaching well-being.

4.1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to investigate some of the implications of situationism
for philosophical thinking about well-being, and in particular for perfectionist
approaches to well-being. Given the deep connection between virtue and
well-being for perfectionism, the situationist threat to conventional models of
virtue also raises doubts over perfectionist accounts of well-being. While the
situationist challenge to Aristotelian virtue ethics has received significant
attention, the issues it raises for thinking about well-being have received far
less consideration. More pointedly, while some authors (Haybron 2014) have
highlighted the threat that situationism poses to Aristotelian accounts of wellbeing, there have been no substantive efforts to show how this challenge can
be answered.
In this paper I will present two challenges to perfectionism that arise from
the situationist literature and show how they undermine Aristotelian
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perfectionism. I will then introduce and motivate a shift towards a different
version of perfectionism: interactionist perfectionism (IP). This strategy of
using interactionism to address these challenges to perfectionism is new to
the literature, and provides a superior choice compared to other strategies
derived from the character-situation debate, such as the rarity response. In
showing that this interactionist version of perfectionism can counter the two
main challenges from situationism, I will demonstrate that perfectionism can
survive this empirically motivated critique, and remains an appealing and
viable way of approaching well-being.

4.2 Well-Being, Perfectionism, and Aristotelianism
Before considering some of the specific details of perfectionist theories of
well-being, I first want to clarify the conceptual terrain. Well-being and
happiness are often used synonymously, in both public discourse and the
philosophical literature. Yet many philosophers also seek to draw distinctions
between the two. Drawing on Haybron’s (2008, p. 29) illuminating account,
we can note that: “The concept of well-being is a normative or evaluative
concept that concerns what benefits a person, is in her interest, is good for
her, or makes her life go well for her.” Happiness can be used in the same
sense as this, but it is more commonly used in a purely psychological sense
to refer to “some broad and typically lasting aspect of the individual’s state
of mind: being happy” (Haybron 2008, p. 30). This psychological sense of
being happy also needs to be kept separate from the temporary emotional or
mood sense of “feeling happy,” as happiness involves long-term
psychological experiences, as opposed to just short-term feelings of happiness
(Haybron 2008, p. 30). Broken down this way, we thus have two distinct
concepts in this discussion: one which concerns what it is for someone’s life
to go well for them (well-being), and one which involves an appealing longterm psychological state (the most common view of happiness) (Haybron
2008, p. 32).
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Other concepts of importance in the literature are flourishing, eudaimonia,
and welfare. Eudaimonia being the term originally used by Aristotle, and
generally thought of as conveying something like the definition of well-being
outlined above. Similarly, welfare and flourishing are also most commonly
used in the same way as well-being, and together with ‘well-being,’ are
generally seen as the best ways of translating eudaimonia into English. Using
the distinction made above between well-being and happiness, we can see
why many have argued that Aristotle had no theory or conception of
happiness at all, but only a theory of well-being (Kraut 1979, p. 167; Haybron
2008, p. 32). This is because Aristotle was concerned with what makes
someone’s life to go well for them, and not with their lasting psychological
state. While this may be disputed, what’s critical for my purposes in this paper
is that I am focused on what it is for someone’s life to go well for them, rather
than with purely psychological states. It is for this reason that I will discuss
‘well-being’ throughout the rest of the paper, rather than ‘happiness.’
In this paper I will focus on perfectionist theories of well-being, which are
those that take perfection to be a “fundamental or ultimate constituent of wellbeing” (Haybron 2007, p. 2). For perfectionists, perfection is often a matter
of maximising one’s capacities or nature, but can be thought of more broadly
as involving excellence or virtue, which “includes, but certainly is not limited
to, moral virtue” (Haybron 2007, p. 2). Perfectionist theories of well-being
are far from being dominant in the contemporary literature, but they have
recently seen a resurgence in interest.1 In particular, Aristotelian theories of
well-being, which fall under the perfectionist banner, have been growing in
interest and influence and have become “chief competitors in discussions of
well-being” (Haybron 2007, p. 1). Aristotelian perfectionism is the most
popular variety of perfectionism, and it is thus worth discussing in a bit more
detail.
What is critical for Aristotelian approaches is that “well-being consists in
a life of virtuous activity” (Haybron 2014, p. 252). As Aristotle
1

For recent prominent examples of perfectionist accounts, see Badhwar (2014) and Kraut

(2007).
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(Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a16-17) writes: “human good turns out to be
activity of the soul in conformity with excellence, and if there are more than
one excellence, in conformity with the best and most complete.” Summarising
Aristotle, Kraut (1979, p. 170) notes that “Aristotle thinks that the most
eudaimon individual is someone who has fully developed and regularly
exercises the various virtues of the soul, both intellectual and moral.”
Furthermore, it is critical to Aristotle’s view of well-being that it takes place
over the course of “a complete life. For one swallow does not make a summer,
nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man
blessed and happy” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a18-20). Finally, it is also
important to note that Aristotle takes external goods (such as friendship) to
play an important role in supporting the “active life of virtue,” and in making
it possible to achieve things (Annas 1993, p. 367). For Aristotle, “Happiness,
then, is an actively virtuous life which has available to and for it an adequate
supply of external goods” (Annas 1993, p. 368).
Drawing on these ideas and others from Aristotle and Aristotelian
theorists, Haybron (2007, pp. 2-4) distils the Aristotelian perspective on wellbeing into three central claims. The first of these claims is “welfare
perfectionism,” which is the claim that “well-being consists, non-derivatively,
at least partly in perfection: excellence or virtue – or, in the Aristotelian case,
excellence or virtuous activity,” (Haybron 2007, p. 2). The second central
claim endorsed by Aristotelians is externalism. Internalism, which is closely
related to subjectivism, holds that an agent’s well-being depends on their
features as an individual, rather than as a member of their species or culture
of group. What matters for well-being for internalists depends on what a
particular individual is like, and has nothing to do with what any other
individuals or groups are like (Haybron 2007, p. 3). Aristotelians oppose
internalism, and instead hold an externalist view because their theories
“ground well-being in facts about the species,” rather than focusing on the
features of particular individuals (Haybron 2007, p. 3). The final central claim
of Aristotelian theories of well-being is “welfare eudaimonism,” which posits
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that well-being is a teleological affair that involves the “fulfillment of our
natures” (Haybron 2007, p. 3).
Perfectionist theories in general, and Aristotelian perfectionism in
particular, are growing in interest, and also hold considerable intuitive appeal
(Braddock 2010). The emergence in recent years of empirically informed
criticisms of conventional accounts of virtue poses a serious threat to
perfectionists though, given their emphasis on the necessity of virtuous
activity to well-being. My aim is to show that perfectionism can overcome
this challenge, but not in its usual Aristotelian form. The following sections
will explore the situationist challenge to virtue ethics, and how this creates
two serious challenges for Aristotelian perfectionism that are difficult to
overcome. In the final section of the paper I will then illustrate how my
alternative perfectionist account, interactionist perfectionism, can more
effectively address these challenges, and thereby defend perfectionism from
the situationist assault.

4.3 Situationism and Challenges to Aristotelian theories of
Well-Being
The character-situation debate has been discussed at length by numerous
others, and will no doubt be familiar to most, so I will not delve into it in great
detail. A quick review, though, should serve to set up the discussion and
argument to come. Philosophical situationism, which emerged in the 1990s,
was inspired by much earlier work in psychology. Psychological situationists,
who came into prominence in the 1960s and 1970s, had challenged the
prevailing person and trait-focused views of personality, and instead
emphasised the importance of situational factors as determinants of
behaviour. An important early inspiration for this trend was Hartshorne and
May’s (1928) extensive study of honesty and dishonesty amongst a group of
over 10,000 school children. Their investigation challenged conventional
ideas of cross-situational consistency - that people possessed personality traits
that were consistent over both time and varying situations - and instead
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suggested that behavioural variance had more to do with situational forces.
Later experiments lent support to this situationist view, and sharpened the
challenge to traditional views of personality and traits. Examples of some of
these experiments include: the infamous “Stanford Prison Experiment”
conducted by Philip Zimbardo and colleagues (Zimbardo et al. 1973; Haney,
Banks & Zimbardo 1973); Isen and Levin’s (1972) work on helping
behaviour; Darley and Batson’s (1973) Princeton Theological Seminary
study on helping behaviour; Darley and Latane’s (1968, 1970) research on
the “bystander effect” and the “diffusion of responsibility”; and Milgram’s
(1963, 1974) studies on obedience. Research such as this presented a strong
challenge to conventional accounts of personality and behaviour, and drove a
new approach in which “situational factors are seen as the most powerful
determinants of behaviour” (Krahe 1992, p. 29).
Unsurprisingly, philosophers eventually began to take note of this
evidence and its possible implications for philosophical theories of character
and moral psychology. This trend was anticipated at an early stage by
Flanagan (1991), but was primarily driven into the philosophical mainstream
by the work of Gilbert Harman and John Doris. Harman (1999, pp. 316-317)
drew attention to evidence of the “fundamental attribution error,” which
posits that people regularly overemphasise the importance of personal factors
as determinants of behaviour, and underemphasise the importance of
situational influences. Harman (2000, p. 223) also made the more radical
proposal that the empirical evidence offers no reason for supposing that
people have character traits at all, and that we might be better off with
jettisoning all notions of character from our thinking about psychology.
Harman was thus the most radical and provocative of the philosophical
situationists.2
Doris (1998, 2002) is more restrained than Harman, and provides a more
developed situationist account. Rather than attacking character broadly
2

It is important to note though that Harman’s view is qualified somewhat, in that he is

talking about character and traits as they are normally conceived. Additionally, in later
work (see Merritt, Doris & Harman 2010) Harman’s approach is no longer quite so radical.
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conceived, Doris (2002, p. 22) specifically targets “globalist” accounts of
character, which are those that hold that character is both consistent across
varying situations, and stable over time in similar situations. He contends that
empirical evidence fails to support the globalist picture of character, and
instead shows that the powerful influence of situational factors means that
character lacks consistency, although it can be stable. The globalist model of
character is thus empirically inadequate (Doris 2002, p. 23). The reason this
argument is troubling for Aristotelian virtue ethicists is because they endorse
a globalist picture of character and virtue, which by situationist lights is an
empirically inadequate and psychologically unrealistic model of virtue. This
is particularly worrying for Aristotelians, given their traditional practical
focus on character development and a descriptively rich and accurate moral
psychology.
The situationist critique generated significant debate and further research.
Many sought to reject the situationist conclusions in order to defend
Aristotelian virtue ethics, and they devised a variety of strategies for doing
so.3 One of the most popular of these was the rarity response or rarity reply.4
Put simply, this response argues that empirical evidence of the rarity of virtue
is not concerning for virtue ethicists, as virtue is supposed to be a rare
achievement in practice. The rarity reply thus attempts to defuse situationism
by positing that Aristotelian virtue ethics is compatible with the empirical
evidence. Other strategies including abandoning a globalist account of traits
to focus on virtuous actions or local virtues (see, e.g., Adams 2006; Hurka
2006); and arguing that the situationist interpretation of the empirical
evidence is flawed, and that the evidence may actually support traditional
globalist accounts of virtue rather than undermine them (see, e.g., Sreenivasan
2002, 2008; Sabini & Silver 2005; Russell 2009; Snow 2010).

3

Alfano (2013b) provides a useful classification and analysis of the primary strategies

adopted for responding to situationism.
4

For examples of theorists who endorse or discuss the rarity response, see, e.g., Miller

(2003); Athanassoulis (2000); Kamtekar (2004); Kupperman (2001); Kristjansson (2008);
and Wielenberg (2006).
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While these strategies for responding to situationism have some
advantages, they didn’t go far enough to defeat situationism. Situationists, in
turn, made their own replies to these strategies. For example, Alfano (2013a,
pp. 78-79) has argued that accounts such as Snow’s and Russell’s, which rely
on the cognitive-affective personality system (CAPS) view of traits, cannot
save virtue ethics, because the CAPS model of traits does not match up with
an Aristotelian one. In a different vein, Merritt, Doris and Harman (2010)
have argued that additional issues persist for the Aristotelian, including
concerns over their accounts of agency and rationality. In short, the charactersituation debate has received no clear resolution, and remains an ongoing area
of research and debate.
As this debate has developed, a variety of alternative approaches –
standing outside of both the situationist and traditional virtue ethical camps –
have emerged. The most prominent and promising of these is interactionism.
Interactionism also takes a cue from earlier developments in psychology, in
which interactionism developed as a resolution to the debate between
situationist social psychologists and traditional trait-focused personality
psychologists. In contrast to these two traditions, interactionism posited that
the “the personality vs situation issue was a pseudo issue” (Endler 1973, p.
301). Summarising the interactionist approach in psychology, Krahe (1992,
p. 70) writes that “actual behaviour is a function of a continuous process of
multidirectional interaction or feedback between the individual and the
situations he or she encounters.” This interactionist approach has been
developed in philosophy in recent years by a number of scholars, such as
Mark Alfano, who argues for an interactionist approach to character that
recognises it is “partly due to features of the agent, partly due to features of
the situation, and partly due to the interaction between the two” (Alfano 2016,
pp. 130-131). This interactionist trend can also be seen in the work of Howell
(2016) and Skorburg (2017). These philosophers draw on interactionist
psychology to propose new, interactionist models of character in philosophy,
that stand in contrast to both situationism and traditional virtue ethical
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accounts.5 Interactionism holds great promise as a research paradigm for
work on character. In Section 4.6 I will return to interactionism to see if it can
help to defend perfectionism from situationist challenges.
In the following sections I will evaluate two challenges to perfectionist
accounts of well-being that arise out of the character-situation debate. There
are additional criticisms of perfectionist theories in addition to these
challenges derived from situationism, but these will not be considered in this
paper. I will focus on these situationist threats for two reasons. Firstly,
because they are relatively new, and have thus far received limited attention
in the literature. Secondly, because these challenges are particularly worrying
for the perfectionist, in that they threaten to undermine the practical and
naturalist nature of many perfectionist theories, in particular Aristotelian
ones, by calling into question the psychological realism of their accounts.
Situationism thus poses a pressing threat that needs to be adequately
addressed. Given that Aristotelianism is the most influential and popular
brand of perfectionism about well-being, the next two sections will focus on
Aristotelian theories and how they are challenged by situationism. Section 4.6
will then introduce my own alternative perfectionist account to show how it
can more effectively deal with these challenges.

4.4 The Direct Challenge
The first challenge from situationism to Aristotelian theories of well-being
that I will consider is what I will call the “Direct Challenge.” It is so named
because it takes the conclusions of situationists about Aristotelian virtue
ethics, and directly applies them to theories of well-being. In essence,
situationists of all stripes challenge Aristotelian accounts of virtue and
character traits, and posit that very few people, if anyone, actually possess

5

While interactionism differs from both situationism and traditional or Aristotelian virtue

ethical accounts, it has points of overlap with both. My own view, as will be made clear
during the paper, is that interactionism can support a revised virtue ethical approach, but
such an approach has key differences from traditional Aristotelianism.
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traits of the kind featured in Aristotelian models. As has been noted,
Aristotelian theories of well-being hold that well-being crucially depends on
virtuous activity and possession of the virtues. The direct challenge is thus: if
situationists are correct that almost no one possesses the Aristotelian virtues,
and possession of such virtues is essential to well-being, then it follows that
almost no one achieves well-being. This places Aristotelians in a bind, for
any theory of well-being that posits that no one or almost no one is ever able
to achieve it would be deeply unappealing.
We can flesh out the details of this challenge by returning to the work of
Doris and Harman. As noted earlier, Doris challenges the globalist view of
virtue, and contends that the empirical evidence illustrates that most people
don’t have global character traits. This is because we could expect the
widespread possession of global traits to be accompanied by widespread
behavioural consistency, yet when we turn to the empirical evidence, we
discover that “systematic observation does not reveal pervasive behavioural
consistency” (Merritt, Doris & Harman 2010, p. 358). The vast majority of
people don’t have global traits; at best, they have “local” traits which are
driven by particular situational circumstances (such as honest-with-spouse)
and not consistent across situations (although they can be stable over time in
the same situation). Situationists like Doris do not rule out completely that
someone could have Aristotelian virtues, but it is nevertheless unlikely for
people to develop such traits, and it would only be a vanishingly small
percentage of the population (if any) that possessed them. Thus, if having
global character traits is necessary for well-being on the Aristotelian view,
and the vast majority of people don’t have such traits, then the vast majority
of people don’t have well-being.
This kind of situationist challenge to Aristotelian theories of well-being,
while closely linked to the situationist challenge to virtue ethics, also has
some important points of separation. Indeed, as Haybron (2014, p. 242) notes:
“the implications of situationist research may be weightier in the case of wellbeing than for virtue.” A key reason for this is that some options for answering
the challenge to virtue ethics seem less appealing when used to defend
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Aristotelian theories of well-being, necessitating the need for new strategies.
As I noted earlier, a popular response for defending Aristotelian virtue ethics
from situationism is the rarity response, which posits that the fact that virtue
is rare is not an issue for Aristotelian theories. This strategy seems less
attractive in the case of well-being. When it comes to virtue, perhaps we can
accept that few people are able to achieve perfect virtue, but that the virtuous
person can still serve as a useful ideal for moral development and action
guidance. The suggestion that well-being is rare to non-existent though is a
far more distressing conclusion. As Haybron (2014, p. 242) puts it, “Even if
we grant the rarity of virtue, this seems a bitter pill to swallow.”
One option for responding to this challenge is a modified version of the
rarity response strategy I discussed in Section 4.3. As I pointed out just above
though, the rarity response strategy initially seems like a poor option, as rare
well-being is more worrying than rare virtue. This is why I will propose a
nuanced version of the strategy, to see if it can save the day against
situationism. The central idea of this variant is that it sees both virtue and
well-being as taking place on a scale between extremes, with most people
falling somewhere in the middle of the scale, rather than at either end. This
idea is, of course, not a new one, as it features in both Aristotle’s own writings
on virtue, and in some of the rarity responses made to the situationist
challenge to virtue ethics, such as those of Miller (2003), Lott (2014), and
Kristjansson (2008).
For this approach, the core idea is that while the character of most people
would fall short of perfect virtue, they would nevertheless still have a certain
degree of virtue, and thereby still have a certain degree of well-being. Perfect
virtue would only be necessary for perfect well-being. If I am less than
perfectly virtuous, this wouldn’t mean that I lack well-being altogether, it
would simply mean that I have less than perfect well-being. In introducing
this kind of granular scale this version of the rarity response aims to avoid the
concern over the basic rarity response that it consigns well-being to a very
small (or non-existent) portion of the population. While perfect well-being on
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this account is still rare, other, still desirable states of well-being would be
much more wide-spread.
Haybron (2014, p. 252), after noting the issues with using the basic rarity
reply to defend theories of well-being, also discusses this kind of strategy. He
notes that this mode of reply does seem initially appealing, because it allows
for some variance in character, and doesn’t set the bar for well-being at
absolute perfection. Nevertheless, Haybron (2014, p. 252) thinks this
response is still problematic, because “Aristotle presumably does not demand
perfection of the virtuous, but he does appear to set a fairly high bar.”
Haybron (2014, p. 253) thinks that even though Aristotelians can
acknowledge some degree of variance, and even some input from situational
factors, the bar remains too high because we need a firm, individual
disposition, that hasn’t been “propped up by extensive scaffolding.” Given
that empirical evidence illustrates the importance of such scaffolding, it thus
seems like the Aristotelian is not only still setting a high bar, but an
unrealistically high bar.
It is not entirely clear that Haybron’s criticism renders this strategy
ineffective. While the bar for perfect virtue and perfect well-being does
remain high, the bars for other levels of virtue and well-being would be lower,
and thus the theory might have broader appeal. If the goal is thus to strive
after perfect virtue and approximate it as best we can, and if such strivings
produce benefits and are worthwhile, then falling short of perfection may not
be so worrisome. Badhwar (2009, p. 272) takes this to an extreme and
suggests that achieving perfect global virtue may be impossible, but
nevertheless, “virtue is a worthy and attractive ideal to try and approximate.”
Such “approximationist” arguments have also been made by others, such as
Athanassoulis (2000), Kupperman (2001), and Zagzebski (1996).
The main issue with such approaches is not that the approximationist
strategy itself is necessarily misguided, but that the psychological account of
character involved is still a misguided one. The virtue ethicists can take heart
from the fact that there is greater evidence to support the role of character in
behaviour than situationists allow. There is a worry though that this could
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lead to a “business as usual” approach that ignores situationism altogether.
While there is evidence supporting the role of character, there is also
undeniable evidence of the power of situations, which goes beyond the extent
assigned to them by Aristotelian approaches. It is thus not enough to
acknowledge that virtue is rare and propose a scale of virtue or an
approximationist approach, because this leaves out our new understanding of
the varied and powerful effects of situational inputs. To retain the traditional
model then, despite the acknowledgement of rarity, would still leave the
Aristotelian with an empirically questionable account of character.
The central worry is thus not that we might not achieve the perfection of
our natures, because, as the approximationist has it, aspiring for the perfection
is still worthwhile and beneficial. The worry is instead that our conception of
how to perfect our natures is misguided, because it is still relying on an
excessively individualist account of virtue, rather than a robustly
interactionist one. Even if our goal is to approximate virtue, rather than fully
achieve it, this endeavour should still be guided by the best available evidence
about moral psychology. As I have noted though, though, the traditional
Aristotelian picture is an incomplete one, and is thus unsuitable for guiding
such efforts. Unless the Aristotelian is willing to revise their account in an
interactionist direction in light of this, they will still be subject to this
objection. These issues demonstrate the inadequacy of the modified rarity
response and the approximationist approach, and highlight the threat that the
Direct Challenge poses to Aristotelian perfectionism.

4.5 The Rational Control Challenge
In this section I will turn to an additional challenge arising from the
situationist literature, one that relates to rationality.6 As well as raising doubts
over conventional ideas about character traits, the evidence situationists draw
on also creates broader doubts about the level of practical rationality that
6

For more on issues with rational control and epistemic situationism, see Alfano (2012),

Olin & Doris (2014), and Merritt, Doris & Harman (2010).
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human agents possess. This again causes trouble for Aristotelians, because
their accounts assume that people have a great deal of individual agency and
rational control over their actions. More pointedly, virtue on the traditional
Aristotelian model requires practical wisdom, and a great deal of control over
one’s actions. Without this high level of rational control, virtue would be
unattainable. If the empirical evidence does undermine the picture of human
agents as possessing a large degree of rational control, then this casts doubt
on our ability to develop the virtues, and thereby casts doubt on our ability to
develop well-being in the perfectionist sense.
Haybron (2014) discusses this challenge as a clash between two views,
which he calls Rational Control (RC) and Situational Determination of
Behaviour (SDB). RC is the more traditional and familiar view, which holds
that “human action is under the command of rational or controlled processes”
(Haybron 2014, p. 244). While this view does allow for a role for certain kinds
of automatic and subconscious processes, ultimately the idea is that rationally
controlled processes “run the show, with automatic processes helping to
execute reason’s commands” (Haybron 2014, p. 244). This can be contrasted
with SDB, which claims that “what we do is ineliminably shaped by
contextual influences in ways that are not governed by rational processes”
(Haybron 2014, p. 242).
Haybron sees SDB as creating a problem for Aristotelian theories of wellbeing because Aristotelian theory is committed to a fairly strong ideal of RC.
This strong RC claim is also part of the problem with Aristotelian accounts
of virtue, but it applies more broadly than this as an issue with general human
rationality. It is thus not enough to just revise our model of virtue, because
we will still not be free of the problem. As Haybron (2014, p. 254) writes:
“The worry here is not that people aren’t virtuous enough to count as
virtuous; it’s that Aristotle’s ideal of human agency, and in turn his ideal
of human flourishing, seems incompatible with the way human beings
actually function.”
The idea then is that people lack the level of rational control over their lives,
and more specifically over decisions concerning their well-being, that
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Aristotelian theories assume they have. Aristotelian theories are thus taken to
be fundamentally mistaken about human rationality and psychology, and to
thereby present a skewed picture of human well-being, and a misguided and
excessively individualist account of how people can pursue their own
flourishing. Furthermore, if this claim is correct and we do lack such rational
control, then we will be incapable of developing Aristotelian virtues, and thus
incapable of living the kind of life of virtuous activity necessary for achieving
well-being.

4.6 Interactionism
In light of these problems with Aristotelian accounts, what is needed to save
perfectionism is an alternative perfectionist account. My proposal for such an
account is interactionist perfectionism (IP). In Section 4.3 I noted that
interactionism has emerged in recent years as a promising approach to
character that stands as an alternative to both Aristotelian virtue ethics and
situationism. It is the attractiveness of the interactionist conception of
character that inspires my proposed shift to interactionist perfectionism. Like
Aristotelian accounts of well-being, IP supports the central welfare
perfectionism claim that well-being consists, at least partly, in virtue or
excellence. In contrast to Aristotelian theories though, IP conceptualises
virtue in specifically interactionist terms, rather than the traditional globalist
model of Aristotelians.
Like situationism, interactionism recognises the important role that
environmental factors play in character and moral behaviour. In contrast to
situationism though, it also posits a greater role for personal factors in the
equation. Furthermore, interactionism also recognises that situational factors
are themselves limited, and that the correlation between situational factors
and a particular behavioural outcome is roughly on par with the correlation
between personal factors and that behavioural outcome (Funder & Ozer
1983). What is most critical for interactionism though is not that both personal
and situational factors are important, but that the interaction between them is
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what is most vital for character and behaviour. As Endler (1983, p. 160)
writes: “behaviour is a function of a continuous multidirectional process of
person-by-situation interactions.”
Interactionist Perfectionism is also solely focused on the perfectionist
claim about the necessity of virtue for well-being, and thus jettisons some of
the additional claims and elements of the Aristotelian system, such as the
strongly individualist conception of agency, and the welfare eudaimonism
claim. These changes from the traditional Aristotelian model give us a theory
that is more empirical viable and psychologically realistic. They also provide
a perfectionist account capable of overcoming the two situationist challenges
that undermine Aristotelian perfectionism.7

4.6.1 Responding to the Direct Challenge
IP has resources for responding to the situationist challenges that Aristotelian
versions of perfectionism lack. Let’s begin by returning to the Direct
Challenge. Earlier, I illustrated that the evidence presented by situationists
raises serious doubts about the Aristotelian account of character, and that this
thereby creates worries about their account of well-being by making it a
seemingly impossible goal. What is thus needed is an account of character
that fits better with the empirical evidence, while also being more realistic
and achievable, to address the high bar concern that I flagged earlier. IP’s
interactionist account of character does just this.
Interactionism presents a conception of character that is compatible with
the best available empirical research. In recognising both personal and
situational factors, and the complex interplay between them, interactionism

7

Aristotelianism is itself a broad label, and some Aristotelians may thus be willing to accept

my IP account as falling within the Aristotelian camp, while others may reject it as too
radically different. In either case, my intent is not to debate what should and shouldn’t count
as an Aristotelian theory, but instead to offer an account that can respond to the situationist
threat to perfectionism. Whether or not Aristotelians are happy about this account is another
matter entirely.
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holds great explanatory power. As I argued in Chapter 1, this explanatory
power is further improved by the interactionist claim that character and virtue
are multiply realisable. By this I mean that interactionism allows that a
particular trait can be realised in different ways through varying levels of
input from personal, environmental, and social factors. One individual’s
honesty could involve a great deal of input and support from environmental
factors, while another’s might be primarily maintained by their personal
factors (Alfano 2014). This allows interactionism to account for a broad range
of cases, including rare cases of strongly individual virtue (which situationism
struggles to explain), and also for cases in which behaviour is heavily driven
by situational factors (which presents problems for the traditional virtue
ethical account). This broad explanatory power means that interactionism
isn’t only empirically adequate, but perhaps superior to its rivals like
situationism and virtue ethics. Additionally, interactionism has become one
of the most influential approaches to personality in psychology, and thus has
great scientific credence (McAdams 2006, pp. 142-155). In short then,
interactionism is a completely viable framework for character given the
empirical evidence, and is thus untroubled by situationist concerns about
empirical adequacy.
Interactionism also posits a more robust model of character than
situationists allow for. This is partly due to the recognition that interactionism
gives to the importance of personal factors in character, rather than focusing
on situations and consigning personal features to the sidelines. More
importantly though, it is also because when environmental exchanges are
properly taken into account, we can see character as more consistent than
situationists claim. Crucial to this is the notion of ‘coherence,’ which is an
alternative way of thinking about consistency, in that it incorporates the
individual’s interpretation of the situation into the definition of consistency
(Krahe 1992, p. 15). In some approaches, consistency is measured in relation
to the objective or nominal features of the situation, such as the spatial and
temporal features, and the human subjects involved. Such descriptions of
situations are thus “largely independent of the perspective of an individual
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observer” (Krahe 1992, p. 205). Assessments of consistency are then made
based on whether an agent’s actions are consistent across situations classified
in such objective terms into the same type.
In contrast to this, interactionism uses coherence as its notion of
consistency, rather than objective consistency. Rather than analysing an
agent’s actions in relation to objective descriptions of the situation, the
interactionist instead incorporates the individual’s interpretation of the
situation into the situation description. The focus is thus on the psychological
features of a situation, rather than its objective features (Mehl et al. 2015, p.
632). The assessment of coherence is then made based on a whether an
agent’s actions are consistent across situations they have interpreted in the
same way, such that their behaviour represents an “inherently lawful
expression of the individual’s personal qualities and cognitive activities”
(Krahe 1992, p. 16). Since the objective and psychological descriptions of
situations can vary from each other, an individual may look inconsistent in an
objective sense, while showing consistency (and coherence) when assessed
in relation to the psychological features of the situations.
Coherence allows for “both stability and change of behaviour so long as
they follow a systematic and hence individually predictable pattern” (Krahe
1992, p. 16). When we consider consistency in terms of coherence, we
observe much greater individual consistency in behaviour and character than
if we only consider the objective features of situations (see, e.g., Krahe
1992; Snow 2010). It is important to note that this emphasis on coherence
also separates interactionism from Aristotelian and other traditional virtue
ethical approaches to traits. This is because such approaches also seem to
rely on an objective notion of consistency. For the interactionist, someone
could possess the trait of compassion if they are reliably disposed to act
compassionately in situations they have interpreted as requiring compassion.
As Alfano (2013a, p. 79) notes though, this isn’t enough for virtue as
traditionally conceived: “But of course compassion isn’t (just) a matter of
helping when you feel that someone needs or deserves help; it’s a matter of
helping when someone does need or deserve help.” This is another example
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of the Aristotelian approach setting an excessively high bar. Considering
consistency in terms of coherence thus differentiates interactionism from
Aristotelianism, while also showing character traits to be more robust and
widespread than either situationists or Aristotelians seem to allow.
The multiple realisability of traits for the interactionist also highlights
how good character is more achievable under interactionism than
Aristotelianism. For the Aristotelian, one needs to develop strong and robust
individual virtues. As I noted earlier though, interactionism allows that
virtue can be realised in different ways: some possess very strong personal
factors that drive their virtues, while others may possess weaker personal
factors, but receive more positive support from environmental inputs. The
class of virtuous traits is thus much larger for the interactionist, because it
includes both the more traditional virtuous traits, as well as virtues more
reliant on situations. Attaining good character thus seems a much more
realistic goal, which helps to dispel worries that perfectionist theories of
well-being, in making virtue necessary for well-being, have thereby made
well-being rare or impossible.
One might worry that in making character so closely related to
environmental factors, interactionist character might be too dependent on
circumstantial luck in terms of receiving positive environmental influences.8
It’s true that poor situational influences still create difficulties for
developing character, but this is also the case for Aristotelian approaches.
Additionally, interactionism offers further resources to assist us in our
pursuit of virtue and well-being, and to help us overcome issues with
circumstantial luck. It provides insights into the vast range of situational
inputs that can influence us, and into the dynamic ways in which these
factors interact with the personal factors of individual agents. Such insights
not only allow us to identify and avoid potential pitfalls and influences that
could lead us astray, but also to identify positive situational supports that we
can make use of to improve our character. We can even take steps to
8

There are further questions to be asked about moral luck in relation to interactionist

character, but they are beyond the scope of this paper to fully address.
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positively shape and influence situations in our favour, or, in Alfano’s
(2013a, p. 80) terms, to be “situation-producers” rather than just “situationconsumers.” Such insights and strategies provide a range of ways of
pursuing and sustaining virtue, and again show good character to be a more
realistic goal for interactionists.
In sum, interactionism can help defend perfectionism from situationist
challenges relating to traditional accounts of traits and virtue. Interactionism
presents a model of character that is empirically adequate, and thus handles
situationist concerns about psychological realism. It also demonstrates that
virtue is a more common and realistic goal for people than both situationism
and the rarity response allow. Thus, in presenting a model of virtue that is
both more reflective of actual human psychology, and also a distinctly more
realisable achievement, interactionism can allow perfectionism to overcome
the Direct Challenge from situationism.

4.6.2 Responding to the Rational Control Challenge
Let’s now turn back to the Rational Control Challenge. Assuming that
Haybron is correct about the situationist evidence undermining strong
accounts of RC, does this necessarily undermine perfectionist theories of
well-being? I noted earlier that Aristotelian accounts are troubled by this
objection, but this need not be the case for IP. To begin with, Haybron
distinguishes between different degrees of both RC and SDB. A strong ideal
of RC fits the traditional ‘captain of the ship’ model, in which the vast
majority of our actions are under our control and “reflect our own judgement
and will” (Haybron 2014, p. 245). In contrast, moderate and weak versions of
RC posit, respectively, that “control is substantial, but limited,” and that
“rational control is the exception rather than the rule” (Haybron 2014, p. 245).
Similarly, SDB can also be divided up into weak, moderate and strong
variants, with weak positing a small role for situational influences, all the way
up to strong, which claims that “human behaviour is largely and ineliminably
determined by situational influences” (Haybron 2014, p. 245).
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Haybron (2014, p. 246) argues that the evidence presented by situationists
challenges at least the strong form of RC by showing the power of situational
influences to undermine rational control, and thereby provides support for
either moderate or strong SDB. It would seem to me that moderate SDB
presents the best fit with the evidence. As I noted in the previous section, there
is evidence to suggest that situationists overstate their case, and that the
influence of situational factors on behaviour doesn’t exceed the influence of
personal factors to any great extent. Moderate SDB thus seems a better fit
than strong SDB. This is important, because moderate SDB is not actually
that threatening. As Haybron (2014, p. 245) defines it, moderate SDB is the
view that:
“situational influences ineliminably play a substantial, or large, role in
determining human behaviour. Rational or other internal processes may
still play the lion’s share of the role in determining how we live, but a lot
of the story involves situational influence.”
What’s clear from this description is that the moderate form of SDB still
allows quite a lot of play for rational control. It seems to be compatible with
at least the weak form of RC, and possibly a moderate form as well. While
Aristotelians may rely on a strong conception of RC, interactionists are not
tied to such an account. For IP then, a moderate or weak form of RC could be
acceptable, if it proves the best fit with the empirical evidence. As a result of
this, IP is not susceptible to the Rational Control objection in the same way
that Aristotelians are, because IP is not reliant on an outdated conception of
human agency.
In addition, the situationist findings aren’t all doom and gloom for
proponents of rational control: they also point to new ways of improving and
utilising rational control by enhancing our understanding of how we interact
with situational influences. Alfano (2013a, pp. 79-81) notes how we could
use our knowledge of social psychology to better understand both our own
personal makeup, and the ways in which we are affected by situational
factors. We could then use this information to select situations conducive to
virtuous behaviour, while avoiding situations likely to lead us astray. In
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addition to situation selection, we could also make active efforts to shape and
change the situations we find ourselves in, including major efforts such as
designing our environments to support virtue (Alfano 2013a, p. 81). The idea
then is that, even though we have acknowledged the importance of situational
factors, we can exercise our rational control in ways such as these to attempt
to control such factors in aid of our own ends. This kind of situational
engagement and reliance may not be acceptable for the Aristotelian, but it is
perfectly fine for IP. Interactionists are thus free to draw on insights from
situationism to explore ways for improving rational control in aid of the
pursuit of both virtue and well-being.
We have now seen that IP can effectively response to both the Direct
Challenge and the Rational Control Challenge. These two challenges, which
emerge from the situationist literature and are supported by substantial
empirical evidence, present a strong threat to perfectionist theories of wellbeing. As I have outlined, this threat creates significant problems for
Aristotelian perfectionist theories, and casts doubt on their appeal as an
approach to well-being. In contrast, Interactionist Perfectionism can
overcome these challenges. In doing so, it illustrates that perfectionism can
survive this situationist threat, and remain a viable option for thinking about
well-being. IP can thus serve as a promising research agenda for future work
on character and well-being.

4.7 Conclusion
This paper has set out to defend perfectionism against the threat posed by
situationism. I have argued that the most popular variety of perfectionism,
Aristotelianism, is susceptible to challenges arising from situationism relating
to both the Aristotelian model of traits, and to the Aristotelian account of
agency and rational control. As a result, Aristotelianism seems ill-equipped
to defend perfectionism against situationism. I then argued that an alternative
perfectionist account need not suffer the same fate as Aristotelianism, and
introduced IP as such an account. I then demonstrated that IP can effectively
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counter both the Direct Challenge and the Rational Control Challenge, and
thereby showed that perfectionism can survive the threat from situationism.
Additionally, the shift towards interactionism also makes for a more
empirically compelling perfectionism, and point to new avenues for future
research on the cultivation of interactionist virtues and their role in wellbeing. In short then, my interactionist perfectionism holds much promise for
future research on both virtue and well-being.
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Chapter 5
Environmental Virtue Ethics: An Interactionist
Defense
Abstract
This paper will investigate some new opportunities for environmental virtue
ethics (EVE) and argue in favour of a shift to make EVE more interactionist.
EVE has developed into one of the more popular and influential approaches
in the environmental ethics literature. It faces a potential threat though, from
the situationist challenge, which has plagued mainstream virtue ethical
accounts in recent years. I will argue that EVE can overcome this challenge
by taking a more interactionist approach to character – one that recognizes
the importance of both personal and situational factors, while emphasizing
the interactions between them. I will argue that interactionism not only allows
EVE to answer the situationist challenge, but that it also meshes nicely with
existing aspects of EVE approaches, and that this interactionist shift is thus a
logical next step for EVE that produces a variety of benefits.

5.1 Introduction
This paper will investigate some new opportunities for environmental virtue
ethics (EVE) and argue in favour of a shift to make EVE more interactionist.
EVE has developed into one of the more popular and influential approaches
in the environmental ethics literature. It faces a potential threat though, from
the situationist challenge, which has plagued mainstream virtue ethical
accounts in recent years. I will argue that EVE can overcome this challenge
by taking a more interactionist approach to character – one that recognizes
the importance of both personal and situational factors, while emphasizing
the interactions between them. I will argue that interactionism not only allows
EVE to answer the situationist challenge, but that it also meshes nicely with
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existing aspects of EVE approaches, and that this interactionist shift is thus a
logical next step for EVE that produces a variety of benefits.
The paper begins with some brief background on EVE, including its
development, core claims, and the advantages that make it an appealing way
of approaching environmental ethics. I will then move on to highlight how
situationism challenges EVE. I will first consider this as a broad challenge: if
situationism challenges the virtue ethical approach to character, and EVE, as
a sub-category of virtue ethics, also endorses the same kind of approach, then
the situationist challenge will also apply to EVE. In addition to this though, I
will also consider the idea that situationism may be particularly threatening
to EVE. This is derived from Kasperbauer (2014), who argues that there is
specific empirical evidence about environmental behaviours that suggests
situational factors are the driving force, and that we should thus take an
environmental situationist approach rather than an EVE one. Situationism
may thus present a challenge to EVE that goes beyond its general challenge
to virtue ethics, and thereby require a unique strategy of response. I will then
introduce the interactionist approach to character, and outline how it provides
both an empirically-adequate moral psychology of character, and an effective
way of answering situationism. After considering how interactionism can
answer the general situationist threat to EVE, I will illustrate how it can also
enable EVE to effectively respond to the specific challenge presented by
Kasperbauer. In the final section, I will then explore a range of additional
connections between interactionism and EVE, and highlight the further
benefits to be gained from EVE taking an interactionist approach.

5.2 Environmental Virtue Ethics
While environmental concerns have a long history in philosophy, EVE has
only recently emerged in the latter half of the Twentieth Century as a specific
approach to environmental ethics. Philosophers such as Hill (1983),
Wensveen (2000), Cafaro (2004), and Sandler (2007) have drawn on virtue
ethics to emphasise the importance of thinking about character and
flourishing in relation to our interactions with the environment. As Cafaro
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(2010, p.4) writes: “EVE now appears to be a vital part of the environmental
philosophy landscape.”
Some environmental ethicists seek to build their accounts around
environmental virtue, while others instead recognise virtue as one of a variety
of concerns in a broader environmental ethic. In either case, consideration of
environmental virtue has a range of advantages. For example, EVE is often
thought to present a more positive outlook on our relationship with the
environment than some other approaches to environmental ethics. This is
because it emphasises the connections between nature and human flourishing,
and it presents a “positive, aspirational vision in which humans and nature
flourish together” (Cafaro 2010, p. 4). This approach can thus be seen as more
positive than fear or duty-based justifications for environmental action, or, at
the very least, can act as a positive complement to such justifications (Cafaro
2010, p. 4).
Kawall (2018, p. 660) also highlights this positive nature, noting that EVE
taps into the idea that “engagement with the world around us can enrich our
lives profoundly,” and that developing virtues such as curiosity, wonder, and
open-mindedness can help us to appreciate nature and pursue positive
engagements with the environment. Similarly, Sandler (2007, p. 50) argues
that the environment gives us opportunities for moral, intellectual, physical
and spiritual growth, as well as providing us with aesthetic and recreational
goods. Kawall (2018, p. 661) sums up this outlook nicely when he writes that:
“EVE is well positioned to capture the insight that a good
environmental life is not simply a matter of denial and burdens, but
instead an active life where moral, epistemic, and aesthetic virtues
enable our appreciation of and engagement with nature, contributing
to our flourishing as individuals.”
Environmental virtue ethicists thus aim to properly recognise the
interdependence of agent and environment, and to do justice to the rich and
varied nature of human relationships with the environment.
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It is also worth noting that environmental virtue theory also makes
distinctions between different categories of environmental virtues. Sandler
(2007, pp. 42-43), for example, distinguishes between three different
categories of environmental virtue, which are further fleshed out by Kawall
(2018, p. 662). The first of these is environmentally responsive virtues, which
are those that directly respond to environmental entities or concerns, and
include virtues such as reverence for life, respect for nature, and wonder. The
second category is environmentally justified virtues, which are those “that are
justified (as virtues) at least in part by environmental considerations” (Kawall
2018, p. 662). Examples of these include simplicity and temperance, as they
can be environmentally justified in terms of their capacity to reduce our
environmental impact. The final category is environmentally productive
virtues, which refers to virtues that can help us take environmental action and
promote environmental issues, such as courage and perseverance (Kawall
2018, p. 662). As Sandler (2007, p. 43) writes: “There is thus a plurality of
ways environmental considerations are implicated in the virtues, including
and beyond environmental entities being morally considerable. EVE is thus
interested in a broad range of character traits and moral behaviour concerning
the environment, including both the environmental dimensions of more
traditional virtues, as well as thinking about new virtues specifically related
to the environment.
In sum, philosophers have drawn on virtue ethics to broaden and enrich
their thinking about the environment, up to the point of developing fullyfledged EVE accounts of environmental ethics. EVE theorists have made a
significant contribution to the development of environmental ethics in recent
years, and present a unique outlook within the field of research. Despite
EVE’s appeal and prominence, it faces a potentially serious threat from
situationism, a threat that should be considered seriously not only by
proponents of EVE, but also by environmental ethicists more generally.
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5.3 The Situationist Challenge to EVE
5.3.1 Situationism
Having outlined some of the key features of EVE, I now want to sketch the
situationist challenge, and illustrate how it poses a threat to EVE.
Situationism developed in philosophy in the 1990s as a challenge to some
conventional ways of thinking about moral psychology in general, and virtue
in particular. Flanagan (1991) presented some initial arguments to this effect,
before Doris (1998, 2002) and Harman (1999) developed the situationist
position in more detail and kicked off the character-situation debate in
philosophy. This new debate echoed the earlier person-situation debate in
psychology, which philosophical situationists took inspiration from. In
psychology, situationist theorists had challenged personality theorists by
arguing that the features of a situation played a greater role in influencing the
behaviour of an agent than the agent’s own personality traits did. This work
was driven by a range of experimental evidence, including Milgram’s (1974)
famous work on obedience, and the evidence of the bystander effect (Latane
& Darley 1970; Darley & Latane 1968).
While some of the situationist evidence highlighted morally relevant
features of the situation that could influence people into acting for bad
reasons, there was also evidence that morally irrelevant and subconscious
features of the situation could also be have surprising impacts on behaviour.
Rather than influencing an agent to act on bad reasons, such factors do not
even give the agent particular reasons for actions. These kinds of influences
have been fittingly described as “situational non-reasons” by Alfano (2013,
p. 44). Examples include the effect of ambient light levels on honesty (Zhong,
Bohns & Gino 2010), and the influence of ambient sound levels on aggression
and helping behaviour (Matthews and Cannon 1975; Donnerstein & Wilson
1976).
Evidence for the importance of situational influences on behaviour was
used by philosophical situationists to argue against traditional accounts of
character traits and virtues. Doris (2002, pp. 22-23) for example, argues
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against “globalist” accounts of character, which are those that construe
“personality as an evaluatively integrated association of robust traits.” While
Doris allows that character traits can be stable over time, he rejects the
stronger claim made by globalists that such traits are also consistent across
varying situations. This is because the empirical evidence does not show the
existence of such consistency, and thus “globalist conceptions of character
are empirically inadequate” (Doris 2002, p. 23, emphasis in original).
Harman (1999, p. 316) makes similar situationist arguments, but also takes
them in a more radical direction. He also argues that the empirical evidence
raises problems for conventional views of character, going so far as to claim
that: “we must conclude that there is no empirical basis for the existence of
character traits.” Importantly, both Doris and Harman argue that the models
of character they are criticizing are the same models that are generally
endorsed by virtue ethicists. As Harman (1999, p. 327) writes “Character
based virtue ethics may offer a reasonable account of ordinary moral views.
But to that extent, these ordinary views rest on error.” Situationism thus
presents a strong challenge to the moral psychology of virtue ethics.
The worry arising from situationism is not just that virtuous traits might be
uncommon, as this is something that the virtue ethicist can probably accept. 1
The more serious concern is that the general picture of moral psychology
presented by virtue ethics is flawed, and doesn’t properly reflect real human
agents. For example, virtue ethical accounts of character stress the importance
of practical reason, and of responding to situations in appropriate ways and
for the right reasons. As I discussed earlier in Chapter 1 though, non-reasons
do not supply stimuli for the agent to reason about though, and “provide no
reason for the conduct they induce” (Alfano 2013, p. 50). The virtue ethicist
will thus have a hard time fitting such situational influences into their
psychological framework.
From a strong situationist position then, there is a genuine concern about
whether human beings can even realise the kinds of psychological features
1

Such acceptance is seen in the “rarity response” made to situationism (see, e.g.,

Kristjansson 2008; Miller 2003; Kamtekar 2004).
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described by virtue ethicists. As Doris and Stich (2005, p. 121) put it: “the
available systematic empirical evidence is compatible with virtue being
psychologically impossible, and this suggests that the impossibility of virtue
is a possibility that has to be taken seriously.” Based on such claims, we may
take it that virtue ethics lacks psychological realism, which would be a serious
flaw for an ethical theory, as we generally want such theories to advocate
character traits and behaviours that are achievable by “creatures like us”
(Flanagan 1991, p. 32).
While there have been a variety of replies to situationism from virtue
ethicists, there is now widespread recognition in psychology of the
importance of situational factors as influences on behaviour, even among
personality theorists, who historically had opposed situationism in
psychology during the person-situation debate. This is not to say that
character is dead (and I will argue against such a view in the next section),
but rather that an empirically adequate moral psychology of character needs
to make proper room for situational influences.

5.3.2 The Situationist Challenge to EVE
While I will argue in the next section that situationists overstate some of their
claims, let us assume for the argument in this paper that situationism is at least
partially true: situational factors play an important role in moral behaviour,
and their influence is more powerful and surprising than has traditionally been
recognized. What I now want to consider is the application of this situationist
challenge to EVE. Given that EVE takes direct inspiration from virtue ethics,
it is not hard to see how the situationist threat would also apply to EVE.
Situationists contend that the empirical evidence illustrates that people lack
the kinds of robust and consistent character traits that virtue ethics has
traditionally thought people to have, and that virtue ethics is thus empirically
inadequate. If EVE makes similar claims about moral psychology to virtue
ethics, then it would also be subject to this objection. We can thus fairly
straightforwardly apply the situationist challenge to EVE: situationism claims
to have shown that virtue ethical moral psychology is inadequate, and thus,
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insofar as EVE endorses a similar moral psychological picture, it is also
empirically inadequate and lacking in psychological realism. Environmental
ethics, like general normative ethics, should thus be revised in situationist
terns.
We can develop this challenge by considering some of the claims made by
environmental virtue ethicists. To begin with, Kasperbauer (2014, p. 473)
notes that EVE theorists often make claims about the need for “behavioural
adequacy.” This refers to the connection between an environmental ethic and
the production of pro-environmental behaviour; between someone holding
environmental values and actually acting on those values to address
environmental challenges and issues. Environmental virtues thus need to help
produce pro-environmental actions. As Kasperbauer (2014, p. 473) writes:
“In order for environmental virtue theories to be adequate, they must actually
translate

into

pro-environmental

behaviors.

They

must

promote

environmental virtues that have real effects on the environment.”
Proponents of EVE also make claims about virtue that echo those of
mainstream virtue ethicists. For example, many environmental virtue ethicists
either explicitly endorse, or at least take inspiration from, neo-Aristotelian
virtue ethics (Kawall 2018). Similarly, Shaw’s (2005, p. 99) account of EVE
echoes standard conceptions of virtue when he writes that “virtues are stable
propensities to excel or character habits that are instilled into us from our
early years and for as long as we are capable of moral growth.” Environmental
virtue ethicists also make claims about the consistency of environmental
character traits. As Kasperbauer (2014, p. 476) notes, while there isn’t
widespread agreement in EVE on how broad and robust character traits are,
a variety of environmental virtue theorists do highlight the importance of
consistency and suggest that virtues are fairly robust.
Based on these points, we can now clearly see how situationism applies to
EVE. Environmental virtue ethicists take direct inspiration from virtue ethics,
and also make similar claims about the nature of character traits. This
challenge to EVE is developed in more detail by Kasperbauer (2014). He
notes that the claims about behavioural adequacy made by environmental
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virtue ethicists are often quite strong, such that: “Behavioral requirements are
central to some theories of virtue, but have a particularly significant role in
environmental theories” (Kasperbauer 2014, p. 473). For example, he cites
Sandler’s (2007, pp. 107-108) argument that in order for an environmental
ethic to be adequate, it must be effective at producing action and solutions in
relation to environmental problems, and thus has an essential practical
dimension in addition to its theoretical one. Based on these kinds of claims
made by Sandler and other EVE theorists, Kasperbauer (2014, p. 482) takes
EVE to place great emphasis on practical outcomes, and to often require a
“high degree of behavioural adequacy.” For this reason, proponents of EVE
should be concerned about situationism, yet situationism has received very
little attention in the environmental ethics literature thus far.2
In addition, Kasperbauer cites a range of empirical evidence that highlights
the power of situational factors to influence environmental behaviours. For
example, he discusses an experiment done by Schultz and colleagues (2007),
which Kasperbauer calls the “Smiley Faces” experiment. This experiment
measured the energy consumption rates of Californian households, before
providing the households with information on energy consumption rates in
their area, and with how their consumptions rates compared with others, while
continuing to track their energy consumption. The experiment found an effect
of social conformity: after the initial information had been distributed,
households who consumed less than average started to increase their
consumption, while households that consumed more than the average
decreased their consumption (Schultz et al. 2007). Importantly, some
households also received extra feedback in the form of smiley faces on their
informational flyers – a smiley face for those who consumed less energy than
the average, and a frowny face for those who consumed more. These smiley
and frowny faces made an important difference: in contrast to the households
that didn’t receive the faces, those who received smiley faces maintained their
lower consumption rates (rather than increasing them like in the other group),
2

Exceptions to this are Cafaro (2015), Kawall (2018), and Sandler (2007), although none of

these develop their responses to situationism in great detail.
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while those who received a frowny face decreased their consumption to a
great degree than the high-consumers from the other group. Kasperbauer
(2014, p. 477) takes these results as indicative of the power of situations: “The
take-home point of this experiment is that trivial social feedback can
significantly alter people’s normal energy consumption.”
Kasperbauer (2014, p. 482) also presents evidence to suggest that
“Proenvironmental values and attitudes rarely lead to pro-environmental
behaviors.” He discusses a meta-analysis by Hines and Colleagues (1987)
which reports that the average correlation between environmental concern
and behaviour to be 0.35. Kasperbauer (2014, p. 483) notes that correlations
lower than 0.30 are generally considered unreliable, and that because this
correlation is only a little higher than that benchmark, it doesn’t “hold much
hope for getting pro-environmental behaviors out of pro-environmental
knowledge, values, attitudes, or intentions.” In addition to these low
correlation estimates, Kasperbauer also points to the influence of various
implicit biases, such as the single action bias, which refers to the phenomenon
in which an individual loses motivation after taking a single action, even
though they know that further actions may be necessary to achieving the
desired goal. Kasperbauer suggests that such biases play a surprisingly
important role in affecting environmental behaviour, and provide further
support for his situationist account.
Based on this evidence, Kasperbauer argues that environmental
behaviours are primarily driven by situational forces and non-trait-like
psychological factors like implicit biases, and that character traits and virtues
should not be our focus. He ultimately concludes that, while people possess a
range of values and beliefs in relation to the environment:
“The problem, according to situationists, is that human psychology
does not function in the right sort of way for these values and beliefs
to help the environment to a sufficient degree, regardless of one’s
virtues or degree of excellence. In order to achieve many of the goals
of environmental ethics—the most fundamental of which are certainly
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worth retaining—we must look elsewhere than the virtues”
(Kasperbauer 2014, p. 487).
Through consideration of these arguments we can see that situationism is
potentially a very strong objection to EVE, which threatens its viability as a
framework for environmental ethics. Answering this challenge will thus be
crucial to demonstrate that EVE still has an important role to play in
environmental ethics, and in our endeavours to tackle the pressing
environmental challenges of our age.

5.4 Interactionism and Saving EVE
With the threat that situationism poses to EVE established, I now want to
discuss the interactionist approach to character, as it is my contention that
interactionism can save EVE from situationism. I’ll begin by sketching some
of the key elements of the interactionist account of character, before showing
why interactionism provides a more empirically adequate approach to
character than situationism. The following section will then consider
Kasperbauer’s argument against interactionism’s ability to save EVE, before
showing how interactionism can overcome this objection.

5.4.1 Interactionism
In Section 5.3 I discussed how situationist philosophers took inspiration from
situationist psychology and the person-situation debate. The interactionist
approach to character also takes inspiration from psychology, in particular
from the way that interactionism in psychology has helped to resolve the
debates between personality theorists and situationists in favour of an
interactionist

resolution. Interactionist

psychologists

criticized

both

situationist and personality theorists for focusing too much on one side over
the other, and for treating person and situation as independent from each
other. As Raush, Dittman and Taylor (1959, p. 373) write: “Which is more
important for behavior, the individual personality or the situation? The
question is a meaningless one. Neither component can be uncoupled from the
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other.” Interactionists recognize that both personal and situational elements
are important determinants of behaviour, while also highlighting the dynamic
and reciprocal nature of the interactions between person and situation. Rather
than a simple, one-way process, such as the situation influencing the person,
and this producing behaviour, interactions are often multi-directional, with
the situation influencing the person, who influences their situation, and so on.
In stressing the importance of dynamic interactions, and recognizing the close
ties between person and situation, interactionists argued against the personsituation debate and claimed that it revolved around a “pseudo issue” by
attempting to pit persons against situations (Endler 1973, p. 301).
Walter Mischel, who’s early work in the 1960’s was an important driver
of situationism in psychology, has since recognized the flaws of the personsituation debate, and praised the interactionist shift in psychology:
“Especially noteworthy is that these developments bridge the classic
partitioning most unnatural and destructive to the building of a
cumulative science of the individual—the one that splits the person
apart from the situation, treating each as an independent cause of
behavior” (Mischel 2009, p. 289).
As Funder (2006, p. 22) writes, the idea that “behavior is a function of an
interaction between the person and the situation” had become a truism by the
1980s, and “Nowadays, everybody is an interactionist.” Interactionism has
thus established its place as the dominant approach to personality and
behaviour in psychology.
In recent years, a number of philosophers have argued for an interactionist
approach to character and virtue, and supported the idea that interactionism
could resolve debates over the nature of character in philosophy in a similar
way to how it has resolved debates about personality in psychology. Skorburg
(2019, p. 2346), for example, argues that philosophers need to recognize the
widespread interactionist consensus in psychology. Similarly, Alfano (2016,
p. 130) has argued that “personality and context both contribute to the
explanation and prediction of behaviour – including moral behaviour,” and
thus that “character should be recast in interactionist terms.” Skorburg and
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Alfano have further developed their interactionist accounts in a range of other
works (see, e.g., Skorburg 2017; Alfano 2013, 2014; Alfano & Skorburg
2016). While some philosophers continue to argue for both situationist
(Vargy 2018) and traditional virtue ethical (West 2018) approaches, Alfano
and Skorburg present strong arguments for the appeal of an interactionist
approach to character. When coupled with the interactionist consensus in
psychology, interactionism makes a strong case for being the best framework
to guide future philosophical work on character and moral psychology.
I will explore interactionism in more detail below in service of my
argument against situationism, but for now the two key takeaways are: firstly
that interactionism is the dominant approach in psychology, and secondly that
it recognizes the importance of both situational and personal variables as
influences on behaviour. This second point is crucial, as by positing an
important role for personal factors, interactionism points the way to both
countering situationism, and to preserving an important role for character in
our theorizing about environmental ethics.

5.4.2 Answering the Situationist Challenge
In arguing against situationism, my strategy will not be to show that
situational factors are unimportant, as they are a crucial part of the moral
psychological picture. Instead, I want to show why situations are not running
the show (as has sometimes been made out by situationists), because personal
factors, and person-situation interactions, are also critical to understanding
character and moral behaviour. I will thus not be critiquing particular
situationist experiments or arguments, as I will instead present evidence to
illustrate the importance of interactions and personal factors, and thereby
show that strong situationist accounts are unjustified.
Let’s start with the importance of personal factors. A key source of support
comes from aggregation. The central idea here is that the correlation between
a personality or character trait and a single behaviour can be quite low,
making prediction difficult. When we aggregate our assessment over multiple
situations or measurements though, we frequently see a greater correlation
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between the trait and behaviour, and thus more consistency. Epstein (1983)
was an important proponent of this idea in psychology, arguing that
aggregation illustrated that personality was more reliable than was often
supposed by situationist psychologists. More recently, Jayawickreme et al.
(2014, pp. 292-293) survey a range of evidence that illustrates that by
aggregating across situations, we can see a greater correlation between traits
and behaviours. Traits thus still have an important role to play in moral
psychology.
In addition to this support for personal factors, it’s also important to note
the limitations of situational factors. Funder and Ozer (1983) take as their
starting point the situationist contention that the correlation between a
particular trait and a behavioral outcome (which is sometimes called the
personality coefficient) rarely exceeds .30-.40. After reviewing a number of
prominent situational effects though, they found that the correlation between
a particular situational factor and a behaviour also tends to average around
.40, suggesting that, rather than running the show, the influence of situations
is actually quite similar to the influence of personal factors. Similarly,
Richard, Bond Jr. and Stokes-Zoota (2003, p. 337) conducted a broad metaanalysis involving over 25,000 studies with 8 million participants, and found
that “situational effects are similar in magnitude to personal effects,” with the
former having an average effect size of .22, and the latter of .19. As a result,
not only are personal factors important influences on behaviour, they may be
as important as situations (or at least roughly on the same level).
Crucially, the above studies illustrate that, even taken together, persons
and situations do not fully explain behaviour. Furthermore, if we only
consider person and situation as independent variables, our prediction and
explanation of behaviour may be quite limited. This is because interactions,
and the way in which person and situation influence each other, are missing
from the account. Situationists are not only mistaken in overemphasising
situational variables, but also for missing the importance of interactions. As
Alfano (2013, p. 77) writes:
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“It may be that those toeing the situationist line have taken it for
granted that if dispositions explain N percent of behaviour then
situations explain (100 – N) percent. This is emphatically not the case.
What neither explains independently must be attributed to their
interaction, to a third factor, or to randomness.”
As such, interactions are a vitally important piece of the puzzle that is missing
if we only consider personal factors and situational factors, and this is part of
the reason that interactionism has now become the leading approach in
psychology. Of course, some situationists had interactionist elements in their
accounts, and some, such as John Doris (see Mehl et al. 2015) have come to
endorse interactionism themselves. This acceptance of interactionism is
missing from Kasperbauer’s account, and, as well shall see in the next section,
he actually makes an argument against interactionism. The key point for now
though is that, even if we consider both personal and situational factors, this
is still not enough, as we need to also recognise interactions to develop a
proper account of character and moral behaviour that reflects the empirical
evidence from psychology.
Based on these arguments, we can see that situationists have overplayed
their hand, as both personal factors and interactions are crucial to
understanding character and moral behaviour, and situations are not as
influential as has sometimes been claimed. This doesn’t mean though that
traditional virtue ethical approaches have been entirely vindicated though, as
interactionism also acknowledges the important influence of situational
factors. Despite this, interactionism does assign personal factors an important
place, and can thus be used to defend EVE, as I will detail more in the next
section.

5.5 Situationism Strikes Back
Based on the preceding argument, it may look as though interactionism can
fairly neatly counter the situationist threat to EVE. There is still more work
to be done though, as Kasperbauer develops a number of points in support of
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his situationist argument against EVE that require further consideration. In
particular, he makes an argument against interactionism that amplifies the
threat of his situationist assault. While he doesn’t discuss interactionism
explicitly, he does refer to the fact that psychologists have noted that
“personality traits and situational factors interact to contribute to behavior,”
and that this presents a counter-argument to situationism’s emphasis on
situations as the main drivers of behaviour (2014, p. 483, n. 41). Such a claim
clearly fits with the kind of interactionist argument I have just made in
response to situationism. Kasperbauer (2014, p. 483, n. 41) though thinks that,
while he agrees with this interactionist point, it also doesn’t affect his
argument for two reasons, which are that:
“(1) environmental virtue theory demands a relatively large correlation
between traits and behaviors, and (2) I am presenting other, independently
persuasive, evidence to suggest that pro-environmental behavior is
primarily due to situational factors.”
As a result, interactionism may not be able to save EVE after all. The evidence
that Kasperbauer cites and the arguments he builds on that evidence may
show that even if situationism has been supplanted by interactionism when it
comes to interpersonal character, it may still hold when it comes to
environmental behaviour and character.
My strategy for responding to this argument will be to first counter (1) by
showing that an interactionist EVE changes our view of the relationship
between traits and behaviours, and to then defuse the threat posed by the
evidence he refers to in (2) by showing why an interactionist approach to
environmental behaviours is superior to Kasperbauer’s situationist one.
Before diving into my own response though, I first want to touch on
Kawall’s (2018) response to Kasperbauer, which, to my knowledge, is the
only existing response to Kasperbauer in the EVE literature. Kawall (2018, p.
667) notes Kasperbauer’s citing of evidence illustrating the power of
situations to influence environmental behaviours, but suggests that “We
should question whether the individuals whose environmental behaviors are
so easily swayed by trivial circumstantial factors are in fact environmentally
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virtuous.” Further to this, he argues that most people have received
significantly less training in environmental virtues than in interpersonal
virtues, and he questions the environmental knowledge and commitments of
the participants in the studies Kasperbauer discusses (although Kawall does
not discuss these studies in any detail). Ultimately, he concludes that the
studies cited by Kasperbauer may not actually tell us anything interesting
about environmental virtues, as “We have good reason to expect
environmental virtue to be particularly rare,” given our comparative lack of
training in it compared to interpersonal virtues (Kawall 2018, p. 667).
Kawall’s argument is an interesting one, and his point about the lack of
environmental knowledge and training in environmental virtues highlights
the need for developing new ideas for moral education in relation to EVE,
which is an issue that I will return to in Section 5.6. In not offering specific
criticism of Kasperbauer’s evidence though, Kawall cedes too much ground
to situationism. We can do a better job of defending EVE by critiquing
Kasperbauer’s use of the evidence, and by taking an interactionist approach
instead, which will be the aim of the remainder of this section.

5.5.1 The Consistency Question
In order to answer (1), I’ll start by referring back to the arguments I made in
the previous section about the importance of personal factors as determinants
of behaviour. As I noted there, character traits are more important than
situationists like Kasperbauer make out, and we can see greater consistency
in character when aggregating across situations. As such, the relationship
between traits and behaviours is stronger than Kasperbauer suggests. I will
present a range of evidence for the importance of personal factors in proenvironmental behaviour in the next sub-section, but for now we can note that
the importance of character traits is a promising starting point for answering
(1).
In addition to this, interactionism also takes a different view about the
nature of traits and the relationship between person and situation to the one
Kasperbauer seems to endorse. As I noted in Section 5.4, interactionists
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emphasise the close ties between person and situation and the difficulty of
pulling them apart, making person and situation interdependent. As Alfano
and Skorburg (2019, p.442) note, for interactionism:
“traits are construed as dependent on the environment, context, or
situation. The dependence in question can be developmental: it may
be difficult or impossible to acquire a virtue absent certain contextual
supports or in the face of certain contextual impediments. The
dependence can be structural: it may be difficult or impossible to
manifest a virtue absent certain contextual supports or in the face of
certain contextual impediments. The dependence may even be constitutive: it may be difficult or impossible to have a virtue absent
certain contextual supports or in the face of certain contextual
impediments.”3
This view about traits and virtues being dependent on the environment
changes how we perceive Kasperbauer’s claim about the need for a close link
between traits and behaviours, and his criticism of the existence of such a
link. In considering traits in this way, we allow that situational factors can
play an important role in supporting traits, not just during initial stages of
development, but also as ongoing supports for maintaining those character
traits.
Overall then, for the interactionist, situations can support traits, and
thereby support the production of behaviours, and it is thus not a strongly
individualist view in which the trait is entirely sustained by internal features
of the agent. As discussed earlier, personal factors are more influential in
producing behaviour than Kasperbauer seems to suggest, but in allowing for
a broader view of traits, in which situational influences can support character,
we will see even more of a correlation between traits and behaviours.

3

As I argued in Chapter 2 though, interactionism is better off without constitutive claims.

The general point about traits being dependent on context and situation remains a crucial
one though, even if it isn’t taken as far as constitutive extension.
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Additionally, individuals can also act to better utilize situations to support
themselves, which I will discuss in more detail in Section 5.6.
A worry with this shift in our account of character traits is that it could be
taking us too far away from EVE. This view about traits might be fine for
interactionists, but it could be too different from the models of character and
virtue endorsed by EVE, and thus be unpalatable to EVE theorists.
Kasperbauer might therefore reply to my point by asserting that this different
view of traits could be an acceptable one, but that it is not the view endorsed
by EVE, and thus it is not capable of saving EVE from his challenge.
Fortunately for my purposes, there are existing interactionist elements in
the EVE literature, which highlight the compatibility of interactionism and
EVE. Cafaro (2015, p. 439) notes that when it comes to developing and
improving character, we need to take consideration of “all possible levels of
intervention—personal, familial, social and environmental.” Further, in
comparison to mainstream virtue ethics, he writes: “Because it is built around
the idea that environmental conditions can help or hinder human flourishing,
environmental virtue ethics starts off with a less heroic, individualistic
conception of virtue” (Cafaro 2015, p. 439). Due to this, Cafaro thinks that
EVE may even be able to help mainstream virtues ethics in responding to
situationism. While Cafaro doesn’t explicitly mention interactionism, his
emphasis on the important contributions that environment and context make
to virtue has a definite interactionist ring to it. We can thus see points of
overlap between EVE and interactionism, which gives me reason to think that
at least some EVE theorists would be happy accepting the interactionist
account of character I have been proposing. In doing so they can also help
better defend EVE against situationism.
EVE can thus accept the idea that context and situation play an important
role in character and virtue, just as situationists like Alfano and Skorburg
suggest. This changes our view about the “correlation between traits and
behaviors” that Kasperbauer mentions, as this interactionist account allows
for situational factors to play an important role in helping (rather than just
hindering) the development and sustenance of virtues. When coupled with the
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previously discussed evidence for the importance of personal factors, we have
an effective reply to (1), both because traits are stronger and more consistent
than Kasperbauer allows (I will also discuss more evidence specifically in
relation to pro-environmental behaviour and traits in the next sub-section),
and because EVE is compatible with the interactionist view that situational
factors can play a key role in supporting traits in the production of moral
behaviour.

5.5.2 Countering the Evidence for Situationism in Environmental
Behaviour
This brings us to (2), which is based on the evidence that Kasperbauer cites
that I discussed in Section 4.The key concern with this evidence is the
possibility that it might show that while interactionism may hold true for
interpersonal virtues, perhaps, when it comes to environmental behaviours,
situations are the primary drivers, and thus we should take a situationist view
rather than an interactionist one. This recalls Kawall’s point that I discussed
earlier about people having less training in environmental virtues than
interpersonal ones; given this is the case, perhaps it isn’t surprising for
situations to be more influential? Additionally, I have argued that an
interactionist approach to EVE can accept that situations play an important
role in determining behaviour, so again we might wonder if this evidence does
pose a significant threat.
While interactionism does recognize the role of situations, it does so as
part of a broader framework in which persons and interactions are also
crucial. It would thus be an issue if Kasperbauer’s evidence showed situations
to be dominant, as this would undermine my interactionist defense of EVE.
Kasperbauer seems to take the evidence to show just this. He argues that
because situational factors and “non-trait like psychological processes” are
the primary drivers of environmental behaviours, we “cannot rely on virtues
to produce pro-environmental behaviors,” and that “our expectations for
environmental virtue theory must be extremely low” (Kasperbauer 2014, p.
486). On the basis of these claims, he makes the strongly situationist
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conclusion that environmental ethics should shift its attention away from
virtues, and “focus instead on the role of situations” (Kasperbauer 2014, p.
486).
The good news is that there is a variety of evidence for the importance of
personal factors in influencing environmental behaviour, which helps to
counter Kasperbauer’s argument. For example, Steg and Vlek (2009)
surveyed a wide range of psychological evidence concerning environmental
behaviours with the intent of investigating the best ways to encourage proenvironmental behaviour. They note that a range of studies illustrate the
connections between moral and normative concerns and pro-environmental
behaviour. An example of this is that there is compelling evidence that
individuals who “subscribe to values beyond their immediate own interests,
that is, self-transcendent, prosocial, altruistic or biospheric values” have a
higher likelihood to engage in pro-environmental behaviours (Steg & Vlek
2009, p. 311). They also cite evidence showing that an individual’s level of
environmental concern is also connected to their actions in relation to the
environment. Crucially though, Steg and Vlek (2009, p. 312) also
acknowledge the importance of situational factors, and highlight the need to
understand “contextual factors, motivational factors, and the interaction
between them” in order to produce effective behavioural interventions aimed
at promoting pro-environmental behaviour. Steg and Vlek thus show, by
drawing on a range of evidence, firstly that personal factors matter and have
an important role to play, and secondly the importance of also consider
person-situation interactions, which fits perfectly with the interactionist
account I am advancing.
Similarly, a meta-analysis of 56 data sets spanning different countries by
Klöckner (2013) also highlighted the important role that personal factors,
such as intentions, habits, and personal norms, play in environmental
behaviour. Klöckner (2013, p. 1035) notes that people holding environmental
values and an ecological worldview, and who possess environmental
knowledge and an understanding of the impacts of their actions, are more
likely to feel a sense of moral obligation towards the environment, which can
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produce pro-environmental behaviour. Again though, Klöckner (2013, pp.
1035-1036) also highlights the role that social norms and expectations play
in pro-environmental behaviour, and suggests that a combination of both
improving oneself through habit change and self-efficacy, and enacting
contextual change to increase social support, is the best way to achieve
improvements in pro-environmental behaviour. Klöckner’s analysis thus also
supports an interactionist approach to environmental behaviour.
Another source of support comes from a study done by Brick and Lewis
(2016) on the effect of personality traits on environmentally positive
behaviour, with a particular focus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
They found that personality traits were important predictors of emissionsreducing behaviours, particularly the traits of Conscientiousness and
Openness. Again though, they also recognise the importance of situations,
writing that: “the effects of personality on behavior may be expressed
differently based on cultural and social context” (Brick and Lewis 2016, p.
653). Ultimately, they conclude strongly that both personal and situational
factors are important, again in line with my interactionist account: “Stable
individual differences and social influence processes are both important for
understanding and changing behaviors that affect the natural environment…
and core personality is a robust, reliable individual difference associated with
environmental behavior” (Brick and Lewis 2016, p. 654).
These studies are just some of those illustrating the importance of personal
factors in environmental behaviour, as a range of further studies also support
this claim.4 On the basis of this evidence, we can see that there is strong
support for the claim that personal factors and traits play an important role in
environmental behaviour. As I have noted throughout though, situational
factors are clearly important too, and Kasperbauer’s suggestions that we give
careful consideration to the ways in which situational factors influence us,
and to the ways in which we could use situations to our advantage, are good
4

For further evidence supporting both the importance of personal factors and the benefits

of an interactionist approach, see Pavalache-Ilie & Cazan 2018; Poškus 2018; Yu & Yu
2017; and Steg et al. 2014.
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ones. The key point though is that situational factors are not dominant or
primary in the way Kasperbauer claims. Personal factors are highly important
too, as are the various ways in which person and situation interact. As such,
we can reject (2), and should recognise that interactionism is the best
approach for understanding environmental behaviour and environmental
virtue. Further, as I discussed in 5.5.1, and as I will flesh out more in the next
section, interactionism and EVE are compatible approaches, making this
interactionist shift one that proponents of EVE can readily accept. Ultimately
then, I have shown that interactionism can protect EVE from situationism,
and that interactionist EVE is a superior approach to Kasperbauer’s
situationism for pursuing future work on environmental ethics and virtue.

5.6 Interactionism and EVE
Now that I have established how interactionism can save EVE from
situationism, I will turn to explore some further connections and points of
overlaps between interactionism and EVE in this section. In doing so, I will
firstly seek to highlight the compatibility of the two approaches, and the
appeal of an interactionist EVE. I will also consider some ways in which this
combination is mutually beneficial: how it can help us to increase our
awareness of the factors that can hinder pro-environmental behaviour, as well
the ways we can use this awareness to aid in developing and sustaining
character.

5.6.1 Connections between Interactionism and EVE
In Section 5.5.1 I discussed Cafaro’s account of environmental virtue as
recognizing the importance of situation and context, and his argument that
EVE thus doesn’t have a strongly individualist sense of virtue. I now want to
both expand on this, and to highlight some other EVE accounts that have
similar points of sympathy with interactionism. We’ll begin by looking at
Cafaro’s work more. Cafaro (2015, p. 440) argues that EVE situates virtue
and goodness within a broader social and environmental context; that our
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virtue should “contribute to the goodness of larger wholes,” and that our
individual achievement shouldn’t inhibit the flourishing of others, either
human or non-human. He cautions against a strongly individualist approach
to virtue that argues we can remain virtuous no matter what our social or
environmental contexts are, as such a view can lead to “heroic strivers” who
want to “cover the world in concrete to shore up an illusory self-importance”
(Cafaro 2015, p. 440). While EVE does recognise that an important element
of virtue is helping us to overcome external challenges, EVE theorists also
“accept that people’s virtues and achievements are not self-generated or selfperpetuated, but are partly produced by forces beyond their control (Cafaro
2015, p. 440). Cafaro thus places a strong emphasis on the dependence of
virtues on social and environmental context, which links up with similar
claims made by interactionists, like those discussed in Section 5.5.1.
Another good example of this overlap with interactionism is Kawall’s
(2018) discussion of EVE. He argues that: “EVE has much to gain from an
ongoing, deep engagement with social psychology, environmental
psychology, and related fields” (Kawall 2018, p. 672). One way EVE can
benefit from engagement with psychology is to develop a better
understanding of our own limitations; of the biases that causes us to make
poor choices, and of the situational factors that can lead us astray. Such
engagement can also aid us in improving our institutions to support for
environmental action, and to think about the social structures that are
conducive to virtue. As Kawall (2018, p. 673) writes: “We might also
consider ways in which social structures of various kinds (from networks of
friends to more formal institutions) can help to provide circumstances that
reinforce virtuous behavior.” In placing such emphasis on the importance of
contextual factors to environmental virtue, Kawall’s account further
highlights the points of sympathy between EVE and interactionism.
We can also see interactionist elements in Clowney’s (2014) work on
individual and collective environmental virtues. Clowney suggests that there
is a great deal of reciprocity between individual and collective virtues. Our
own environmental character traits, and the choices we make in response to
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the environment, can help to shape the groups and societies we belong to. In
turn, our societal and group engagements can influence our individual virtue:
“Our group character makes it harder or easier for group members to acquire
and act in accordance with particular virtues or vices” (Clowney 2014, p. 33).
As such, our context can play an important role in supporting our character,
but individuals can also take actions to shape these contextual forces, which
again meshes nicely with interactionism.
These examples illustrate the connections between interactionism and
EVE. Both approaches share a commitment to the importance of context for
not just acquiring virtue, but also for sustaining it over time. Additionally,
both EVE and interactionism, when highlighting the importance of context,
do not just mean social and political context, but also our broader
environmental and ecological contexts. This separates them from more
traditional approaches to virtue ethics, such as those in the Aristotelian
tradition. As Cafaro (2015, p. 440) discusses, Aristotle considered both
individual virtue, and its relationship to political policies and institutions, in
the Ethics and Politics respectively, and we can imagine that he “might have
written a third book on practical ethics, the Ecologics, discussing the proper
appreciation and management of flourishing ecosystems.” As Cafaro (2015,
p. 440) notes though, Aristotle did not write such a book, but the work of
contemporary EVE theorists can be seen as trying to achieve just such a
project. In highlighting the compatibility of interactionism and EVE, I hope
to have shown their suitability for the future pursuit of this project.

5.6.2 Building and Sustaining Character
Exploring the connections between interactionism and EVE can also
highlight new ideas for thinking about character development. As I have
discussed, interactionism recognises an important role for situational factors,
and some of these influences can be surprising and seemingly irrelevant, such
as the aforementioned situational non-reasons. One way that interactionism
can thus contribute to EVE is by providing more information on these kinds
of effects, so that they can be better recognised and responded to. For
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example, we could avoid situations or influences that tend to lead us astray,
or favour situations that are conducive to virtuous behaviour.
Not everything is about situations though, and this isn’t just a static process
of trying to accommodate fixed situational effects. As mentioned earlier,
interactionism emphasises that persons and situations influence each other in
ongoing feedback loops, so we can also think about the ways that we can take
action to improve and shape the situational forces we engage with. As Alfano
(2013, p. 80) writes, this involves a shift from just consuming situations, to
also producing them: “If we think of ourselves not only as situationconsumers but also as situation-producers, the power of situational influences
becomes a tool rather than a threat.” In addition to seeking out situations that
support our virtue, we could thus also aim at actively creating such situations.
In addition, we could think about this kind of expertise in understanding
and managing situations as an important skill, or perhaps even as its own kind
of virtue. Robertson (2018, p. 341) draws on the Confucian tradition and the
concept of li, or ritual, which he suggests involves both techniques for
manipulating situations to produce good behaviour, and that, further to this,
it can also be conceptualized as a virtue that “consists of facility with and
expertise in these situational manipulations.” It is important to note that, if
viewed as a virtue, we should avoid viewing this kind of situational expertise
as a global trait, and it would still need to be conceptualised in interactionist
terms.5 This general point about developing situational expertise though does
further illustrate the importance of thinking about the individual as an active
and intentional agent in the processes of moral behaviour, and not merely as
a puppet who is constantly manipulated by overwhelming situational
influences.
We can also see similar discussions about the reciprocal relationship
between developing virtue and developing situations in the EVE literature.
For example, Wensveen (2001, p. 232) argues that “ecosystem sustainability
5

Alfano (2013, p. 81) makes a similar point in response to Sarkissian’s (2010) related

argument about a Confucian virtue of situational control (de), noting that “like any other
global trait, de may not be common or even commonly acquirable.”
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is a necessary condition for the cultivation of a virtue,” and that because
“genuine virtue” should be concerned with supporting the conditions
necessary for virtue cultivation, genuine virtue should thus be concerned with
ecosystem sustainability. We can thus see a reciprocal feedback loop between
the virtuous agent and the environment, with both contributing to each other.
Both interactionism and EVE are thus interested in exploring these feedback
loops between agent and environment, and further investigation into the role
they can play in environmental virtue is an important area for future research.
Another area in which collaboration between EVE and interactionism
could prove beneficial is in helping use to think about specific environmental
virtues, and how we could develop them. Interactionism could draw on EVE
theory to develop interactionist accounts of various environmental virtues,
including both virtues focused on the environment (the previously mentioned
environmentally responsive virtues), and also the environmental dimensions
of more traditional virtues (environmentally justified or environmentally
productive virtues). For example, we could draw on Kawall’s (2003) account
of reverence for life as an environmental virtue, or Gambrel and Cafaro’s
(2010) account of the virtue of simplicity, and combine them with
interactionist moral psychology to give interactionist readings of those
environmental virtues. Similarly, we could take Bannon’s (2017) account of
friendship as a guiding ideal for environmental virtue, and connect it to
Alfano and Skorburg’s (2016) interactionist model of friendship. While
developing accounts of particular virtues like these is beyond the scope of the
present paper, it is an interesting area of inquiry for future research. Taken
together with the other examples of pursuing new ideas about character
development, as well as the earlier examples of overlap between
interactionism and EVE, we can see that future collaboration between
interactionists and environmental virtue ethicists holds much promise.

5.7 Conclusion
Interest in environmental virtue has increased considerably in the last few
decades, but EVE’s appeal as an approach to environmental ethics faces a
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strong challenge from situationism, as has been argued by Kasperbauer. I
began the paper by discussing some of the relevant background on both EVE
and situationism, and highlighted that EVE endorses some of the same ideas
and commitments as mainstream virtue ethics. After considering how
situationism challenges both virtue ethics in general, and EVE in particular, I
then introduced interactionism as an alternative approach to virtue, and
argued that it provides a better fit with the empirical evidence than
situationism. Situationism can thus be seen as overemphasising the
importance of situational factors, and as not properly recognising the role of
personal factors and person-situation interactions as determinants of
behaviour. I then argued that by positing an important role for personal
factors, and by connecting with existing elements in EVE theory,
interactionism is well positioned to counter the situationist challenge to EVE.
I considered Kasperbauer’s argument that the empirical evidence supported
situationism about environmental behaviour as an objection to my
interactionist strategy, before presenting a variety of empirical evidence to
counter Kasperbauer’s position, and to support my interactionist account.
Finally, I highlighted some further points of overlap between interactionism
and EVE, and presented some ideas on how they could be mutually informing
on matters such as character development. This paper has thus shown firstly
that EVE can overcome the situationist challenge and that virtue remains an
important consideration for environmental ethics, and secondly that a
specifically interactionist approach to environmental virtue is highly
appealing, and should be a fruitful avenue of future research.

184

References
Alfano, M 2013, Character as Moral Fiction, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Alfano, M 2014, ‘What are the Bearers of Virtues?’, in H Sarkissian & JC
Wright (eds.), Advances

in

Experimental

Moral

Psychology,

Bloomsbury Academic, London, pp. 73-90.
Alfano, M & Skorburg, JA 2016, ‘The Embedded and Extended Character
Hypotheses’, in J Kiverstein (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of
Philosophy of the Social Mind, Routledge, London, pp. 465-478
Alfano, M & Skorburg, JA 2019, ‘Psychological Science and Virtue
Epistemology: Intelligence as an Interactionist Virtue’, in H Battaly
(ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, Routledge,
New York, pp. 433-445.
Bannon, BE 2017, ‘Being a Friend to Nature: Environmental Virtues and
Ethical Ideals’, Ethics, Policy & Environment, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 4458.
Brick, C & Lewis, GJ 2016, ‘Unearthing the “Green” Personality: Core Traits
Predict Environmentally Friendly Behavior’, Environment and
Behavior, vol. 48, no. 5, pp. 635-668.
Cafaro, P 2004, Thoreau’s Living Ethics: Walden and the Pursuit of Virtue,
University of Georgia Press, Athens, GA.
Cafaro, P 2010, ‘Environmental Virtue Ethics Special Issue: Introduction’,
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, vol. 23, no. 1/2,
pp. 3-7.
Cafaro, P 2015, ‘Environmental Virtue Ethics’, in L Besser-Jones & M Slote
(eds.), The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics, Routledge, New
York, pp. 427-444.

185

Clowney, D 2014, ‘Collective Environmental Virtue’, Environmental Values,
vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 315-333.
Darley, JM & Latane, B 1968, ‘Bystander Intervention in Emergencies:
Diffusion of

Responsibility’, Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 377-383.
Donnerstein, E & Wilson, DW 1976, ‘Effects of Noise and Perceived Control
on Ongoing and Subsequent Aggressive Behaviour’, Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 774-781.
Doris, JM 1998, ‘Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics’, Nous, vol. 32, no.
4, pp. 504-530.
Doris, JM 2002, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behaviour,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Doris, JM & Stitch, SP 2005, ‘As a Matter of Fact: Empirical Perspectives on
Ethics’, in F

Jackson & M Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of

Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford

University Press, Oxford, pp.

114-152.
Epstein, S 1983, ‘Aggregation and Beyond: Some Basic Issues on the
Prediction of Behavior’, Journal of Personality, vol. 51, no. 3, pp.
360-392.
Flanagan, O 1991, Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological
Realism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Gambrel, J & Cafaro, P 2010, ‘The Virtue of Simplicity’, Journal of
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, vol. 23, no. 1/2, pp. 85-108.
Harman, G 1999, ‘Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics
and the Fundamental Attribution Error’, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, vol. 99, no. 3, pp. 315-331.
Hill, Thomas 1983, ‘Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural
Environments’, Environmental Ethics, vol. 5, pp. 211-224.

186

Hines, JM, Hungerford, HR & Tomera, AN 1987, ‘Analysis and Synthesis of
Research on Responsible Environmental Behavior’, Journal of
Environmental Education, vol. 18, pp. 1-8.
Jayawickreme, E, Meindl, P, Helzer, EG, Furr, RM & Fleeson, W 2014,
‘Virtuous States and Virtuous Traits: How the Empirical Evidence
Regarding the Existence of Broad Traits Saves Virtue Ethics
from the Situationist Critique’, Theory and Research in Education,
vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 283-308.
Kamtekar, R 2004, ‘Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our
Character’, Ethics, vol. 114, no. 3, pp. 458-491.
Kasperbauer, TJ 2014, ‘Behaviorally Inadequate: A Situationist Critique of
Environmental Virtues’, Environmental Ethics, vol. 36, no. 4, pp.
471-487.
Kawall, J 2003, ‘Reverence for Life as a Viable Environmental Virtue’,
Environmental Ethics, vol. 25, pp. 339-358.
Kawall, J 2018, ‘Environmental Virtue Ethics’, in NE Snow (ed.), The Oxford
Handbook of Virtue, Oxford University Press, New York.
Klöckner, CA 2013, ‘A Comprehensive Model of Environmental Behaviour
– A Meta-Analysis’, Global Environmental Change, vol. 23, no. 5,
pp. 1028-1038.
Kristjansson, K 2008, ‘An Aristotelian Critique of Situationism’, Philosophy,
vol. 83, no. 323, pp. 55-76.
Latane, B & Darley, JM 1970, The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn’t He
Help?, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
Matthews, KE & Cannon, LK 1975, ‘Environmental Noise Level as a
Determinant of Helping Behaviour’, Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 571-577.

187

Mehl, MR, Bollich, KL, Doris, JM, & Vazire, S 2015, ‘Character and
Coherence: Testing the Stability of Naturalistically Observed
Daily Moral Behavior’, in CB Miller, RM Furr, A Knobel, & W
Fleeson (Eds.), Character: New Directions from Philosophy,
Psychology, and Theology, Oxford University Press, New York,
pp. 630-651.
Milgram S 1974, Obedience to Authority, Harper and Row, New York.
Miller, CB 2003, ‘Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics’, The Journal of
Ethics, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 365-392.
Mischel, W 2009, ‘From Personality and Assessment (1968) to Personality
Science, 2009’, Journal of Research in Personality, vol. 43, no. 2, pp.
282-290.
Pavalache-Ilie, M & Cazan, AM 2018, ‘Personality Correlates of ProEnvironmental Attitudes’, International Journal of Environmental
Health Research, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 71-78.
Poškus, MS 2018, ‘Personality and Pro-Environmental Behaviour’, Journal
of Epidemiology and Community Health, vol. 72, no. 11, pp. 969970.
Raush, HL, Dittmann, AT and Taylor, TJ 1959, ‘Person, Setting, and Change
in Social Interaction’, Human Relations, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 361-378.
Richard, FD, Bond Jr., CF & Stokes-Zoota, JJ 2003, ‘One Hundred Years of
Social Psychology Quantitatively Described’, Review of General
Psychology, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 331-363.
Robertson, S 2018, ‘Power, Situation, and Character: A Confucian-Inspired
Response to Indirect Situationist Critiques’, Ethical Theory and
Moral Practice, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 341-358.
Sandler, RL 2007, Character and Environment: A Virtue-Oriented Approach
to Environmental Ethics, Columbia University Press, New York.

188

Schultz, PW, Nolan, JM, Cialdini, RB, Goldstein, NJ & Griskevicius, V 2007,
‘The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social
Norms’, Psychological Science, vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 429-434.
Shaw, B 2005, ‘A Virtue Ethics Approach to Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic’, in
R Sandler & P Cafaro (eds.), Environmental Virtue Ethics, Rowman
& Littlefield, New York, pp. 93-

106.

Skorburg, JA 2017, ‘Lessons and New Directions for Extended Cognition
from Social and Personality Psychology’, Philosophical Psychology,
vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 458-480.
Skorburg, JA 2019, ‘Where are virtues?’, Philosophical Studies, vol. 176, no.
9, pp. 2331-2349.
Steg, L & Vlek, C 2009, ‘Encouraging Pro-Environmental Behaviour: An
Integrative

Review

and

Research

Agenda’,

Journal

of

Environmental Psychology, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 309- 317.
Steg, L, Bolderdijk, JW, Keizer, K & Perlaviciute, G 2014, ‘An Integrated
Framework for Encouraging Pro-Environmental Behaviour: The role
of values, situational factors, and goals’, Journal of Environmental
Psychology, vol. 38, pp. 104-115.
Wensveen, LK 2000, Dirty Virtues: The Emergence of Ecological Virtue
Ethics, Prometheus, Amherst, NY.
Wensveen, LK 2001, ‘Ecosystem Sustainability as a Criterion for Genuine
Virtue’, Environmental Ethics, vol. 23, pp. 227-241.
Yu, TY & Yu, TK 2017, ‘The Moderating Effect of Students’ Personality
Traits on Pro-Environmental Behavioral Intentions in Relation to
Climate Change’, International Journal of Environmental Research
and Public Health, vol. 14, no. 12, p. 1472.
Zhong, C-B, Bohns, N & Gino, F 2010, ‘Good Lamps are the Best Police:
Darkness Increases

Dishonesty and Self-Interested Behaviour’,

Psychological Science, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 311-314.

189

General Conclusion
In this short concluding chapter I will aim to bring together the main ideas
and arguments of the thesis, and consider some implications and
possibilities for future research. I’ll begin by summarising the main
conclusions drawn from the thesis research, and by illustrating how the
thesis has achieved its aims and central research goal. I’ll then discuss some
possibilities for extending the research done in this thesis, by further
developing interactionism’s moral psychology, and by investigating its
normative dimensions. Following this, I will present some other potential
implications of my thesis work, and some future research directions that
interactionist theory could take.

I. Main Conclusions of the Thesis
I began this thesis with the intention to investigate interactionism’s potential
as an account of moral character, and with the goal of developing and
advancing the interactionist position in philosophy. In support of this goal, I
specified three main aims: to further the development of philosophical
interactionism; to refine the interactionist position and defend it from
objections; and to explore the implications of interactionism for other topics.
In pursuit of these aims, I set out in Chapter 1 to develop a clear central
framework for an interactionist approach to character. I drew on both
philosophy and psychology to synthesise the key claims of interactionism,
and to thereby establish the theoretical foundation on which to build the rest
of the thesis research. I also highlighted recent trends in the area to
demonstrate that not everyone is an interactionist, before arguing in favour
of interactionism over some rival approaches.
Chapter 1 provided a starting point for the rest of the thesis project: an
account of the moral psychology of character that does justice to the
empirical evidence, and which enjoys a number of advantages over rival
virtue ethical and situationist approaches. Like any theory though,
interactionism is open to objections, which Chapters 2 and 3 then focused
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on addressing. In these chapters I aimed to build on the core framework
established in Chapter 1, introducing new details about interactionism, and
considering counter-arguments both metaphysical and methodological. In
showing how interactionism can evade the Causal-Constitutive Fallacy
objection, Chapter 2 helped to refine my account of interactionism, and
defended it against a concerning metaphysical issue. Chapter 3 continued
this trend of defending interactionism, but this time from issues relating to
the replication crisis in psychology, which potentially threatened to
undermine my interactionist position. In showing why this objection did not
stick, and why interactionism remains the best fit with the empirical
evidence even in light of the replication crisis, Chapter 3 played an
important role in defending the core approach of the thesis, and thereby
contributed to my second research aim.
If the arguments up to this point have been compelling, then I have
shown interactionism to be an appealing approach to the moral psychology
of character that has a number of advantages over its rivals, and illustrated
how it can overcome potential objections to stand as a robust and appealing
framework. With such an approach in hand, I then set about considering its
implications in other areas, to see if the framework could be put to work in
making useful contributions to other debates and topics. Chapter 4
considered the application of the situationist challenge to perfectionist
theories of well-being, and argued that an interactionist perfectionism could
overcome this threat. Similarly, Chapter 5 evaluated the challenge posed to
environmental virtue ethics by situationism, and countered this argument by
way of interactionism. In these chapters, I drew on the core framework
established at the outset of the thesis and refined in subsequent chapters, in
order to demonstrate the broader relevance of interactionism, and to
illustrate how my research can inform other areas of inquiry.
As a thesis by compilation, each of the papers included in this thesis were
developed to be freestanding, and to pursue their own topics and arguments.
Viewed as a whole though, I think that the thesis presents a clear
progression between developing a core account, refining and defending that
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account, and then applying and extending that account. While each of the
papers can stand on its own, they all contribute towards the pursuit of my
three main research aims. Furthermore, the chapters also build on one
another, with the later chapters drawing on and extending the ideas
presented in the earlier ones. In this way, all the papers featured in thesis
work in unison towards my central goal of furthering the development of
interactionism in philosophy. In developing an interactionist account,
answering objections, and showing new applications of this account, I hope
to have illustrated interactionism’s appeal and power as a framework for
approaching research on character; one that is perhaps the best option for
future research in the area.

II. The Further Development of Interactionism
Now that I have brought together the main conclusions of the thesis, I want
to consider some possibilities for future research on interactionism, which
could build on the work done in this thesis. A first point to note is that
interactionism could benefit from future collaborative work between
philosophers and psychologists. In Chapter 3 I discussed the advantages of
engagement and collaboration between the two disciplines, and noted some
examples of recent interdisciplinary work on moral character. Future work
could aim to continue in this trend, with interactionist philosophers and
psychologists collaborating on both empirical and theoretical work. This
could allow for the gathering of new evidence, and the formulation of new
ideas to further develop interactionism’s moral psychology.
Another avenue for future research is developing interactionist models of
individual virtues. Alfano and Skorburg (2019) have done work along these
lines in their account of intelligence as an interactionist virtue. Future
research could aim to develop similar interactionist accounts for other
virtues, both moral and intellectual. Doing so would add detail to
interactionism’s framework, and have the potential to inform a range of
further ethical topics. It could also point to other avenues for collaboration
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between philosophy and psychology, as new empirical work could be
undertaken to investigate the target virtue in detail.
A promising example for this kind of work would be developing an
interactionist account of heroism, as there has been some interesting recent
research that could inform such an endeavour. In their study of heroism,
Walker, Frimer and Dunlop (2010, p. 907) write that: “exemplary moral
functioning can take multifarious forms and arises from different sources,
reflecting divergent person x situation interactions.” Similarly,
Jayawickreme and Di Stefano (2012, p. 165) take an interactionist approach
to heroism, and argue that it is driven by a “complex interplay of factors –
including traits, situations, and communal beliefs.” Future research could
build on this psychological work to produce a philosophical account of
interactionist heroism.
There is also interesting work to be done in developing interactionism’s
normative dimensions, and considering its implications for other aspects of
ethical theory. For example, I have previously mentioned that
interactionism’s claim that character and virtue are multiply realisable raises
interesting normative questions. As noted in Chapter 2, Alfano (2014)
discusses how this claim raises questions about whether some means of
achieving virtue are morally preferable to others. For example, if my trait of
courage is primarily sustained by personal factors, while another agent’s
trait of courage is reliant on social and environmental supports, we might
wonder if I am more deserving of praise. We thus may want to specify that
an agent’s personal factors must meet a minimum threshold of contribution
for a trait to count as virtuous. As Alfano (2014, pp. 85-86) writes:
“Furthermore, the framework allows for the plausible idea that there is a
kind of asymmetry among the relata that bear virtues. Someone ’s
personality can only be so weak before we are no longer inclined to call
him…virtuous, even if that weakness is counteracted by great social and
asocial strengths.” Conversely, we might think there is something
praiseworthy about an agent overcoming personal weaknesses through
skillfully selecting situations conducive to virtue, and by attempting to
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cultivate social and environmental conditions (insofar as they are able) to
support their character traits. Such questions could serve to direct future
work in interactionist theory.
I have also previously mentioned that interactionism, like situationism,
raises new questions about moral luck. While this has received some
attention in the literature, such as Doris’ (2002) discussion of circumstantial
luck, and more recent work by Herdova and Kearns (2015), the implications
of psychological evidence for moral luck have not been explored in great
detail. In particular, investigating the specific implications of interactionism
for moral luck is an area in need of further exploration. Similarly, Doris
(2002) also considers the connections between situationism and moral
responsibility. A range of other authors have also explored the implications
of psychological evidence for responsibility, including Ciurria (2013),
Sartorio (2018), Levy (2017), and Piovarchy (2020). Again though, there is
work to be done in unpacking the implications of interactionism for moral
responsibility, which would also help to flesh out the normative dimensions
of the framework. Examples such as the ones discussed in this section point
to the range of ways in which future research could build on the work done
in this thesis.

III. Implications and Future Directions
In addition to these means of furthering the development of interactionism’s
core descriptive and normative aspects, there is also profitable research to
be done exploring its implications for a range of other topics. Some such
implications have already been investigated in this thesis, namely the
implications for the connections between virtue and well-being, and for
environmental virtue ethics. Hopefully this work will have illustrated the
rich potential of interactionism for contributing to other areas of inquiry. I
will now sketch some further examples of possible future directions for
interactionist work that was beyond the scope of this thesis to address fully,
but which nevertheless hold promise for future research.
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One example of such a line of research is using interactionism as a
framework for exploring the connections between narrative and virtue.
Interest in narrative in philosophy has grown significantly in recent years,
but there has also been longstanding interest in both narrative in general,
and the moral dimensions of narratives in particular. A range of authors,
including Nussbaum (1990), Johnson (1993), Rorty (1989), and Goldie
(2000), have argued in support of the important role that narrative can play
in character and moral development. Johnson (1993, p. 197), for example,
writes that our engagements with narratives can “develop our perception of
character, of what is important in a given situation, and of the subtly
interwoven threads of our moral entanglements.”
Interactionism could contribute to this tradition through its moral
psychological resources, and by considering how narrative might fit within
its framework. We could investigate basic questions, such as: can narratives
play a role in character development?; can they support virtue over time?;
and can they contribute to developing an agent’s moral perception and
situation sensitivity? We could also investigate some of the more specific
and particular contributions that interactionism could make; for example,
could empirical evidence about the ways in which agents and situations
interact be incorporated into our strategies for using narratives in moral
education? Along these lines, Engelen et al. (2018) have proposed a strategy
for moral education that involves combining narratives about moral
exemplars with ‘nudge’ strategies, and this work could fit nicely within an
interactionist framework. Relatedly, Berger and Alfano (2016, p. 154) argue
in support of an interactionist approach to art, in which art could be used to
educate about both the morally relevant features of a situation, and the
“drivers of behavior that are morally and socially irrelevant.” There is thus
valuable research to be done in investigating how narratives can fit into an
interactionist approach to character, and also how interactionism can
contribute to work on narrative.
As I suggested earlier in the thesis, there is also more to be gained from
exploring the connections between interactionism and E cognition. Chapter
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2 presented my argument that interactionism evades the C-C Fallacy, but
this does not mean I think the philosophy of mind has nothing to offer the
interactionist. E cognition approaches, like interactionism, emphasise agentenvironment interactions, and thus have many points of sympathy and
overlap. More recently, some proponents of E cognition have explored the
implications of their accounts in ways that line up nicely with
interactionism. For example, Colombetti and Torrance (2008, p. 517,
emphasis in original) propose an enactivist approach to ethics, and write that
“an important focus for ethical appraisal is the interaction between people.”
Similarly, Jayawickreme and Chemero (2008, p. 118) draw on ecological
psychology to propose an account of the “moral analogues of affordances,”
in which there are tight connections between agent and environment, and
between virtue and situation, in the perception of possibilities for moral
behaviour. Future research could aim to explore these connections,
investigating both what E cognition can contribute to interactionism, and
what interactionism can contribute to E cognition.
Interactionism also has implications for a range of other areas, including
political philosophy, legal theory, and other areas of applied ethics such as
bioethics, business ethics, and military ethics. I will not attempt to develop
these connections here, but I hope that the examples in this section have
illustrated interactionism’s potential to future work in a variety of
philosophical areas.

IV. Conclusion
In pursuing this thesis, my main hope was to make a worthwhile
contribution to the interactionist project in philosophy. In my view,
interactionism holds great potential as an approach to character, but, despite
some notable exceptions, has not yet received the attention it deserves in the
philosophical literature. I have tried to help remedy this somewhat, by
developing interactionism’s core framework, defending it from objections,
and applying it to new areas. Ultimately, it is my contention that
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interactionism provides us with an appealing way of approaching the moral
psychology of character, and its emphasis on context and agent-environment
interactions gives us a rich framework for moral character that can
contribute to a range of other topics and areas of inquiry. Hopefully, the
work presented in this thesis will have helped contribute to the development
of interactionism, and more broadly to our understanding of virtue and
moral psychology.
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